20 ideas
19395 | Philosophy is sanctified, because it flows from God [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is sanctified by having its streams flow from the fountain of God's attributes. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A General Principle to Explain Laws of Nature [1687], p.69) |
10017 | Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes] |
Full Idea: Truth in a model is interesting because it provides a transparent and mathematically tractable model - in the 'ordinary' rather than formal sense of the term 'model' - of the less tractable notion of truth. | |
From: Harold Hodes (Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic [1984], p.131) | |
A reaction: This is an important warning to those who wish to build their entire account of truth on Tarski's rigorously formal account of the term. Personally I think we should start by deciding whether 'true' can refer to the mental state of a dog. I say it can. |
10018 | Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes] |
Full Idea: There is an enormous difference between the truth of sentences in the interpreted language of set theory and truth in some model for the disinterpreted skeleton of that language. | |
From: Harold Hodes (Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic [1984], p.132) | |
A reaction: This is a warning to me, because I thought truth and semantics only entered theories at the stage of 'interpretation'. I must go back and get the hang of 'skeletal' truth, which sounds rather charming. [He refers to set theory, not to logic.] |
10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: 'Equivocation' is when the terms do not mean the same thing in the premises and in the conclusion. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Consequence [2005], Intro) |
10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Logic is purely formal either when it is invariant under permutation of object (Tarski), or when it has totally abstracted away from all contents, or it is the constitutive norms for thought. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Consequence [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The third account sounds rather woolly, and the second one sounds like a tricky operation, but the first one sounds clear and decisive, so I vote for Tarski. |
10015 | Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes] |
Full Idea: Brand higher-order logic as unintelligible if you will, but don't conflate it with set theory. | |
From: Harold Hodes (Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic [1984], p.131) | |
A reaction: [he gives Boolos 1975 as a further reference] This is simply a corrective, because the conflation of second-order logic with set theory is an idea floating around in the literature. |
10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Technical work on logical consequence has either focused on proofs, where validity is the existence of a proof of the conclusions from the premises, or on models, which focus on the absence of counterexamples. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Consequence [2005], 3) |
10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Two different views of logical consequence are necessary truth-preservation (based on modelling possible worlds; favoured by Realists), or truth-preservation based on the meanings of the logical vocabulary (differing in various models; for Anti-Realists). | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Consequence [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: Thus Dummett prefers the second view, because the law of excluded middle is optional. My instincts are with the first one. |
10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: A logical step is a 'material consequence' and not a formal one, if we need the contents as well as the structure or form. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Consequence [2005], 2) |
10011 | Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes] |
Full Idea: Identity should he considered a logical notion only because it is the tip of a second-order iceberg - a level 1 relation with a pure second-order definition. | |
From: Harold Hodes (Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic [1984]) |
10016 | When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes] |
Full Idea: A model is created when a language is 'interpreted', by assigning non-logical terms to objects in a set, according to a 'true-in' relation, but we must bear in mind that this 'interpretation' does not associate anything like Fregean senses with terms. | |
From: Harold Hodes (Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic [1984], p.131) | |
A reaction: This seems like a key point (also made by Hofweber) that formal accounts of numbers, as required by logic, will not give an adequate account of the semantics of number-terms in natural languages. |
10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: If a conclusion follows from an empty collection of premises, it is true by logic alone, and is a 'logical truth' (sometimes a 'tautology'), or, in the proof-centred approach, 'theorems'. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Consequence [2005], 4) | |
A reaction: These truths are written as following from the empty set Φ. They are just implications derived from the axioms and the rules. |
10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Models are abstract mathematical structures that provide possible interpretations for each of the non-logical primitives in a formal language. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Consequence [2005], 3) |
10027 | Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes] |
Full Idea: I take the view that (agreeing with Aristotle) mathematics only requires the notion of a potential infinity, ...and that mathematics is higher-order modal logic. | |
From: Harold Hodes (Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic [1984]) | |
A reaction: Modern 'modal' accounts of mathematics I take to be heirs of 'if-thenism', which seems to have been Russell's development of Frege's original logicism. I'm beginning to think it is right. But what is the subject-matter of arithmetic? |
10026 | Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes] |
Full Idea: Arithmetic should be able to face boldly the dreadful chance that in the actual world there are only finitely many objects. | |
From: Harold Hodes (Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic [1984], p.148) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a basic requirement for any account of arithmetic, but it was famously a difficulty for early logicism, evaded by making the existence of an infinity of objects into an axiom of the system. |
10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: There are many proof-systems, the main being Hilbert proofs (with simple rules and complex axioms), or natural deduction systems (with few axioms and many rules, and the rules constitute the meaning of the connectives). | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Consequence [2005], 3) |
10021 | It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes] |
Full Idea: The mathematical object-theorist says a number is an object that represents a cardinality quantifier, with the representation relation as the entire essence of the nature of such objects as cardinal numbers like 4. | |
From: Harold Hodes (Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic [1984]) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This a classic case of a theory beginning to look dubious once you spell it our precisely. The obvious thought is to make do with the numerical quantifiers, and dispense with the objects. Do other quantifiers need objects to support them? |
10022 | Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes] |
Full Idea: The dogmatic Frege is more right than wrong in denying that numerical terms can stand for numerical quantifiers, for there cannot be a language in which object-quantifiers and objects are simultaneously viewed as level zero. | |
From: Harold Hodes (Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic [1984], p.142) | |
A reaction: Subtle. We see why Frege goes on to say that numbers are level zero (i.e. they are objects). We are free, it seems, to rewrite sentences containing number terms to suit whatever logical form appeals. Numbers are just quantifiers? |
10023 | Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes] |
Full Idea: Talk about mirror images is a sort of fictional discourse. Statements 'about' such fictions are not made true or false by our whims; rather they 'encode' facts about the things reflected in mirrors. | |
From: Harold Hodes (Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic [1984], p.146) | |
A reaction: Hodes's proposal for how we should view abstract objects (c.f. Frege and Dummett on 'the equator'). The facts involved are concrete, but Hodes is offering 'encoding fictionalism' as a linguistic account of such abstractions. He applies it to numbers. |
19394 | Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Equality may be considered as an infinitely small inequality, and we may make inequality approach equality as much as we wish. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (A General Principle to Explain Laws of Nature [1687], p.67) | |
A reaction: An interesting response to David Lewis's brusque dismissal of the problem of identity, as all-or-nothing...end of story. |