Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Analysis', 'The Handbook [Encheiridion]' and 'Frege on Apriority (with ps)'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis aims at the structure of facts, which are needed to give a rationale to analysis [Urmson, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Urmson explains the direction of analysis as 'towards a structure...more nearly similar to the structure of the fact', adding that this metaphysical picture is needed as a 'rationale of the practice of analysis'.
     From: report of J.O. Urmson (Philosophical Analysis [1956], p.24-5) by Jonathan Schaffer - On What Grounds What n30
     A reaction: In other words, only realists can be truly motivated to keep going with analysis. Merely analysing language-games is doable, but hardly exciting.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge]
     Full Idea: Geometrical concepts appear to depend in some way on a spatial ability. Although one can translate geometrical propositions into algebraic ones and produce equivalent models, the meaning of the propositions seems to me to be thereby lost.
     From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Apriority (with ps) [2000], 4)
     A reaction: I think this is a widely held view nowadays. Giaquinto has a book on it. A successful model of something can't replace it. Set theory can't replace arithmetic.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge]
     Full Idea: In the Peano axiomatisation, arithmetic seems primitively to involve the thought that 0 is a number.
     From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Apriority (with ps) [2000], 5)
     A reaction: Burge is pointing this out as a problem for Frege, for whom only the logic is primitive.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge]
     Full Idea: Whereas Leibniz and Frege predicate apriority primarily of truths (or more fundamentally, proofs of truths), Kant predicates apriority primarily of cognition and the employment of representations.
     From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Apriority (with ps) [2000], 1)
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: The will of nature may be learned from those things in which we do not differ from one another.
     From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 26)
     A reaction: There you go! This is the rule for anthropologists on field trips. And it guides us towards a core of essential human nature. But it neglects the way that nature is expressed in different cultures, which is also important.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: The injunction of Epictetus is well known, that in commiserating with another for his misfortune, we ought to talk consolingly, but not be moved by pity.
     From: report of Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], §16) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §15.1
     A reaction: This goes strongly against the grain of the Christian tradition, but strikes me as an appealing attitude (even if I am the sufferer).
If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: When you see someone weeping is sorrow …do not shrink from sympathising with him, and even groaning with him, but be careful not to groan inwardly too.
     From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 16)
     A reaction: The point is that the person's suffering is an 'indifferent' because nothing can be done about it, and we should only really care about what we are able to choose. He is not opposed to the man's suffering, or his need for support.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: The governor Agrippinus would try to persuade those whom he sentenced that it was proper for them to be sentenced, …just as the physician persuades a patient to accept their treatment.
     From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 22)
     A reaction: This resembles the Contractualism of T.H. Scanlon (that actions are good if you can justify them to those involved). It may be possible to persuade people by the use of sophistry and lies. Nevertheless, a fairly civilise proposal.