49 ideas
19648 | Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The central notion of philosophy since Kant is 'correlation' - that we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux's charge is that philosophy has thereby completely failed to grasp the scientific revolution, which has used mathematics to make objectivity possible. Quine and Putnam would be good examples of what he has in mind. |
19674 | The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The Copernican Revolution is not so much the decentring of observers in the solar system, but (by the mathematizing of nature) the decentring of thought relative to the world within the process of knowledge. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 5) | |
A reaction: In other words, I take it, the Copernican Revolution was the discovery of objectivity. That is a very nice addition to my History of Ideas collection. |
19657 | In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The major shift that has occurred in the conception of thought from Kant's time to ours is from the unknowability of the thing-in-itself to its unthinkability. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux is making the case that philosophy is alienating us more and more from the triumphant realism of the scientific revolution. He says thinking has split from being. He's right. Modern American pragmatists are the worst (not Peirce!). |
19675 | Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Ever since Kant, to think science as a philosopher has been to claim that science harbours a meaning other than the one delivered by science itself. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 5) | |
A reaction: The point is that science discovered objectivity (via the mathematising of nature), and Kant utterly rejected objectivity, by enmeshing the human mind in every possible scientific claim. This makes Meillassoux and I very cross. |
19649 | Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Since Kant, objectivity is no longer defined with reference to the object in itself, but rather with reference to the possible universality of an objective statement. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux disapproves of this, as a betrayal by philosophers of the scientific revolution, which gave us true objectivity (e.g. about how the world was before humanity). |
19666 | If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: So long as we continue to believe that there is a reason why things are the way they are rather than some other way, we will construe this world is a mystery, since no such reason will every be vouchsafed to us. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Giving up sufficient reason sounds like a rather drastic response to this. Put it like this: Will we ever be able to explain absolutely everything? No. So will the world always be a little mysterious to us? Yes, obviously. Is that a problem? No! |
19656 | Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The principle of non-contradiction itself is without reason, and consequently it can only be the norm for what is thinkable by us, rather than for what is possible in the absolute sense. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: This is not Meillassoux's view, but describes the modern heresy of 'correlationism', which ties all assessments of how reality is to our capacity to think about it. Personally I take logical non-contradiction to derive from non-contradiction in nature. |
13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Dialetheism is the view that some truths have true negations. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 7.4) | |
A reaction: The important thing to remember is that they are truths. Thus 'Are you feeling happy?' might be answered 'Yes and no'. |
13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: The truthmaker thesis is that an object is a truthmaker for a sentence if and only if its existence entails the sentence. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.5.3) | |
A reaction: The use of the word 'object' here is even odder than usual, and invites many questions. And the 'only if' seems peculiar, since all sorts of things can make a sentence true. 'There is someone in the house' for example. |
13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: The inference of 'distribution' (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically. It is straightforward to construct a 'stage' at which the LHS is true but the RHS is not. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 6.1.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to parallel the iterative notion in set theory, that you must construct your hierarchy. All part of the general 'constructivist' approach to things. Is some kind of mad platonism the only alternative? |
13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Relevant logic endorses excluded middle, ..but says instances of the law may fail. Bv¬B is true in every situation that settles the matter of B. It is necessary that there is some such situation. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.2) | |
A reaction: See next idea for the unusual view of necessity on which this rests. It seems easier to assert something about all situations than just about 'some' situation. |
13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: The argument from P to A is 'relevantly' valid if and only if, for every situation in which each premise in P is true, so is A. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.2) | |
A reaction: I like the idea that proper inference should have an element of relevance to it. A falsehood may allow all sorts of things, without actually implying them. 'Situations' sound promising here. |
13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Relevant consequence says the conclusion of a relevantly invalid argument is not 'carried in' the premises - it does not follow from the premises. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.3.3) | |
A reaction: I find this appealing. It need not invalidate classical logic. It is just a tougher criterion which is introduced when you want to do 'proper' reasoning, instead of just playing games with formal systems. |
13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: We have not abandoned classical logic in our acceptance of relevant logic. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.4) | |
A reaction: It appears that classical logic is straightforwardly accepted, but there is a difference of opinion over when it is applicable. |
13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: We could reject the inference from A to itself (on grounds of circularity). | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 8) | |
A reaction: [Martin-Meyer System] 'It's raining today'. 'Are you implying that it is raining today?' 'No, I'm SAYING it's raining today'. Logicians don't seem to understand the word 'implication'. Logic should capture how we reason. Nice proposal. |
13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Some relevant logics reject transitivity, but we defend the classical view. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 8) | |
A reaction: [they cite Neil Tennant for this view] To reject transitivity (A?B ? B?C ? A?C) certainly seems a long way from classical logic. But in everyday inference Tennant's idea seems good. The first premise may be irrelevant to the final conclusion. |
13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: A logic is 'free' to the degree it refrains from existential import of its singular and general terms. Classical logic must have non-empty domain, and each name must denote in the domain. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 7.1) | |
