41 ideas
13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Dialetheism is the view that some truths have true negations. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 7.4) | |
A reaction: The important thing to remember is that they are truths. Thus 'Are you feeling happy?' might be answered 'Yes and no'. |
13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: The truthmaker thesis is that an object is a truthmaker for a sentence if and only if its existence entails the sentence. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.5.3) | |
A reaction: The use of the word 'object' here is even odder than usual, and invites many questions. And the 'only if' seems peculiar, since all sorts of things can make a sentence true. 'There is someone in the house' for example. |
13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: The inference of 'distribution' (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically. It is straightforward to construct a 'stage' at which the LHS is true but the RHS is not. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 6.1.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to parallel the iterative notion in set theory, that you must construct your hierarchy. All part of the general 'constructivist' approach to things. Is some kind of mad platonism the only alternative? |
13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: The argument from P to A is 'relevantly' valid if and only if, for every situation in which each premise in P is true, so is A. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.2) | |
A reaction: I like the idea that proper inference should have an element of relevance to it. A falsehood may allow all sorts of things, without actually implying them. 'Situations' sound promising here. |
13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Relevant logic endorses excluded middle, ..but says instances of the law may fail. Bv¬B is true in every situation that settles the matter of B. It is necessary that there is some such situation. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.2) | |
A reaction: See next idea for the unusual view of necessity on which this rests. It seems easier to assert something about all situations than just about 'some' situation. |
13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Relevant consequence says the conclusion of a relevantly invalid argument is not 'carried in' the premises - it does not follow from the premises. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.3.3) | |
A reaction: I find this appealing. It need not invalidate classical logic. It is just a tougher criterion which is introduced when you want to do 'proper' reasoning, instead of just playing games with formal systems. |
13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: We have not abandoned classical logic in our acceptance of relevant logic. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.4) | |
A reaction: It appears that classical logic is straightforwardly accepted, but there is a difference of opinion over when it is applicable. |
13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Some relevant logics reject transitivity, but we defend the classical view. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 8) | |
A reaction: [they cite Neil Tennant for this view] To reject transitivity (A?B ? B?C ? A?C) certainly seems a long way from classical logic. But in everyday inference Tennant's idea seems good. The first premise may be irrelevant to the final conclusion. |
13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: We could reject the inference from A to itself (on grounds of circularity). | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 8) | |
A reaction: [Martin-Meyer System] 'It's raining today'. 'Are you implying that it is raining today?' 'No, I'm SAYING it's raining today'. Logicians don't seem to understand the word 'implication'. Logic should capture how we reason. Nice proposal. |
13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: A logic is 'free' to the degree it refrains from existential import of its singular and general terms. Classical logic must have non-empty domain, and each name must denote in the domain. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 7.1) | |
A reaction: My intuition is that logic should have no ontology at all, so I like the sound of 'free' logic. We can't say 'Pegasus does not exist', and then reason about Pegasus just like any other horse. |
13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Nowadays we think of the consequence relation itself as the primary subject of logic, and view logical truths as degenerate instances of this relation. Logical truths follow from any set of assumptions, or from no assumptions at all. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.2) | |
A reaction: This seems exactly right; the alternative is the study of necessities, but that may not involve logic. |
13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: According to the Peripatetics (Aristotelians), only syllogistic laws stated in variables belong to logic, and not their applications to concrete terms. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.5) | |
A reaction: [from Lukasiewicz] Seems wrong. I take it there are logical relations between concrete things, and the variables are merely used to describe these relations. Variables lack the internal powers to drive logical necessities. Variables lack essence! |
13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Through much of the 20th century the conception of logic was inherited from Frege and Russell, as knowledge of a body of logical truths, as arithmetic or geometry was a knowledge of truths. This is odd, and a historical anomaly. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Interesting. I have always taken this idea to be false. I presume logic has minimal subject matter and truths, and preferably none at all. |
13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Logic does not study formal languages for their own sake, which is formal grammar. Logic evaluates arguments, and primarily considers formal languages as interpreted. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Hodges seems to think logic just studies formal languages. The current idea strikes me as a much more sensible view. |
13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics if anything is. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 4.2.1) | |
