70 ideas
21887 | Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida] |
Full Idea: We should focus on other philosophers, and not on science. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21888 | Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is entirely linguistic, and is a display. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21896 | Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May] |
Full Idea: Derrida points out that the project of philosophy consists largely in attempting to build foundations for thought. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 1.04 | |
A reaction: You would first need to be convinced that there could be such a thing as foundations for thinking. Derrida thinks the project is hopeless. I think of it more as building an ideal framework for thought. |
21893 | Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida] |
Full Idea: All of philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and hence aesthetic. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
17663 | If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Paradox of Analysis:if we ask what sort of thing an X is, then either we know what an X is or we do not. If we know then there is no need to ask the question. If we do not know then there is no way to begin the investigation. It's pointless or impossible | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.2) | |
A reaction: [G.E. Moore is the source of this, somewhere] Plato worried that to get to know something you must already know it. Solving this requires the concept of a 'benign' circularity. |
21892 | Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Because interpretations of texts can be interpreted, they can therefore have no 'original meaning'. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
20925 | Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
Full Idea: Derrida worried that hermeneutics blunts the disruptive power of truth by forcing it conform to the interpreter's mental horizon. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction 3 'The heart' | |
A reaction: Good heavens - I agree with Derrida. Very French, though, to see the value of truth in its disruptiveness. I tend to find the truth reassuring, but then I'm English. |
20934 | Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
Full Idea: Derrida described the hermeneutic impulse to understand another as a form of violence that seeks to overcome the other's particularity and unique difference. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction App 'Derrida' | |
A reaction: I'm not sure about 'violence', but Derrida was on to somethng here. The 'hermeneutic circle' sounds like a creepy process of absorption, where the original writer disappears in a whirlpool of interpretation. |
21895 | Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21934 | The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
Full Idea: The tradition of conceiving being in terms of persisting presence, and meaning in terms of pure intelligibility or logos potentially present to the mind, finds itself dismantled by resources internal to its own construction. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 6 | |
A reaction: [compressed] Glendinning says this is the basic meaning of de-construction. My personal reading of this is that Aristotle is right, and grand talk of Being is hopeless, so we should just aim to understand objects. I also believe in propositions. |
21883 | Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Sincerity can never be verified, so fiction infuses all speech, which means that reality is also fictional. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21882 | Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Sentences are implicitly contradictory, because they can be used differently in different contexts (most obviously in 'I am ill'). | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21881 | We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida] |
Full Idea: The aim is to explore the limits of expression (which is what makes the poetry of Mallarmé so important). | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
4756 | Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel] |
Full Idea: Derrida's view is that every discourse is metaphorical, and there is no difference between truth-talk and metaphor. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Pascal Engel - Truth §2.5 | |
A reaction: Right. Note that this is a Frenchman's summary. How would one define metaphor, without mentioning that it is parasitic on truth? Certainly some language tries to be metaphor, and other language tries not to be. |
21877 | True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida] |
Full Idea: 'True' thoughts are inaccessible, buried in the subconscious, long before they get to speech or writing. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction | |
A reaction: [My reading of some Derrida produced no quotations. I've read two commentaries, which were obscure. The Derrida ideas in this db are my simplistic tertiary summaries. Experts can chuckle over my failure] |
21889 | 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida] |
Full Idea: 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21878 | Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida] |
Full Idea: We can give a subjective account of names, by considering our own name. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21879 | Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Even Kripke can't explain names, because the word is the thing, and also the thing is the word. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
17688 | Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Negative facts appear to be supervenient upon the positive facts, which suggests that they are nothing more than the positive facts. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 10.3) |
17691 | Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: I believe that nothing is genuinely related to itself. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 10.7) |
17679 | All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: A property ...is something which is strictly identical, strictly the same, in all its different instances. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.2) | |
A reaction: Some is gravitation one property, or an infinity of properties, for each of its values? What is the same between objects of different mass. I sort of believe in all the masses, but I'm not sure what 'mass' is. Abstraction, say I. |
12677 | Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis] |
Full Idea: I am against Armstrong's strong categoricalism, that is, the thesis that all basic properties are categorical. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983]) by Brian Ellis - The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism 3 | |
A reaction: I certainly agree with this, as I cannot see where the power would come from to get the whole thing off the ground. Armstrong depends on universals to necessitate what happens, which I find very peculiar. |
17666 | Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Actualism ...debars us from admitting into our ontology the merely possible, not only the merely logically possible, but also the merely physically possible. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.3) | |