A reaction: My intuition is that logic should have no ontology at all, so I like the sound of 'free' logic. We can't say 'Pegasus does not exist', and then reason about Pegasus just like any other horse. |
19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: For contemporary logicians, it is not non-contradiction that provides the criterion for what is thinkable, but rather inconsistency. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: The point is that para-consistent logic might permit isolated contradictions (as true) within a system, but it is only contradiction across the system (inconsistencies) which make the system untenable. |
19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Paraconsistent logics were only developed in order to prevent computers, such as expert medical systems, from deducing anything whatsoever from contradictory data, because of the principle of 'ex falso quodlibet'. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) |
19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Paraconsistent logics are only ever dealing with contradictions inherent in statements about the world, never with the real contradictions in the world. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: Thank goodness for that! I can accept that someone in a doorway is both in the room and not in the room, but not that they are existing in a real state of contradiction. I fear that a few daft people embrace the logic as confirming contradictory reality. |
13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Nowadays we think of the consequence relation itself as the primary subject of logic, and view logical truths as degenerate instances of this relation. Logical truths follow from any set of assumptions, or from no assumptions at all. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.2) | |
A reaction: This seems exactly right; the alternative is the study of necessities, but that may not involve logic. |
13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: According to the Peripatetics (Aristotelians), only syllogistic laws stated in variables belong to logic, and not their applications to concrete terms. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.5) | |
A reaction: [from Lukasiewicz] Seems wrong. I take it there are logical relations between concrete things, and the variables are merely used to describe these relations. Variables lack the internal powers to drive logical necessities. Variables lack essence! |
13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Through much of the 20th century the conception of logic was inherited from Frege and Russell, as knowledge of a body of logical truths, as arithmetic or geometry was a knowledge of truths. This is odd, and a historical anomaly. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Interesting. I have always taken this idea to be false. I presume logic has minimal subject matter and truths, and preferably none at all. |
13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Logic does not study formal languages for their own sake, which is formal grammar. Logic evaluates arguments, and primarily considers formal languages as interpreted. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Hodges seems to think logic just studies formal languages. The current idea strikes me as a much more sensible view. |
13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics if anything is. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 4.2.1) | |
A reaction: This is an interesting contrast to the claim of logicism, that mathematics reduces to logic. This idea explains why students of logic are surprised to find themselves involved in mathematics. |
13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: We are pluralists about logical consequence because we take there to be a number of different consequence relations, each reflecting different precisifications of the pre-theoretic notion of deductive logical consequence. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 8) | |
A reaction: I don't see how you avoid the slippery slope that leads to daft logical rules like Prior's 'tonk' (from which you can infer anything you like). I say that nature imposes logical conquence on us - but don't ask me to prove it. |
13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: The sentence X follows logically from the sentences of the class K if and only if every model of the class K is also a model of the sentence X. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 3.2) | |
A reaction: This why the symbol |= is often referred to as 'models'. |
13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: If mathematical truth reduces to logical truth then it is important what counts as logically true, …but if logicism is not a going concern, then the body of purely logical truths will be less interesting. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Logicism would only be one motivation for pursuing logical truths. Maybe my new 'Necessitism' will derive the Peano Axioms from broad necessary truths, rather than from logic. |
13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: The Paradox of the Preface is an apology, that you are committed to each proposition in the book, but admit that collectively they probably contain a mistake. There is a contradiction, of affirming and denying the conjunction of propositions. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.4) | |
A reaction: This seems similar to the Lottery Paradox - its inverse perhaps. Affirm all and then deny one, or deny all and then affirm one? |
19677 | What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: We must establish the thesis that what is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 5) | |
A reaction: The truth of this thesis would permanently establish mathematics as the only possible language of science. Personally I have no idea how you could prove or assess such a thesis. It is a lovely speculation, though. 'The structure of the possible' (p,127) |
19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: We maintain that it is absolutely necessary that every entity might not exist. ...The absolute is the absolute impossibility of a necessary being. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: This is the main thesis of his book. The usual candidates for necessary existence are God, and mathematical objects. I am inclined to agree with Meillassoux. |
19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: It is necessary that there be something rather than nothing because it is necessarily contingent that there is something rather than something else. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: The great charm of metaphysics is the array of serious answers to the question of why there is something rather than nothing. You'll need to read Meillassoux's book to understand this one. |
19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: It is incumbent upon us to break with the ontological requisite of the moderns, according to which 'to be is to be a correlate'. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: He blames Kant for this pernicious idea, which has driven philosophy away from realist science, when it should be supporting and joining it. As a realist I agree, and find Meillassoux very illuminating on the subject. |
