4 ideas
5042 | For every event it is possible for an omniscient being to give a reason for its occurrence [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Nothing ever takes place without its being possible for one who knew everything to give some reason why it should have happened rather than not. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letter on Freedom [1689], p.112) | |
A reaction: Presumably there will be GOOD reason why genocide occurs. Note that there is a reason for every 'event'. Is there a reason for every truth? Presumably not, or there would have to be reasons for self-evident truths. |
15785 | Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system [Hintikka] |
Full Idea: We must distinguish between what we are committed to existing in the actual world or a possible world ('ontology'), and what we are committed to as a part of our ways of dealing with the world conceptually, as a part of our conceptual system ('ideology'). | |
From: Jaakko Hintikka (Semantics for Propositional Attitudes [1969], p.95), quoted by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 02 | |
A reaction: I think this is the most illuminating idea I have read on the subject of ontological commitment. I'm fighting for the idea that what we think is true should be kept separate from what we think exists. Ideology is a nice addition to the mix. |
13132 | A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself [Plantinga, by Westerhoff] |
Full Idea: Plantinga assumes that being identical with that snowball names a property which is that snowball's haecceity. | |
From: report of Alvin Plantinga (De Essentia [1979]) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §52 | |
A reaction: Only a philosopher would suggest such a bizarre way of establishing the unique individuality of a given snowball. You could hardly keep track of the snowball with just that criterion. How do you decide whether something has Plantinga's property? |
15786 | Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka] |
Full Idea: Quantification over members of one particular world is a measure of ideology, quantification that crosses possible worlds is often a measure of ideology. | |
From: Jaakko Hintikka (Semantics for Propositional Attitudes [1969], p.95), quoted by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 02 | |
A reaction: I like this. See Idea 15785 for the underlying distinction. It leaves the question open of what we might mean by 'ideological commitment'. |