Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logical Pluralism', 'The World as Will and Idea' and 'Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


101 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 027)
     A reaction: I think what draws people to philosophy is an interest in whatever is timeless. Contingent reality is so frustrating and exhausting. Hence I agree.
Everyone is conscious of all philosophical truths, but philosophers bring them to conceptual awareness [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Every person is conscious of all philosophical truths, but to bring them to conceptual awareness, to reflection, is the business of the philosopher.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.68)
     A reaction: I like this. All human beings are philosophical. It seems unlikely, though, that we are all pre-conceptually conscious of the higher levels of philosophical logic.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Absurdity is incongruity between correct and false points of view [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: The more correct the subsumption of objects from one point of view, and the greater and more glaring the incongruity from another point of view, the greater is the ludicrous effect which is produced by this contrast.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 013), quoted by Roger Scruton - Laughter §5
     A reaction: This accounts for ludicrous humour, but there seem to be plenty of other types. Exceptional stupidity is usually amusing without necessarily being incongruous. Though it is a departure from the sensible norm.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics must understand the world thoroughly, as a principal source of knowledge [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: The task of metaphysics is not to pass over experience in which the world exists, but to understand it thoroughly, since inner and outer experience are certainly the principal source of all knowledge.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 428), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will'
     A reaction: I wonder to what extent he meant ordinary experience, and to what extent he was advocating the study if science?
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: Dialetheism is the view that some truths have true negations.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 7.4)
     A reaction: The important thing to remember is that they are truths. Thus 'Are you feeling happy?' might be answered 'Yes and no'.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: The truthmaker thesis is that an object is a truthmaker for a sentence if and only if its existence entails the sentence.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.5.3)
     A reaction: The use of the word 'object' here is even odder than usual, and invites many questions. And the 'only if' seems peculiar, since all sorts of things can make a sentence true. 'There is someone in the house' for example.
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
(∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: The inference of 'distribution' (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically. It is straightforward to construct a 'stage' at which the LHS is true but the RHS is not.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 6.1.2)
     A reaction: This seems to parallel the iterative notion in set theory, that you must construct your hierarchy. All part of the general 'constructivist' approach to things. Is some kind of mad platonism the only alternative?
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 5. Relevant Logic
Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: Relevant logic endorses excluded middle, ..but says instances of the law may fail. Bv¬B is true in every situation that settles the matter of B. It is necessary that there is some such situation.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.2)
     A reaction: See next idea for the unusual view of necessity on which this rests. It seems easier to assert something about all situations than just about 'some' situation.
It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: The argument from P to A is 'relevantly' valid if and only if, for every situation in which each premise in P is true, so is A.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.2)
     A reaction: I like the idea that proper inference should have an element of relevance to it. A falsehood may allow all sorts of things, without actually implying them. 'Situations' sound promising here.
Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: We have not abandoned classical logic in our acceptance of relevant logic.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.4)
     A reaction: It appears that classical logic is straightforwardly accepted, but there is a difference of opinion over when it is applicable.
Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: Relevant consequence says the conclusion of a relevantly invalid argument is not 'carried in' the premises - it does not follow from the premises.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.3.3)
     A reaction: I find this appealing. It need not invalidate classical logic. It is just a tougher criterion which is introduced when you want to do 'proper' reasoning, instead of just playing games with formal systems.
A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: We could reject the inference from A to itself (on grounds of circularity).
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 8)
     A reaction: [Martin-Meyer System] 'It's raining today'. 'Are you implying that it is raining today?' 'No, I'm SAYING it's raining today'. Logicians don't seem to understand the word 'implication'. Logic should capture how we reason. Nice proposal.
Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: Some relevant logics reject transitivity, but we defend the classical view.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 8)
     A reaction: [they cite Neil Tennant for this view] To reject transitivity (A?B ? B?C ? A?C) certainly seems a long way from classical logic. But in everyday inference Tennant's idea seems good. The first premise may be irrelevant to the final conclusion.
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: A logic is 'free' to the degree it refrains from existential import of its singular and general terms. Classical logic must have non-empty domain, and each name must denote in the domain.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 7.1)
     A reaction: My intuition is that logic should have no ontology at all, so I like the sound of 'free' logic. We can't say 'Pegasus does not exist', and then reason about Pegasus just like any other horse.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: Nowadays we think of the consequence relation itself as the primary subject of logic, and view logical truths as degenerate instances of this relation. Logical truths follow from any set of assumptions, or from no assumptions at all.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.2)
     A reaction: This seems exactly right; the alternative is the study of necessities, but that may not involve logic.
Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: According to the Peripatetics (Aristotelians), only syllogistic laws stated in variables belong to logic, and not their applications to concrete terms.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.5)
     A reaction: [from Lukasiewicz] Seems wrong. I take it there are logical relations between concrete things, and the variables are merely used to describe these relations. Variables lack the internal powers to drive logical necessities. Variables lack essence!
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: Through much of the 20th century the conception of logic was inherited from Frege and Russell, as knowledge of a body of logical truths, as arithmetic or geometry was a knowledge of truths. This is odd, and a historical anomaly.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.2)
     A reaction: Interesting. I have always taken this idea to be false. I presume logic has minimal subject matter and truths, and preferably none at all.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: Logic does not study formal languages for their own sake, which is formal grammar. Logic evaluates arguments, and primarily considers formal languages as interpreted.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.1)
     A reaction: Hodges seems to think logic just studies formal languages. The current idea strikes me as a much more sensible view.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics if anything is.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 4.2.1)
     A reaction: This is an interesting contrast to the claim of logicism, that mathematics reduces to logic. This idea explains why students of logic are surprised to find themselves involved in mathematics.
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: We are pluralists about logical consequence because we take there to be a number of different consequence relations, each reflecting different precisifications of the pre-theoretic notion of deductive logical consequence.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 8)
     A reaction: I don't see how you avoid the slippery slope that leads to daft logical rules like Prior's 'tonk' (from which you can infer anything you like). I say that nature imposes logical conquence on us - but don't ask me to prove it.
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: The sentence X follows logically from the sentences of the class K if and only if every model of the class K is also a model of the sentence X.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 3.2)
     A reaction: This why the symbol |= is often referred to as 'models'.
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: If mathematical truth reduces to logical truth then it is important what counts as logically true, …but if logicism is not a going concern, then the body of purely logical truths will be less interesting.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.2)
     A reaction: Logicism would only be one motivation for pursuing logical truths. Maybe my new 'Necessitism' will derive the Peano Axioms from broad necessary truths, rather than from logic.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / d. The Preface paradox
Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: The Paradox of the Preface is an apology, that you are committed to each proposition in the book, but admit that collectively they probably contain a mistake. There is a contradiction, of affirming and denying the conjunction of propositions.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.4)
     A reaction: This seems similar to the Lottery Paradox - its inverse perhaps. Affirm all and then deny one, or deny all and then affirm one?
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which only exist relatively, and for each other [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: In my system matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which exist only for each other, and so exist only relatively.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I.Supp)
     A reaction: A plausible picture, but built from dualist presuppositions. Personally I think intellect is built out of matter, so I am not going down Schopenhauer's road.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence of anything, if I see no reason for believing it.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.205)
     A reaction: This may just be a reasonable application of Ockham's Razor, but I fear that Berkeley painted himself into corner by demanding too many 'reasons' for everything.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
I know that nothing inconsistent can exist [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: I know that nothing inconsistent can exist.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.224)
     A reaction: Fine, but the problem is to assess with confidence what is inconsistent. Human imagination seems to be the test for existence. But what else can we do?
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Schopenhauer, unlike other idealists, says reality is irrational [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
     Full Idea: Schopenhauer radically departs from his fellow idealists in his assertion of the irrational character of reality.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4
     A reaction: This is the rejection of the original confidence about rationality of the stoics. And yet Schopenauer saw the principle of sufficient reason as axiomatic. Not sure how to reconcile those. Lewis identifies this idea as 'Romantic'.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The knowing subject and the crude matter of the world are both in themselves unknowable [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: The world has two poles - the knowing subject and crude matter, which are both completely unknowable, the former because it is the knower, the latter because without form and quality it cannot be perceived.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp)
     A reaction: A nice concept, that all of reality comes from their relationship, but the two components are intrinsically unknowable. Does God the Knower know his own mind?
