55 ideas
9136 | The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: The paradox of analysis says if a conceptual analysis states exactly what the original statement says, then the analysis is trivial; if it says something different from the original, then the analysis is mistaken. All analyses are trivial or false. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 8.5) | |
A reaction: [source is G.E. Moore] Good analyses typically give explanations, or necessary and sufficient conditions, or inferential relations. At their most trivial they at least produce a more profound dictionary than your usual lexicographer. Not guilty. |
17070 | Coherence is consilience, simplicity, analogy, and fitting into a web of belief [Smart] |
Full Idea: I shall make use of the admittedly imprecise notions of consilience, simplicity, analogy and fitting into a web of belief, or in short of 'coherence'. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.06) | |
A reaction: Coherence sounds like a family of tests, rather than a single unified concept. I still like coherence, though. |
17072 | We need comprehensiveness, as well as self-coherence [Smart] |
Full Idea: Not mere self-coherence, but comprehensiveness belongs to the notion of coherence. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.07) |
9131 | Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: If there is an upper bound on the length of understandable sentences, then two understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 6.4) | |
A reaction: Not a huge paradox about the use of the word 'and', perhaps, but a nice little warning to be clear about what is being claimed before you cheerfully assert a screamingly obvious law of thought, such as conjunction. |
13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Dialetheism is the view that some truths have true negations. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 7.4) | |
A reaction: The important thing to remember is that they are truths. Thus 'Are you feeling happy?' might be answered 'Yes and no'. |
13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: The truthmaker thesis is that an object is a truthmaker for a sentence if and only if its existence entails the sentence. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.5.3) | |
A reaction: The use of the word 'object' here is even odder than usual, and invites many questions. And the 'only if' seems peculiar, since all sorts of things can make a sentence true. 'There is someone in the house' for example. |
9139 | If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: If nothing exists, then there are no truthmakers that could make 'Nothing exists' true. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 11.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites David Lewis] We may be confusing truth with facts. I take facts to be independent of minds, but truth only makes sense as a concept in the presence of minds which are endeavouring to think well. |
9140 | Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: If I buy two toothbrushes on a 'buy one, get one free' offer, which one did I buy and which one did I get free? Those who believe that each contingent truth has a truthmaker are forced to believe that 'buy one, get one free' is false. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 11.6) | |
A reaction: Nice. There really is no fact of which toothbrush is the free one. The underlying proposition must presumably be 'two for the price of one'. But you could hardly fault the first slogan under the Trades Descriptions Act. |
13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: The inference of 'distribution' (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically. It is straightforward to construct a 'stage' at which the LHS is true but the RHS is not. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 6.1.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to parallel the iterative notion in set theory, that you must construct your hierarchy. All part of the general 'constructivist' approach to things. Is some kind of mad platonism the only alternative? |
13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Relevant logic endorses excluded middle, ..but says instances of the law may fail. Bv¬B is true in every situation that settles the matter of B. It is necessary that there is some such situation. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.2) | |
A reaction: See next idea for the unusual view of necessity on which this rests. It seems easier to assert something about all situations than just about 'some' situation. |
13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: The argument from P to A is 'relevantly' valid if and only if, for every situation in which each premise in P is true, so is A. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.2) | |
A reaction: I like the idea that proper inference should have an element of relevance to it. A falsehood may allow all sorts of things, without actually implying them. 'Situations' sound promising here. |
13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Relevant consequence says the conclusion of a relevantly invalid argument is not 'carried in' the premises - it does not follow from the premises. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.3.3) | |
A reaction: I find this appealing. It need not invalidate classical logic. It is just a tougher criterion which is introduced when you want to do 'proper' reasoning, instead of just playing games with formal systems. |
13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: We have not abandoned classical logic in our acceptance of relevant logic. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.4) | |
A reaction: It appears that classical logic is straightforwardly accepted, but there is a difference of opinion over when it is applicable. |
13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: We could reject the inference from A to itself (on grounds of circularity). | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 8) | |
A reaction: [Martin-Meyer System] 'It's raining today'. 'Are you implying that it is raining today?' 'No, I'm SAYING it's raining today'. Logicians don't seem to understand the word 'implication'. Logic should capture how we reason. Nice proposal. |
13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Some relevant logics reject transitivity, but we defend the classical view. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 8) | |
A reaction: [they cite Neil Tennant for this view] To reject transitivity (A?B ? B?C ? A?C) certainly seems a long way from classical logic. But in everyday inference Tennant's idea seems good. The first premise may be irrelevant to the final conclusion. |