A reaction: This is the big metaphysical question for fans (like myself) of 'powers' in nature. Armstrong declares himself an Actualist. I take it as obvious that the actual world contains powers, but how are we to characterise them? |
17667 | Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It is not denied that statements attributing dispositions and/or powers to objects are often true. But the truth-makers or ontological ground for such statements must always be found in the actual, or categorical, properties of the objects involved. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.3) | |
A reaction: This is the big debate in the topic of powers. I love powers, but you always think there must be 'something' which has the power. Could reality entirely consist of powers? See Fetzer. |
17687 | If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: I believe reducing all universals to powers is involved in vicious regress. The power is what it is by the sort of actualisations it gives rise to in suitable sorts of circumstances. But they themselves can be nothing but powers... | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 08.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed wording] I don't see this problem. Anything postulated as fundamental is going to be baffling. Why are categorical properties superior to powers? Postulate basic powers (or basic empowered stuff), then build up. |
17678 | Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Universals can be brought into the spatio-temporal world, becoming simply the repeatable features of that world. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.2) | |
A reaction: I wish Armstrong wouldn't use the word 'universal', which has so much historical baggage. The world obviously has repeatable features, but does that mean that our ontology must include things called 'features'? Hm. |
17669 | Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: A Realistic version of a Regularity theory of laws will have to postulate universals. How else will it be possible to say that the different instances of a certain uniformity are all instances of objectively the same phenomenon? | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 02.4) | |
A reaction: I disagree. We may (or may not) need properties, but they can be have a range. We just need stable language. We use one word 'red', even when the shade of redness varies. Non-realists presumably refer to sense-data. |
17677 | Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Past, present and future I take to be all and equally real. A universal need not be instantiated now. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.2) | |
A reaction: This is the price you must pay for saying that you only believe in universals which are instantiated. |
15442 | Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
Full Idea: Armstrong takes universals generally, and structural universals along with the rest, to be abstractions from their particular instances. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], p.83-4) by David Lewis - Against Structural Universals 'The pictorial' | |
A reaction: To me, 'abstracted' implies a process of human psychology, a way of thinking about the instances. I don't see how there can be an 'abstracted' relation which is a part of the external world. That makes his laws of nature human creations. |
17686 | Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Universals are abstractions from states of affairs. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 7) | |
A reaction: I'm getting confused about Armstrong's commitments. He bases his whole theory on the existence of universals (repeatable features), but now says those are 'abstracted' from something else. Abstracted by us? |
17668 | It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: For each particular it is likely that there exists at least one individuating conjunction of properties, that is, a conjunction of properties such that the particular instantiates this conjunction and nothing else does. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 02.3) | |
A reaction: Armstrong commits to a famous Leibniz view, but I don't see his grounds for it. There is nothing incoherent about nature churning out perfect replicas of things, such as quarks and electrons. Would we care if two pens were perfectly identical? |
17680 | The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: There is reason to rule out as pseudo-properties such things as the identity of a thing with itself. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.2) | |
A reaction: Good on you, David. |
8361 | What is true used to be possible, but it may no longer be so [Wright,GHv] |
Full Idea: It is not very natural to say of that which is true that it is also possible. ...What is true was possible - but whether it still is a potency of the world is not certain. | |
From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §5) | |
A reaction: A simple and rather important distinction. Before encountering this, I would certainly have been happy to affirm that the actual is possible, but actually it may not be. The power to create differs from the power to sustain. Could God re-create the world? |
17693 | The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It may be that the necessary/contingent distinction is tied to a metaphysics which recognises possibility as a real something wider than actuality. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 11.2) | |
A reaction: Armstrong responds by trying to give an account of possibility in terms of 'combinations' from actuality. I think powers offer a much better strategy. |
17685 | Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Many philosophers of science have distinguished between 'simple induction' - the argument from observed Fs to all Fs - and the argument to hidden or theoretical entities (Peirce's 'abduction'). | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.7) | |
A reaction: 'Abduction' is (roughly) the same is inference to the best explanation, of which I am a great fan. |
17683 | Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It is plausible to say, on the basis of total science, that 'grue' is a predicate to which no genuine, that is, unitary, universal corresponds. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.7) |
17675 | Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The predicate 'grue' involves essential reference to a particular time, which 'green' does not. Also on the 'grue' hypothesis a change occurs in emeralds in a way that change does not occur on the 'green' hypothesis. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 04.5) | |
A reaction: I'm inclined to think that comparing 'grue' with 'green' is a category mistake. 'Grue' is a behaviour. Armstrong says this is no objection, because Goodman's argument is purely formal. |
17674 | The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: We could rewrite the generalisation as For all x, ((x is a raven and x is black) v (x is not a raven and x is black) v (x is not a raven and x is not black)). Instances of any one of the three disjuncts will do as confirmation. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 04.3) | |
A reaction: A nice clarification. |
17672 | A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: A good reason for P is not necessarily an explanation of P. The presence of smoke is a good reason for thinking that fire is present. But it is not an explanation of the presence of fire. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 04.2) | |