A reaction: This is an interesting contrast to the claim of logicism, that mathematics reduces to logic. This idea explains why students of logic are surprised to find themselves involved in mathematics. |
13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: We are pluralists about logical consequence because we take there to be a number of different consequence relations, each reflecting different precisifications of the pre-theoretic notion of deductive logical consequence. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 8) | |
A reaction: I don't see how you avoid the slippery slope that leads to daft logical rules like Prior's 'tonk' (from which you can infer anything you like). I say that nature imposes logical conquence on us - but don't ask me to prove it. |
13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: The sentence X follows logically from the sentences of the class K if and only if every model of the class K is also a model of the sentence X. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 3.2) | |
A reaction: This why the symbol |= is often referred to as 'models'. |
13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: If mathematical truth reduces to logical truth then it is important what counts as logically true, …but if logicism is not a going concern, then the body of purely logical truths will be less interesting. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Logicism would only be one motivation for pursuing logical truths. Maybe my new 'Necessitism' will derive the Peano Axioms from broad necessary truths, rather than from logic. |
13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: The Paradox of the Preface is an apology, that you are committed to each proposition in the book, but admit that collectively they probably contain a mistake. There is a contradiction, of affirming and denying the conjunction of propositions. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.4) | |
A reaction: This seems similar to the Lottery Paradox - its inverse perhaps. Affirm all and then deny one, or deny all and then affirm one? |
17611 | We want the essence of continuity, by showing its origin in arithmetic [Dedekind] |
Full Idea: It then only remained to discover its true origin in the elements of arithmetic and thus at the same time to secure a real definition of the essence of continuity. | |
From: Richard Dedekind (Continuity and Irrational Numbers [1872], Intro) | |
A reaction: [He seeks the origin of the theorem that differential calculus deals with continuous magnitude, and he wants an arithmetical rather than geometrical demonstration; the result is his famous 'cut']. |
10572 | A cut between rational numbers creates and defines an irrational number [Dedekind] |
Full Idea: Whenever we have to do a cut produced by no rational number, we create a new, an irrational number, which we regard as completely defined by this cut. | |
From: Richard Dedekind (Continuity and Irrational Numbers [1872], §4) | |
A reaction: Fine quotes this to show that the Dedekind Cut creates the irrational numbers, rather than hitting them. A consequence is that the irrational numbers depend on the rational numbers, and so can never be identical with any of them. See Idea 10573. |
17612 | Arithmetic is just the consequence of counting, which is the successor operation [Dedekind] |
Full Idea: I regard the whole of arithmetic as a necessary, or at least natural, consequence of the simplest arithmetic act, that of counting, and counting itself is nothing else than the successive creation of the infinite series of positive integers. | |
From: Richard Dedekind (Continuity and Irrational Numbers [1872], §1) | |
A reaction: Thus counting roots arithmetic in the world, the successor operation is the essence of counting, and the Dedekind-Peano axioms are built around successors, and give the essence of arithmetic. Unfashionable now, but I love it. Intransitive counting? |
18087 | If x changes by less and less, it must approach a limit [Dedekind] |
Full Idea: If in the variation of a magnitude x we can for every positive magnitude δ assign a corresponding position from and after which x changes by less than δ then x approaches a limiting value. | |
From: Richard Dedekind (Continuity and Irrational Numbers [1872], p.27), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 10.7 | |
A reaction: [Kitcher says he 'showed' this, rather than just stating it] |
13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: In relevant logic, the necessary truths are not those which are true in every situation; rather, they are those for which it is necessary that there is a situation making them true. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to rest on the truthmaker view of such things, which I find quite attractive (despite Merricks's assault). Always ask what is making some truth necessary. This leads you to essences. |
13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: All judgement, for Kant, is essentially the predication of some property to some subject. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.5) | |
A reaction: Presumably the denial of a predicate could be a judgement, or the affirmation of ambiguous predicates? |
13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Situation semantics is a variation of the truth-conditional approach, taking the salient unit of analysis not to be the possible world, or some complete consistent index, but rather the more modest 'situation'. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.5.4) | |
A reaction: When I read Davidson (and implicitly Frege) this is what I always assumed was meant. The idea that worlds are meant has crept in to give truth conditions for modal statements. Hence situation semantics must cover modality. |
13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Our talk of propositions expresses commitment to the general notion of content, without a commitment to any particular way of spelling this out. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.1) | |
A reaction: As a fan of propositions I like this. It leaves open the question of whether the content belongs to the mind or the language. Animals entertain propositions, say I. |
21202 | The strong force has a considerably greater range than the weak force [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: The strong nuclear force has a range of 10^-15 m, considerably larger than the range of the weak force. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01) | |
A reaction: This is because the bosons transmitting the weak force (W+, W-, W°) are much heavier than the gluons of the strong force. |