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.257)
     A reaction: A nice clear statement of idealism. Why is he so confident of making this assertion. Note the addition, though, of 'in a strict' sense. He is presenting an epistemological claim as if it was an ontological one.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: In relevant logic, the necessary truths are not those which are true in every situation; rather, they are those for which it is necessary that there is a situation making them true.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.2)
     A reaction: This seems to rest on the truthmaker view of such things, which I find quite attractive (despite Merricks's assault). Always ask what is making some truth necessary. This leads you to essences.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: A thing is shown to be impossible when a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas comprehended in its definition.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.214)
     A reaction: The problem is always that imagination is needed to see the 'repugnancy', and that is relative and limited.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Descartes found the true beginning of philosophy with the Cogito, in the consciousness of the individual [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: By taking Cogito Ergo Sum as the only certainty, and by his provisionally regarding the existence of the world as problematical, the essential starting point of all philosophy was found, and its true focus in the subjective, the individual consciousness.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp)
     A reaction: Some people think this was a disaster, not a triumph. Descartes could have doubted himself and accepted the world as his starting point.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: As our ideas are perpetually varied, without any change in the supposed real things, it necessarily follows that they cannot all be true copies of them.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.239)
     A reaction: This seems a good objection to any direct or naïve realist view. Colours get darker as the sun goes down, and objects become blurred as they recede into the distance.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: Either you perceive the being of matter immediately, or mediately; if immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive it; if mediately, let me know by what reasonings it is inferred from those things which you perceive immediately.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.208)
     A reaction: A problem for strong empiricists, and he is right that existence can't be directly perceived, but it seems a good explanation (for which some reason can be shown), and supports a more rationalist view.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: Sensible things are nothing else but so many sensible qualities.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.154)
     A reaction: As it stands this is phenomenalism, but Berkeley eventually votes for idealism. He should acknowledge possible sensations which aren't actually experienced.
Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer]
     Full Idea: Berkeley did not (as we are commonly told) deny the reality of material things. ..What Berkeley discovered was that material things must be defined in terms of sense-contents.
     From: report of George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by A.J. Ayer - Language,Truth and Logic Ch.2
     A reaction: This seems to be a rather debatable attempt to claim that Berkeley was a phenomenalist (like Ayer), rather than an idealist. Try ideas 3942, 3944, 3945, 3957, 3959 in this database.
Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley]
     Full Idea: The considerations which make it necessary, as Berkeley saw, to give a phenomenalist account of material things, make it necessary also, as Berkeley did not see, to give a phenomenalist account of the self.
     From: comment on George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by A.J. Ayer - Language,Truth and Logic Ch.7
     A reaction: Phenomenalism involves 'possible' experiences as well as actual ones. That could add up to quite a rich and stable account of the self, as opposed to Hume's notorious introspection, which only saw an actual shifting 'bundle' of experience.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Schopenhauer can't use force/energy instead of 'will', because he is not a materialist [Lewis,PB on Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Some say Schopenhauer would be less misunderstood if he had used 'force' or 'energy' rather than 'will' to characterise inner natures. But this would have steered his idealism towards materialism, of which he was an avowed opponent.
     From: comment on Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4
     A reaction: I presume therefore that Nietzsche's will to power is a commitment to materialism, since it occurs in material objects as well as minds.
The world only exists in relation to something else, as an idea of the one who conceives it [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: The world which surrounds man exists only as idea - that is, only in relation to something else, the one who conceives the idea, which is himself. If any truth can be enunciated a priori, it is this.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 001)
     A reaction: Yes, but the idea we have is of a real world. It is definitely not part of the idea that it is an idea (unlike my idea for a Christmas present).
We know reality because we know our own bodies and actions [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: The double knowledge of the nature and action of our own body is the key to the inner being of every phenomenon in nature.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 105), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4
     A reaction: Lewis calls this 'the heart of his philosophy'. Bodily awareness comes from acts of willing. So Lewis says 'the thing-in-itself is revealed to us in willing'. We experience Being and causation. Is he trying to combine idealism with the thing-in-itself?
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Kant's greatest merit is the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing-in-itself.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 417 App), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: This is Schopenhauer firmly opposing the Absolute Idealism of Kant's successors, who dismissed the 'thing-in-itsef'.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell on Berkeley]
     Full Idea: Berkeley thinks 'to be is to be perceived', and only God provides continuity. He has simply confused the experience of perception with the thing being perceived. Ideas have content.
     From: comment on George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by Bertrand Russell - Problems of Philosophy
For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: Berkeley's thesis is that reality ultimately consists of a community of minds and their ideas; one of the minds (God) is infinite, and causes most of the ideas.
     From: report of George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
     A reaction: I think Russell nicely pinpoints what is wrong with Berekely, which is that he confuses ideas with their contents. If I think about my garden, the garden is real (probably), which is the content, and they idea is just a way of thinking.
Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.172)
     A reaction: But we distinguish between subjective time (which flies when you are having fun), and objective time, judged from observation of clocks and nature.
There is no such thing as 'material substance' [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: That there is no such thing as what philosophers call 'material substance', I am seriously persuaded.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.150)
     A reaction: I'm sorry, but I can't do with this. It confuses epistemology with ontology. Ontology is a matter of judgement; epistemology is the evidence on which we base it. We know sensations; personally I judge that there are material substances. What about you?
I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: I may conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, but that is all. And this is far from proving that I can conceive it existing out of the minds of all spirits.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.184)
     A reaction: If Berkeley has based a world view on this point, then his mistake is to require a 'proof'. Aristotle explained why you can't prove everything (not to mention Gödel).
There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: I challenge you to show me that thing in nature which needs matter to explain or account for it.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.212)
     A reaction: I disagree. Physics is a good theory for explaining why we have perceptions. Failing that there is not even a glimmer of an explanation of our experiences.
Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: Wood, fire, water, flesh, iron, are things that I know, and only known because I perceive them by my senses; these are immediately perceived, and so are ideas; ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence consists therefore in being perceived.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.220)
     A reaction: This makes no distinction between an idea and its content. Berkeley fails to grasp the weird concept of intentionality. Trees aren't in my head, just because I think about them!
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: Sensible qualities are by philosophers divided into primary and secondary; the former are extension, figure, solidity, gravity, motion and rest, which exist really in bodies.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.169)
     A reaction: A crucial distinction, which anti-realists such as Berkeley end up denying. I think it is a good distinction, and philosophers should fight to preserve it.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: A mite must be supposed to see his own foot as a body of some considerable dimension, though they appear to you scarcely discernible.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.170)
     A reaction: Berkeley is confused. Hot is secondary, but temperature is primary. Bigness is secondary, size primay. Midgets and tall people don't disagree over the size of a table.
The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: As we approach to or recede from an object, the visible extension varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred times greater than at another; doth it not follow that it is not really inherent in the object?
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.171)
     A reaction: Berkeley is confused, because he is too literally empirical. Qualities are not self-evidently primary or secondary, but are judged so after comparisons (e.g. with testimony, or with the other senses).
'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: By 'solidity' either you do not mean any sensible quality, and so it is beside our enquiry; or if you do, it must be hardness or resistance, which are plainly relative to our senses.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.173)
     A reaction: Berkeley fails to recognise that a quality can have primary and secondary aspects (hot/high temperature). He is right that primary qualities are not directly perceived. They are judgements.
Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: Distance is not properly and immediately perceived by sight.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.186)
     A reaction: Interestingly, if secondary qualities are not strictly perceptions of the object, and primary qualities are not directly perceived, then we don't seem to perceive anything at all. Perhaps we should drop the concept of 'perception'?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: Those immediate objects of perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.237)
     A reaction: If that is a judgement, which it seems to be, it is a strange one. Realists offer a much better explanation of perceptions.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Direct feeling of the senses are merely data; perception of the world comes with understanding causes [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: What the eye, the ear, or the hand feels, is not perception, it is merely data. Only when the understanding passes from the effect to the cause does the world lie before us as perception extended in space.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 004)
     A reaction: These certainly seems to be a sense-data theory. Philosophers are much more ready to separate the data from the understanding than neuroscientists are.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
All perception is intellectual [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: All perception is intellectual.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 004)
     A reaction: Even in slugs? I suspect that this is a tautology. Schopenhauer will only allow my vision or hearing to become 'perception' when an intellectual element enters into it.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: The difference between real things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a dream, is that the latter are faint and indistinct.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.225)
     A reaction: In Hume this becomes 'impressions' and 'ideas'. It does raise the question of WHY some ideas are not as faint as others.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: Figures and extension, being originally perceived by sense, do not belong to pure intellect.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.176)
     A reaction: Is the square root of 169 less 'pure' in my mind if I learn it from laying out bricks instead of by thinking about numbers? Confusion of how you learn with what you learn?
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed. [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: We might perceive all things just as we do now, though there was no matter in the world.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.209)
     A reaction: An old Greek argument. Now we have an explanation of experience, but we wouldn't if nothing existed. Which doesn't prove that anything exists. Is some explanation always preferable to none? Cf. religion.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of water, in an intermediate state; will not the water seem cold to one hand, and warm to the other?
