Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Semantics for Propositional Attitudes', 'Letter on Freedom' and 'Elimination of Metaphysics by Analysis of Language'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Metaphysics uses empty words, or just produces pseudo-statements [Carnap]
     Full Idea: Since metaphysics doesn't want to assert analytic propositions, nor fall within the domain of physical science, it is compelled to employ words for which no criteria of application are specified, ..or else combine meaningful words..into pseudo-statements.
     From: Rudolph Carnap (Elimination of Metaphysics by Analysis of Language [1959]), quoted by Tim Maudlin - The Metaphysics within Physics 2.4
     A reaction: A classic summary of the logical positivist rejection of metaphysics. I incline to treat metaphysics as within the domain of science, but at a level of generality so high that practising scientists become bewildered and give up.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
For every event it is possible for an omniscient being to give a reason for its occurrence [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Nothing ever takes place without its being possible for one who knew everything to give some reason why it should have happened rather than not.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letter on Freedom [1689], p.112)
     A reaction: Presumably there will be GOOD reason why genocide occurs. Note that there is a reason for every 'event'. Is there a reason for every truth? Presumably not, or there would have to be reasons for self-evident truths.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system [Hintikka]
     Full Idea: We must distinguish between what we are committed to existing in the actual world or a possible world ('ontology'), and what we are committed to as a part of our ways of dealing with the world conceptually, as a part of our conceptual system ('ideology').
     From: Jaakko Hintikka (Semantics for Propositional Attitudes [1969], p.95), quoted by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 02
     A reaction: I think this is the most illuminating idea I have read on the subject of ontological commitment. I'm fighting for the idea that what we think is true should be kept separate from what we think exists. Ideology is a nice addition to the mix.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka]
     Full Idea: Quantification over members of one particular world is a measure of ideology, quantification that crosses possible worlds is often a measure of ideology.
     From: Jaakko Hintikka (Semantics for Propositional Attitudes [1969], p.95), quoted by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 02
     A reaction: I like this. See Idea 15785 for the underlying distinction. It leaves the question open of what we might mean by 'ideological commitment'.