21211 | If an expected reaction does not occur, that implies a conservation law [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: If some reaction is not observed when there is apparently nothing to prevent it occurring, it is an indication that a conservation law is in operation. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 07) |
21209 | Electron emit and reabsorb photons, which create and reabsorb virtual electrons and positrons [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: In QED an electron constantly emits and reabsorbs virtual photons and these photons constantly create and reabsorb pairs of virtual electrons and positrons, and so on. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 06) | |
A reaction: 'And so on'! These virtual particles have energy, and hence mass. |
21201 | A 'field' is just a region to which points can be assigned in space and time [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: The word 'field' is simply a shorthand way of saying that a physical property is assigned to the points of space and time in a region. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01) | |
A reaction: This is disappointing because I had begun to think that fields were foundational for modern ontology. Turns out they are operational abstractions (according to Martin). Note that a field extends over time. |
21212 | The Higgs field, unlike others, has a nozero value in a state without particles [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: The Higgs field has the property of having a nonzero value in a state without particles, the vacuum state. Other fields are assumed to have a value zero in a vacuum state. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 09) | |
A reaction: This seems to make a big difference to our concept of a field, since it has a measurable reality even when there are no particles. So it isn't just a geometrical frame for locating particles. |
21205 | Many physicists believe particles have further structure, if only we could see it [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: Although standard particles are assumed to be structureless, many physicists believe that if distances could be probed down to 10^-35 m structures would be discovered. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01) | |
A reaction: Such probing is said to be probably impossible. And does the division then come to a halt? Aristotle's meditations on this are not irrelevant. |
21203 | Uncertainty allows very brief violations of energy conservation - even shorter with higher energies [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: The uncertainty principle states that energy conservation can be violated, but only for a limited period of time. As the energy violation increases, the time period within which 'borrowed' energy has to be 'paid back' decreases. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01) | |
A reaction: This is the only reason modern physicists ever seem to mention the uncertainty principle. You can ask why this debt must be paid, but it seems to be hidden where the laws of physics may not even apply. |
21207 | The Exclusion Principle says no two fermions occupy the same state, with the same numbers [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: The 'exclusion principle' initially stated that no two electrons in a system could simultaneously occupy the same quantum state and thus have the same set of quantum numbers. The principle actually applies to all fermions, but not to bosons. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 02) | |
A reaction: This principle is said to be at the root of atomic structure, making each element unique. What exactly is a 'system'? Why does this principle hold? How do you ensure two women don't wear the same dress at a party? |
21204 | The standard model combines theories of strong interaction, and electromagnetic and weak interaction [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: As presently formulated, the standard model is two theories. One operates in the sector of strong interaction, and the other in the sector of the electromagnetic and weak interactions. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01) | |
A reaction: The first is Quantum Chomodynamics (QCD). The second is Quantum Electrodynamics (QED). Interesting that the weak interaction is included in the latter, which (I take it) means there is an electro-weak union. Interactions are the heart of the model. |
21206 | The properties of a particle are determined by its quantum numbers and its mass [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: In quantum theory, the full set of quantum numbers defines the state of the particle and, along with its mass, determines its properties. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 02) |
21208 | Eletrons don't literally 'spin', because they are point-like [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: The picture of a particle spinning like a top is sometime useful, but it is not consistent with the idea of the electron being point-like. In fact there is no analogy for spin in non-quantum physics. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 02) | |
A reaction: If we take this stuff literally then it blow traditional metaphysics to bits, because an electron has properties without being a substance. In what sense can an electron 'have' properties if it is a point? In interactions they cease to be points. Eh? |
21210 | Virtual particles surround any charged particle [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: A cloud of virtual particles always surrounds a charged particle. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 06) | |
A reaction: Here's a nice fact for aspiring Buddhists to meditate on. |
21213 | String theory only has one free parameter (tension) - unlike the standard model with 19 [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: Unlike the standard model, with its 19 free parameters (including the masses of quarks, coupling constants and mixing angles), string theories have a single free paramater: the string tension. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 10) | |
A reaction: This must be one feature in favour of string theory, despite its problems. |
21200 | An 'element' is what cannot be decomposed by chemistry [Martin,BR] |
Full Idea: In the modern sense 'element' means a substance that cannot be decomposed by the methods of chemistry. | |
From: Brian R. Martin (Particle Physics [2011], 01) |