9 ideas
3626 | Knowing the attributes is enough to reveal a substance [Descartes] |
Full Idea: I have never thought that anything more is required to reveal a substance than its various attributes. | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to Fifth Objections [1641], 360) |
19701 | Fallibilism is consistent with dogmatism or scepticism, and is not alternative to them [Dougherty] |
Full Idea: There has been a tendency to treat fallibilism as an alternative to either dogmatism or scepticism. ...But it is much better to think of fallibilism as consistent with either dogmatism or skepticism. | |
From: Trent Dougherty (Fallibilism [2011], 'Closure') | |
A reaction: It seems perfectly reasonably to describe oneself as a 'fallibilist dogmatist' (perhaps from the Pope?), or a 'fallibilist sceptic' (perhaps from Peter Unger?), so this idea sounds correct. |
19700 | It is best to see the fallibility in the reasons, rather than in the agents or the knowledge [Dougherty] |
Full Idea: It seems best to take fallible reasons as the basic notion of fallibilism. So fallible knowers are agents who know what they know on the basis of fallible reasons. Fallible knowledge will be knowledge on basis of fallible reasons. | |
From: Trent Dougherty (Fallibilism [2011], 'Cognates') | |
A reaction: This is because an ideal knower would be compelled by the evidence, so if fallibilism is universal it must reside in the evidence and not in the knower (bottom p.131). |
19702 | We can't normally say that we know something 'but it might be false' [Dougherty] |
Full Idea: It will ordinarily be conversationally inappropriate to say 'I know that p, but p might be false' even if it is true, since this would mislead an interlocutor to infer that that possibility was an epistemically significant one. | |
From: Trent Dougherty (Fallibilism [2011], 'Epistemic') | |
A reaction: This seems to imply hypocrisy when a fallibilist philosopher claims (in non-philosophical company) to know something. Fair enough. Philosophers are in a permanent state of hypocrisy about what they are really thinking. That's the fun of it. |
3630 | Our thinking about external things doesn't disprove the existence of innate ideas [Descartes] |
Full Idea: You can't prove that Praxiteles never made any statues on the grounds that he did not get from within himself the marble from which he sculpted them. | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to Fifth Objections [1641], 362) |
7435 | Dispositions are second-order properties, the property of having some property [Jackson/Pargetter/Prior, by Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It was proposed that dispositions are second-order properties of objects: the property of having some property. | |
From: report of Jackson/Pargetter/Prior (Three theses about dispositions [1982]) by David M. Armstrong - Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' p.xvii | |
A reaction: It seems more plausible to say that dispositions are first-order properties - that is, properties are dispositions, which are causal powers. A disposition to smoke is to have a causal power which leads to smoking. |
3631 | A blind man may still contain the idea of colour [Descartes] |
Full Idea: How do you know that there is no idea of colour in a man born blind? | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to Fifth Objections [1641], 363) |
3640 | Possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle, just as necessary existence is a perfection in the idea of God. | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to Fifth Objections [1641], 383) |
3639 | Necessary existence is a property which is uniquely part of God's essence [Descartes] |
Full Idea: In the case of God necessary existence is in fact a property in the strictest sense of the term, since it applies to him alone and forms a part of his essence as it does of no other thing | |
From: René Descartes (Reply to Fifth Objections [1641], 383) |