13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: In relevant logic, the necessary truths are not those which are true in every situation; rather, they are those for which it is necessary that there is a situation making them true. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to rest on the truthmaker view of such things, which I find quite attractive (despite Merricks's assault). Always ask what is making some truth necessary. This leads you to essences. |
19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: My term 'precariousness' designates a possibility of not-being which must eventually be realised. By contrast, absolute contingency designates a pure possibility; one which may never be realised. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: I thoroughly approve of this distinction, because I have often enountered the assumption that all contingency is precariousness, and I have never seen why that should be so. In Aquinas's Third Way, for example. The 6 on a die may never come up. |
19671 | The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The very notion of chance is only conceivable on condition that there are unalterable physical laws. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Laws might be contingent, even though they never alter. Chance in horse racing relies on the stability of whole institution of horse racing. |
19651 | Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: What distinguishes transcendental idealism from speculative idealism is the fact that the former does not posit the existence of the transcendental subject apart from its bodily individuation. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: These modern French philosophers explain things so much more clearly than the English! The 'speculative' version is seen in Berkeley. On p.17 he says transcendental idealism is 'civilised', and speculative idealism is 'uncouth'. |
19647 | The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: All aspects of the object that can give rise to a mathematical thought rather than to a perception or a sensation can be meaningfully turned into the properties of the thing not only as it is with me, but also as it is without me. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: This is Meillassoux's spin on the primary/secondary distinction, which he places at the heart of the scientific revolution. Cartesian dualism offers a separate space for the secondary qualities. He is appalled when philosophers reject the distinction. |
19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: How is mathematical discourse able to describe a reality where humanity is absent? | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: He is referring to the prehistoric world. He takes this to be a key question about the laws of nature. We extrapolate mathematically from the experienced world, relying on the stability of the laws. Must they be necessary to be stable? No, it seems. |
19668 | Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Hume's question can be formulated as follows: can we demonstrate that the experimental science which is possible today will still be possible tomorrow? | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Could there be deep universal changes going on in nature which science could never, even in principle, detect? |
19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The transcendental subject simply cannot be said to exist; which is to say that the subject is not an entity, but rather a set of conditions rendering objective scientific knowledge of entities possible. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux treats this as part of the Kantian Disaster, which made an accurate account of the scientific revolution impossible for philosophers. Kant's ego seems to have primarily an epistemological role. |
13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: All judgement, for Kant, is essentially the predication of some property to some subject. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.5) | |
A reaction: Presumably the denial of a predicate could be a judgement, or the affirmation of ambiguous predicates? |
22306 | To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing [Russell] |
Full Idea: To explain belief in what is false we shall have to regard what is called belief in a proposition as not a thought related to the proposition, but rather as a thought related to the constituents of the proposition. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Papers of 1906 [1906], V.321), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 40 '1906' | |
A reaction: Russell proposed a new theory of judgement, in order to explain erroneous judgements, given that true propositions are identical with facts. Of course there might be errors about the constituents, as well as about their structure. Othello is his example. |
13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Situation semantics is a variation of the truth-conditional approach, taking the salient unit of analysis not to be the possible world, or some complete consistent index, but rather the more modest 'situation'. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.5.4) | |
A reaction: When I read Davidson (and implicitly Frege) this is what I always assumed was meant. The idea that worlds are meant has crept in to give truth conditions for modal statements. Hence situation semantics must cover modality. |
13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Our talk of propositions expresses commitment to the general notion of content, without a commitment to any particular way of spelling this out. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.1) | |
A reaction: As a fan of propositions I like this. It leaves open the question of whether the content belongs to the mind or the language. Animals entertain propositions, say I. |
19667 | If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: The standard objection is that if the laws of nature were actually contingent, we would already have noticed it. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Meillassoux offers a sustained argument that the laws of nature are necessarily contingent. In Idea 19660 he distinguishes contingencies that must change from those that merely could change. |
19670 | Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: We must ask how we are to explain the manifest stability of physical laws, given that we take these to be contingent? | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: Meissalloux offers a very deep and subtle answer to this question... It is based on the possibilities of chaos being an uncountable infinity... It is a very nice question, which physicists might be able to answer, without help from philosophy. |
19653 | The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Since Descartes conceives of God as existing necessarily, whether I exist to think of him or not, Descartes assures me of a possible access to an absolute reality - a Great Outdoors that is not a correlate of my thought. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: His point is that the ontological argument should be seen as part of the scientific revolution, and not an anomaly within it. Interesting. |
19658 | Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: Once the absolute has become unthinkable, even atheism, which also targets God's inexistence in the manner of an absolute, is reduced to a mere belief, and hence to a religion, albeit of the nihilist kind. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: An interesting claim. Rather hard to agree or disagree, though the idea that atheism must qualify as a religion seems odd. If it is unqualified it does have the grand quality of a religion, but if it is fallibilist it just seems like an attitude. |