6 ideas
21943 | Since Kant, self-criticism has been part of philosophy [Gutting] |
Full Idea: Philosophy after Kant has involved a continuing critique of its own project. | |
From: Gary Gutting (Foucault: a very short introduction [2005], 6) | |
A reaction: I'm struck by many modern philosophers in the analytic tradition who write as if Kant had never existed. I don't know if that is a conscious decision, but it may be a good one. |
13750 | Analysis aims at the structure of facts, which are needed to give a rationale to analysis [Urmson, by Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Urmson explains the direction of analysis as 'towards a structure...more nearly similar to the structure of the fact', adding that this metaphysical picture is needed as a 'rationale of the practice of analysis'. | |
From: report of J.O. Urmson (Philosophical Analysis [1956], p.24-5) by Jonathan Schaffer - On What Grounds What n30 | |
A reaction: In other words, only realists can be truly motivated to keep going with analysis. Merely analysing language-games is doable, but hardly exciting. |
21944 | Structuralism describes human phenomena in terms of unconscious structures [Gutting] |
Full Idea: Structuralism in the 1960s was a set of theories which explained human phenomena in terms of underlying unconscious structures, rather than the lived experience described by Phenomenology. | |
From: Gary Gutting (Foucault: a very short introduction [2005], 6) | |
A reaction: Hence the interest in Freud and Marx, and Foucault's interest in history, each offering to unmask what is hidden in consciousness. The unmasking is a basically Kantian project. Cf. Frege's hatred of 'psychologism'. |
12129 | 'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn] |
Full Idea: 'Truth' may, like 'proof', be a term with only intra-theoretic applications. | |
From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970], §5) | |
A reaction: I think we can blame Tarski (via Quine, Kuhn's teacher) for this one. I take it to be an utter failure to grasp the meaning of the word 'truth' (and sneakily substituting 'satisfaction' for it). For a start, we have to compare theories on some basis. |
6809 | Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird] |
Full Idea: Kuhn later came to accept that there are five values to which scientists in all paradigms adhere: accuracy; consistency with accepted theories; broad scope; simplicity; and fruitfulness. | |
From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.8 | |
A reaction: To shake off the relativism for which Kuhn is notorious, we should begin by asking the question WHY scientists favoured these particular values, rather than (say) bizarreness, consistency with Lewis Carroll, or alliteration. (They are epistemic virtues). |
12128 | In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn] |
Full Idea: In transitions between theories words change their meanings or applicability. Though most of the signs are used before and after a revolution - force, mass, cell - the ways they attach to nature has changed. Successive theories are thus incommensurable. | |
From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970], §6) | |
A reaction: A very nice statement of the view, from the horse's mouth. A great deal of recent philosophy has been implicitly concerned with meeting Kuhn's challenge, by providing an account of reference that doesn't have such problems. |