13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: A logic is 'free' to the degree it refrains from existential import of its singular and general terms. Classical logic must have non-empty domain, and each name must denote in the domain. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 7.1) | |
A reaction: My intuition is that logic should have no ontology at all, so I like the sound of 'free' logic. We can't say 'Pegasus does not exist', and then reason about Pegasus just like any other horse. |
13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Nowadays we think of the consequence relation itself as the primary subject of logic, and view logical truths as degenerate instances of this relation. Logical truths follow from any set of assumptions, or from no assumptions at all. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.2) | |
A reaction: This seems exactly right; the alternative is the study of necessities, but that may not involve logic. |
13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: According to the Peripatetics (Aristotelians), only syllogistic laws stated in variables belong to logic, and not their applications to concrete terms. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.5) | |
A reaction: [from Lukasiewicz] Seems wrong. I take it there are logical relations between concrete things, and the variables are merely used to describe these relations. Variables lack the internal powers to drive logical necessities. Variables lack essence! |
13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Through much of the 20th century the conception of logic was inherited from Frege and Russell, as knowledge of a body of logical truths, as arithmetic or geometry was a knowledge of truths. This is odd, and a historical anomaly. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Interesting. I have always taken this idea to be false. I presume logic has minimal subject matter and truths, and preferably none at all. |
13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Logic does not study formal languages for their own sake, which is formal grammar. Logic evaluates arguments, and primarily considers formal languages as interpreted. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Hodges seems to think logic just studies formal languages. The current idea strikes me as a much more sensible view. |
13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics if anything is. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 4.2.1) | |
A reaction: This is an interesting contrast to the claim of logicism, that mathematics reduces to logic. This idea explains why students of logic are surprised to find themselves involved in mathematics. |
13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: We are pluralists about logical consequence because we take there to be a number of different consequence relations, each reflecting different precisifications of the pre-theoretic notion of deductive logical consequence. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 8) | |
A reaction: I don't see how you avoid the slippery slope that leads to daft logical rules like Prior's 'tonk' (from which you can infer anything you like). I say that nature imposes logical conquence on us - but don't ask me to prove it. |
13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: The sentence X follows logically from the sentences of the class K if and only if every model of the class K is also a model of the sentence X. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 3.2) | |
A reaction: This why the symbol |= is often referred to as 'models'. |
9119 | No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: The history of deviant logics is without a single success. Bivalence has been denied at least since Aristotle, yet no anti-bivalent theory has ever left the philosophical nursery. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is part of a claim that nothing in reality is vague - it is just our ignorance of the truth or falsity of some propositions. Personally I don't see why 'Grandad is bald' has to have a determinate truth value. |
9135 | We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: As philosophers gradually freed themselves from the assumption that all words are names, ..they realised that generalizations really use variables rather than names of abstract entities. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 8.4) | |
A reaction: This looks like a key thought in trying to understand abstraction - though I don't think you can shake it off that easily. (For all x)(x-is-a-bird then x-has-wings) seems to require a generalised concept of a bird to give a value to the variable. |
13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: If mathematical truth reduces to logical truth then it is important what counts as logically true, …but if logicism is not a going concern, then the body of purely logical truths will be less interesting. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Logicism would only be one motivation for pursuing logical truths. Maybe my new 'Necessitism' will derive the Peano Axioms from broad necessary truths, rather than from logic. |
9125 | Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: An unsolvable problem is still a problem, despite Wittgenstein's view that there are no genuine philosophical problems, and Kant's romantic defeatism in his treatment of the antinomies of pure reason. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 4.3) | |
A reaction: I like the spin put on Kant, that he is a romantic in his defeatism. He certainly seems reluctant to slash at the Gordian knot, e.g. by being a bit more drastically sceptical about free will. |
9137 | Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: The old objection to the ban on self-reference is that it is too broad; it bans innocent sentences such as 'This very sentence is in English'. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 11.1) | |
A reaction: Tricky. What is the sigificant difference between 'this sentence is in English' and 'this sentence is a lie'? The first concerns context and is partly metalinguistic. The second concerns semantics and truth. Concept and content.. |
13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: The Paradox of the Preface is an apology, that you are committed to each proposition in the book, but admit that collectively they probably contain a mistake. There is a contradiction, of affirming and denying the conjunction of propositions. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.4) | |
A reaction: This seems similar to the Lottery Paradox - its inverse perhaps. Affirm all and then deny one, or deny all and then affirm one? |