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], I p.158)
     A reaction: A nice clear example of how some relativism must be acknowledged. It feels hot, but what is its temperature in degrees C?
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: It is plain that other minds have an existence exterior to my mind, since I find them by experience to be independent of it.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.220)
     A reaction: This is a surprising claim from Berkeley. If trees only exist through their experience in my mind, why don't other minds exist in the same way?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: A consciousness without an object is no consciousness.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp)
     A reaction: This hints at Hume's observations about the self. Certainly totally vacant consciousness seems inconceivable, but is that a necessary or a contingent truth?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
We have hidden and unadmitted desires and fears, suppressed because of vanity [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: We often do not know what we desire or fear. For years we can have a desire without admitting it to ourselves ....because the intellect is not to know anything about it, since the good opinion we have of ourselves would inevitably suffer thereby.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 210), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 5 'Will'
     A reaction: The idea of unconscious thought crept up well before Freud. It is in La Rochefoucauld, and important in Nietzsche. Neuroscience seems to give it a strong priority over the conscious mind, which is a revolutionary idea.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: My body is the only object of which I know not merely the one side, that of the representation, but also the other, that is called 'will'.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 125), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will'
     A reaction: I'm not convinced that knowledge of the body through the will (and action, presumably) constitutes a different sort of knowledge. Philosophers are always trying to split the world in two (but not Nietzsche!).
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
It is as perverse to resent our individuality being replaced by others, as to resent the body renewing itself [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: It is as perverse to desire the continuity of one's individuality which is being replaced by other individuals, as to desire the permanence of the body's substance which is always being replaced by new substance.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.54)
     A reaction: If I let that go, what am I supposed to hang on to? Nothing? Non-existence is not an attractive condition to aspire to.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
We all regard ourselves a priori as free, but see from experience that character and motive compel us [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Everyone regards himself a priori as free in his individual actions, and only a posteriori sees that necessarily his actions follow from the coincidence of character with motives.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.55)
     A reaction: I'm not sure what experience shows. Necessity seems more obvious when observing other people. Samuel Johnson said experience showed freedom, not necessity.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Man's actions are not free, because they follow strictly from impact of motive on character [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Man's action have been interpreted as free, which they are not, for every individual action follows with strict necessity from the impact of motive on character.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 023)
     A reaction: If 'character is fate' (Heraclitus) then presumably motive must also be fate to complete the determinist picture. I shall spend the next year redesigning my motivation.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought?
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.203)
     A reaction: Presumably, though, he thinks that thought can cause 'that which is unthinking' to move'. He likes one half of the interaction problem (which supports dualism), but avoids the other half.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: All judgement, for Kant, is essentially the predication of some property to some subject.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.5)
     A reaction: Presumably the denial of a predicate could be a judgement, or the affirmation of ambiguous predicates?
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell on Berkeley]
     Full Idea: Berkeley seems to have confused the colour of the thing apprehended with the act of apprehension; probably either of these would have been called an 'idea' be Berkeley.
     From: comment on George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by Bertrand Russell - Problems of Philosophy
     A reaction: If we are saying that Berkeley's error was entirely verbal, there is a chicken-and-egg problem. He was an idealist, so he wouldn't have thought that there were two separate concepts behind the word 'idea'. Russell merely asserts that there are.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: Situation semantics is a variation of the truth-conditional approach, taking the salient unit of analysis not to be the possible world, or some complete consistent index, but rather the more modest 'situation'.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.5.4)
     A reaction: When I read Davidson (and implicitly Frege) this is what I always assumed was meant. The idea that worlds are meant has crept in to give truth conditions for modal statements. Hence situation semantics must cover modality.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: Our talk of propositions expresses commitment to the general notion of content, without a commitment to any particular way of spelling this out.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.1)
     A reaction: As a fan of propositions I like this. It leaves open the question of whether the content belongs to the mind or the language. Animals entertain propositions, say I.
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 018)
     A reaction: The word 'act' seems to beg the question (as does 'true'!). I am no longer sure that I know what an act of will is. Hobbes says there is no such thing.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Schopenhauer was caught in Christian ideals, because he didn't deify his 'will' [Nietzsche on Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Schopenhauer's interpretation of the in-itself as will was an essential step: but he didn't know how to deify the will, and remained caught in the moral, Christian ideal
     From: comment on Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Writings from Late Notebooks 9[42]
     A reaction: Intriguingly, this seems to suggest that Nietzsche consciously sought to replace the absence of God with the human will, which strikes me as an odd, and very nineteenth century, idea. Loss of religion bothered them a lot.
Only the will is thing-in-itself, seen both in blind nature and in human action [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Only the will is thing-in-itself. ...It appears in every blindly acting force of nature, and also in the deliberate conduct of man, and the great difference between the two concerns only the degree of the manifestation.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 110), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will'
     A reaction: If will acts 'blindly' in forces of nature, then these seems to be the same concept as Nietzsche's 'will to power'. This seems to be heading towards Heidegger's Dasein, as a central and distinctive mode of being.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: If, as all philosophers imagine, the intellect is our actual nature and the will is arrived at through knowledge, then only the motive from which we imagined we were acting would decide our moral worth. Imagined and true motive would be indistinguishable.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II Supp)
     A reaction: A nice argument. If motive is morally decisive, it is certainly crucial to decide between real and imagined motive (especially since Freud). But uncontrollable motive seems morally irrelevant.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Schopenhauer is a chief proponent of aesthetic experience as 'disinterested' [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
     Full Idea: Schopenhauer belongs to a tradition which equates aesthetic experience with a 'disinterested' attitude towards its object, and is often cited as one of the chief proponents of such a view.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Aesthetic'
     A reaction: 'Disinterested' is quite a nice word for one's attitude to art, though you then have to capture why you are also involved in it.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
A principal pleasure of the beautiful is that it momentarily silences the will [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: The momentary silencing of all volition …is one of the principal elements in our pleasure in the beautiful.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.65)
     A reaction: Iris Murdoch sees moral value in beauty, because it overrides selfishness. The perception of beauty is certainly something deeper than just another nice feeling. There is a cognitive element to it.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
The Sublime fights for will-less knowing, when faced with a beautiful threat to humanity [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
     Full Idea: Exaltation of the Sublime is the struggle to maintain will-less knowing in the face of a threat to the human will. The Sublime contains an awful beauty and a delightful terror because it includes a threat to human existence.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 201-7) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 5
     A reaction: Can you experience the Sublime when looking down a microscope? Can a mere theory in cosmology be sublime? Can a supposed perception of the Sublime ever be incorrect? We no longer worry about these questions, it seems.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Schopenhauer emphasises Ideas in art, unlike most romantics [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
     Full Idea: The emphasis on the presentation of Platonic Ideas distinguishes Schopenhauer's theory of art from standard Romantic theories, which emphasize the expression of emotion and feeling.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 5
     A reaction: Theories of art that neglect ideas, even if subliminally expressed, have gone badly wrong.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
The will-less contemplation of art brings a liberation from selfhood [Schopenhauer, by Gardner]
     Full Idea: For Schopenhauer, the point of art lies in the metaphysical liberation from selfhood that will-less aesthetic contemplation induces.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Sebastian Gardner - Aesthetics 3.6.3
     A reaction: I've never understood why anyone (Buddhists included) would want 'liberation from selfhood'. Certainly art can make us forget ourselves in a more objective view of things, but science can do that too.
Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], III 41)
     A reaction: A bit of a shock, because it implies human vanity, but it fits the best works of art rather well. What else reveals humanity's beauty? Beautiful deeds must be recorded.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: Sin or moral turpitude doth not consist in the outward physical action or motion, but in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.227)
     A reaction: A Kantian view (that the only good thing is a good will). It is a very empiricist (and anti-Greek) view to deny that actions have any intrinsic value.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Nothing else can be stated as the aim of our existence except the knowledge that it would be better for us not to exist.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 605), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 8 'Denial'
     A reaction: Nonsense on stilts. Nietzsche rebelled against this. If there is such 'knowledge' then it obviously has nothing to do with the aim of our existence. It is just a rejection of aims. The aim is making the best of existence, not spurning it.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: We should be just as foolish to expect that our moral systems and ethics would create virtuous, noble and hold men, as that our aesthetics would produce poets, painterd and musicians.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 271), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
     A reaction: Presumably the aim of ethical theory is to understand the truths about ethics. That can't do any harm, can it? In every other area of life we think that understanding leads to improvement. Unless, of course, there are no truths of ethics....