9116 | Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: Vague words have hidden boundaries. The subtraction of a single grain of sand might turn a heap into a non-heap. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], Intro) | |
A reaction: The first sentence could be the slogan for the epistemic view of vagueness. The opposite view is Sainsbury's - that vague words are those which do not have any boundaries. Sorensen admits his view is highly counterintuitive. I think I prefer Sainsbury. |
9132 | An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: Sometimes an exclusive 'or' gradually develops into an inclusive 'or'. A restaurant offers 'free coffee or juice'. The customers ask for both, and gradually they are given it, first as a courtesy, and eventually as an expectation. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 7.2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] A very nice example - of the rot of vagueness even seeping into the basic logical connectives. We don't have to accept it, though. Each instance of usage of 'or', by manager or customer, might be clearly one or the other. |
13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: In relevant logic, the necessary truths are not those which are true in every situation; rather, they are those for which it is necessary that there is a situation making them true. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to rest on the truthmaker view of such things, which I find quite attractive (despite Merricks's assault). Always ask what is making some truth necessary. This leads you to essences. |
9128 | It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: The primary bearer of apriority is the propositional attitude (believing, knowing, guessing and so on) rather than the proposition itself. A proposition could be a priori to homo sapiens but a posteriori to Neandethals. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 6.3) | |
A reaction: A putative supreme being is quite useful here, who might even see the necessity of Arsenal beating Manchester United next Saturday. Unlike infants, adults know a priori that square pegs won't fit round holes. |
9130 | Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: Every attribution of apriority to a proposition is tacitly an attribution of a cognitive ability to some thinker. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 6.3) | |
A reaction: The ability would include a range of background knowledge, as well as a sheer power of intellect. If you know all of Euclid's theorems, you will spot facts about geometrical figues quicker than me. His point is important. |
9118 | The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: The bands of colour in a colour spectrum do not correspond to objective discontinuities in light wavelengths. These apparently external bands arise from our biology rather than simple physics. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], Intro) | |
A reaction: If any more arguments are needed to endorse the fact that some qualities are clearly secondary (and, to my amazement, such arguments seem to be very much needed), I would take this to be one of the final conclusive pieces of evidence. |
9124 | We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: The human perceptual system appears unable to represent a nose as concave rather than convex. If you look at the concave side of a mask, you see the features as convex. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 4.3) | |
A reaction: I don't think that is quite true. You wouldn't put a mask on if you thought it was convex. It is usually when seen at a distance with strong cross-lighting that the effect emerges. Nevertheless, it is an important point. |
17073 | I simply reject evidence, if it is totally contrary to my web of belief [Smart] |
Full Idea: The simplest way of fitting the putative observed phenomena of telepathy or clairvoyance into my web of belief is to refuse to take them at face value. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.07-8) | |
A reaction: Love it. It is very disconcerting for the sceptical naturalist to be faced with adamant claims that the paranormal has occurred, but my response is exactly the same as Smart's. I reject the reports, no matter how passionately they are asserted. |
9126 | Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: Bayesians demonstrate that a self-correcting agent can build an imposing edifice of near-certain knowledge from numerous beliefs that are only slightly more probable than not. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 6.1) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as highly significant for the coherence account of justification, even if one is sceptical about the arithmetical approach to belief of Bayesianism. It seems obvious that lots of quite likely facts build towards certainty, Watson. |
9121 | Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: Philosophers tend to associate illusions with skepticism. But since illusions are signs of modular construction, they are actually reason for scientific hope. Illusions have been very useful in helping us to understand vision. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 1.4) | |
A reaction: This is a nice reversal of the usual view. If I see double, it reveals to me that my eyes are not aligned properly. Anyone led to scepticism by illusions should pay more attention to themselves, and less to the reality they hope to know directly. |
17077 | The height of a flagpole could be fixed by its angle of shadow, but that would be very unusual [Smart] |
Full Idea: You could imagine a person using the angle from a theodolite to decide a suitable spot to cut the height of the flagpole, …but since such circumstances would be very unusual we naturally say the flagpole subtends the angle because of its height. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.14) | |
A reaction: [compressed; he mentions Van Fraassen 1980:132-3 for a similar point] As a response this seems a bit lame, if the direction is fixed by what is 'usual'. I think the key point is that the direction of explanation is one way or the other, not both. |
17078 | Universe expansion explains the red shift, but not vice versa [Smart] |
Full Idea: The theory of the expansion of the universe renders the red shift no longer puzzling, whereas he expansion of the universe is hardly rendered less puzzling by facts about the red shift. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.15) | |
A reaction: The direction of explanation is, I take it, made obvious by the direction of causation, with questions about what is 'puzzling' as mere side-effects. |
17061 | Explanation of a fact is fitting it into a system of beliefs [Smart] |
Full Idea: I want to characterise explanation of some fact as a matter of fitting belief in this fact into a system of beliefs. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.02) | |