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.65)
     A reaction: A nice way of stating the core of moral relativism. To me, though, it just seems a rejection of morality. Conflicting wills bring moral paralysis. Might is right.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Schopenhauer, by Scruton]
     Full Idea: Since for Schopenhauer will has no intrinsic end, but breaks through all its temporary fulfilments and casts them aside as irrelevant once attained, it becomes impossible to assert that there is any ultimate aim to human activity.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.13
     A reaction: This sums up part of the modern anti-teleological view of life, with its notion of purposes which can only arise out of consciousnesses. Such a view leaves untouched the key question, which is "What should I will?"
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Perhaps no one at the end of his life, if he gives the matter sober consideration and is, at the same time, frank, ever wishes to live it over again; he more readily chooses non-existence.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.59)
     A reaction: Hence Nietzsche's doctrine of 'eternal return' (Gay Science §341, idea 2936). From Schopenhauer it is just bleak pessimism, but from Nietzsche it is a wonderful challenge to live, perhaps the best ever.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: If we observe an altruistic action the simplest explanation and the essential character of the person's conduct is that they make less distinction than is usually made between themselves and others.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66)
     A reaction: Obvious, really, but Schopenhauer is talking about the will. Is the effacement of the Self desirable, apart from the benefit it might bring to other people. I don't find it appealing.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: A theory of morals which motivates can only do so by working on self-love, but what springs from this latter has no moral worth.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66)
     A reaction: I just don't believe this pessimism. Schopenhauer was an incipient social darwinist who needed a course in modern game theory. Or he just needed to be a nicer man.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: We are fortunate if we keep up the game whereby desire passes into satisfaction, and satisfaction into new desire - if the pace of this is swift, it is called happiness, and if it is slow, sorrow.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 029)
     A reaction: This seems to be the dream of the addict, as Socrates points out with his example of the leaky jar in 'Gorgias'. Should we want more desires?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: So long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given up to the throng of desires with its constant hopes and fears, so long as we are the subject of willing, we never attain lasting happiness or peace.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 196), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Aesthetic'
     A reaction: I hate this idea. It obviously leads to his Buddhism, and the eastern idea that life is generally a bad idea and to be avoided. I think Nietzsche rebelled strongly against this attitude of Schopenhauer's.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue must spring from an intuitive recognition that other people are essentially like us [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Virtue must spring from that intuitive knowledge which recognises in the individuality of others the same essence as in our own.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66)
     A reaction: After all his pessimism, he arrives at a view similar to Hume's, that morality is built on natural empathy. But why built a moral theory on one base. Everything points us towards morality! Moral actions are more beautiful.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
The essence of nature is the will to life itself [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: The essence of nature is the will to life itself.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.60)
     A reaction: How would he have responded to Darwin? The will to life is the product, there, of a different and more remote force, such as the 'energy' of the physicist (whatever that is!).
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: I immediately and necessarily conclude the being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.198)
     A reaction: Daft. This contradicts Berkeley's whole empiricist position, that existence depends on known experience. Who knows whether God is thinking about trees?
There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: From the dependency I find in myself and my ideas, I do by an act of reason necessarily infer the existence of a God.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.222)
     A reaction: No. Hume answered this, by showing how big abstract ideas are built up from experience. This is a future bishop's wish-fulfilment.
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: Divines and philosophers have proved beyond all controversy, from the beauty and usefulness of the several parts of creation, that it was the workmanship of God.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.198)
     A reaction: Not convincing. Beauty is probably a sublimation of sexual desire (or an echo of the human mind in the external world, in music), and utility is relative to homo sapiens, I presume.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christianity is a pessimistic religion, in which the world is equated with evil [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Let no one think that Christianity is conducive to optimism; on the contrary, in the Gospels 'world' and 'evil' are used almost synonymously.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.59)
     A reaction: The source of Nietzsche's 'Beyond Good and Evil'. Do any religions throw you vigorously back into the middle of life, with its conflict and creativity?
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: All systems of religion are the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.63)
     A reaction: Is this a compliment? It seems to be, because at least the mysteries are identified and given an outward form. A nice thought.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: Thinking rational beings, in the production of motions, have the use of limited powers, ultimately derived from God, but immediately under the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their own actions.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.228)
     A reaction: An episcopal evasion. A classic attempt to have cake and eat it. Either God is in charge or he isn't.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: If sin doth not consist of purely physical actions, the making God a cause of all such actions, is not making him the author of sin.
     From: George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.227)
     A reaction: An equivocation. If responsibility resides in consciousness, God is presumably conscious, and we can judge the events he causes.