A reaction: Sounds good to me. Simple facts slot straight into daily beliefs, and deep obscure facts are explained when we hook them up to things we have already grasped. Quark theory fits into prior physics of forces, properties etc. |
17074 | Explanations are bad by fitting badly with a web of beliefs, or fitting well into a bad web [Smart] |
Full Idea: An explanation may be bad if it fits only into a bad web of belief. It can also be bad if it fits into a (possibly good) web of belief in a bad sort of way. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.09) | |
A reaction: Nice. If you think someone has an absurd web of beliefs, then it counts against some belief (for you) if it fits beautifully into the other person's belief system. Judgement of coherence comes in at different levels. |
17076 | Deducing from laws is one possible way to achieve a coherent explanation [Smart] |
Full Idea: The Hempelian deductive-nomological model of explanation clearly fits in well with the notion of explanation in terms of coherence. One way of fitting a belief into a system is to show that it is deducible from other beliefs. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.13) | |
A reaction: Smart goes on to reject the law-based deductive approach, for familiar reasons, but at least it has something in common with the Smart view of explanation, which is the one I like. |
17071 | An explanation is better if it also explains phenomena from a different field [Smart] |
Full Idea: One explanation will be a better explanation that another if it also explains a set of phenomena from a different field ('consilience'). | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.07) | |
A reaction: This would count as 'unexpected accommodation', rather than prediction. It is a nice addition to Lipton's comparison of mere accommodation versus prediction as criteria. It sounds like a strong criterion for a persuasive explanation. |
17062 | If scientific explanation is causal, that rules out mathematical explanation [Smart] |
Full Idea: I class mathematical explanation with scientific explanation. This would be resisted by those who, unlike me, regard the notion of causation as essential to scientific explanation. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.02-3) | |
A reaction: I aim to champion mathematical explanation, in terms of axioms etc., so I am realising that my instinctive attraction to exclusively causal explanation won't do. What explanation needs is a direction of dependence. |
17075 | Scientific explanation tends to reduce things to the unfamiliar (not the familiar) [Smart] |
Full Idea: The history of science suggests that most often explanation is reduction to the unfamiliar. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.11) | |
A reaction: Boyle was keen to reduce things to the familiar, but that was early days for science, and some nasty shocks were coming our way. What would Boyle make of quantum non-locality? |
13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: All judgement, for Kant, is essentially the predication of some property to some subject. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.5) | |
A reaction: Presumably the denial of a predicate could be a judgement, or the affirmation of ambiguous predicates? |
9134 | The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: The negation of any meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 8.1) | |
A reaction: Nice. Compare 'there is another prime number beyond the highest one we have found' with its negation. The first seems verifiable in principle, but the second one doesn't. So the verificationist must deny Sorensen's idea? |
13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Situation semantics is a variation of the truth-conditional approach, taking the salient unit of analysis not to be the possible world, or some complete consistent index, but rather the more modest 'situation'. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 5.5.4) | |
A reaction: When I read Davidson (and implicitly Frege) this is what I always assumed was meant. The idea that worlds are meant has crept in to give truth conditions for modal statements. Hence situation semantics must cover modality. |
13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: Our talk of propositions expresses commitment to the general notion of content, without a commitment to any particular way of spelling this out. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.1) | |
A reaction: As a fan of propositions I like this. It leaves open the question of whether the content belongs to the mind or the language. Animals entertain propositions, say I. |
9133 | Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: Propositions play the role of dis-ambiguators; they are the things between which utterances are ambiguous. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 7.7) | |
A reaction: I have become a great fan of propositions, and I think this is one of the key reasons for believing in them. The proposition is what we attempt to pin down when asked 'what exactly did you mean by what you just said?' |
9129 | I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: I am entitled to buy any litre of water, but I am not entitled to buy every litre of water. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 6.3) | |
A reaction: A decent social system must somehow draw a line between buying up all the water and buying up all the paintings of Vermeer. Even the latter seems wicked, but it is hard to pin down the reason. |
17063 | Unlike Newton, Einstein's general theory explains the perihelion of Mercury [Smart] |
Full Idea: Newtonian celestial mechanics does not explain the advance of the perihelion of Mercury, while Einstein's general theory of relativity does. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.03) | |
A reaction: A perfect example of why explanation is the central concept in science, and probably in all epistemological activity. The desire to know is the desire for an explanation. Once the explanation is obvious, we know. |
9122 | God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen] |
Full Idea: Theologians worry that God may be an alien being. God cannot feel pain since pain is endured against one's will. God is all powerful and suffers nothing against His Will. To understand pain, one must experience pain. So God's power walls him off from us. | |
From: Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 3.2) | |
A reaction: I can't think of a good theological reply to this. God, and Jesus too (presumably), can only experience pain if they volunteer for it. It is inconceivable that they could be desperate for it to stop, but were unable to achieve that. |