A reaction: This may be an equivocation on 'the reason for'. Smoke is a reason for thinking there is a fire, but no one would propose it as a reason for the fire. If the reason for the fire was arson, that would seem to explain it as well. |
17684 | To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Given the Regularity theory, the explanatory element seems to vanish. For to say that all the observed Fs are Gs because all the Fs are Gs involves explaining the observations in terms of themselves. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.7) | |
A reaction: This point cries out, it is so obvious (once spotted). Tigers are ferocious because all tigers are ferocious (see?). |
17676 | Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The best explanation explains the most by means of the least. Explanation unifies. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 05.4) | |
A reaction: To get unification, you need to cite the diversity of what is explained, and not the mere quantity. The force of gravity unifies because it applies to such a diversity of things. |
21890 | Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Heidegger showed us the importance of transient time for consciousness. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21880 | 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida] |
Full Idea: All thought is controlled by tacit theory (which is why Freud is so important). | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction | |
A reaction: This idea is said to be the essential thought of Derrida's Deconstruction. The aim is liberation of thought, by identifying and bypassing these tacit metaphysical schemas. |
17664 | Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: To every subject, its appropriate level of abstraction. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.2) | |
A reaction: Mathematics rises through many levels of abstraction. Economics can be very concrete or very abstract. It think it is clearer to talk of being 'general', rather than 'abstract'. |
21886 | Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Meaning depends on 'differences' (contrasts). | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21930 | For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida] |
Full Idea: A noun [for Aristotle] is proper when it has but a single sense. Better, it is only in this case that it is properly a noun. Univocity is the essence, or better, the telos of language. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 5 | |
A reaction: [no ref given] His target seem to be Aristotelian definition, and also formal logic, which usually needs unambiguous meanings. {I'm puzzled that he thinks 'telos' is simply better than 'essence', since it is quite different]. |
21884 | Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida] |
Full Idea: The capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21935 | The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida] |
Full Idea: The sign is conceivable only on the basis of the presence that it defers, and moving toward the deferred presence that it aims to reappropriate. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 6 | |
A reaction: [Glendinning gives no source for this] I take the fundamental idea to be that meanings are dynamic, when they are traditionally understood as static (and specifiable in dictionaries). |
21933 | Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
Full Idea: Writing can and must be able to do without the presence of the sender. ...Also writing can and must he able to do without the presence of the receiver. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 6 | |
A reaction: In simple terms, one of them could die during the transmission. This is the grounds for the assertion of the primacy of writing. It opposes orthodox views which define language in terms of sender and receiver. |
21894 | Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks behind all language. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21931 | 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
Full Idea: The intention to oppose polysemia with dissemination does not aim to affirm that everything we say is ambiguous, but that polysemia is irreducible in the sense that each and every 'meaning' is itself subject to more than one understanding. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 5 | |
A reaction: The key point, I think, is that ambiguity and polysemia are not failures of language (which is the way most logicians see it), but part of the essential and irreducible nature of language. Nietzsche started this line of thought. |
21885 | Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Words only exist is 'spacings' (of time and space), so there are no synchronic meanings (except perhaps in writing). | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21891 | The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Even the good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there can be no 'pure' good. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
17692 | We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: No serious and principled deduction of the phenomena from the One has ever been given, or looks likely to be given. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 11) | |
A reaction: This seems to pick out the best reason why hardly anybody (apart from Jonathan Schaffer) takes the One seriously. |
17689 | Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Lacks and absences could perhaps by thought of as effects, but we ought to be deeply reluctant to think of them as causes. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 10.4) | |
A reaction: Odd. So we allow that they exist (as effects), but then deny that they have any causal powers? |
8363 | p is a cause and q an effect (not vice versa) if manipulations of p change q [Wright,GHv] |
Full Idea: What makes p a cause-factor relative to the effect-factor q (rather than vice versa) is the fact that by manipulating p, producing changes in it 'at will', we could bring about changes in q. | |
From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §8) | |
A reaction: As a solution to the direction-of-causation problem, I suspect that this proposal is begging the question. Will a causal explanation be offered of the action of manipulation? If he mistook his manipulation for a cause when it is actually an effect... |
8364 | We can imagine controlling floods by controlling rain, but not vice versa [Wright,GHv] |
Full Idea: Given our present knowledge of the laws of nature, we can imagine ways of controlling floods by controlling rainfall, but not the other way round. That is should be so, however, is contingent. | |
From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §8) | |
A reaction: Despite my objections to Idea 8363, this is a good example. It won't establish the metaphysics of the direction of causation, though, because God might control rainfall by controlling floods. Maybe causation is more like a motorway pile-up than dominoes. |
8366 | The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action [Wright,GHv] |
Full Idea: There is an implicit dependence of the very notion of a cause on a concept of agency and action. | |
From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §10) | |
A reaction: This is because he thinks experimental intervention is the key to the concept of causation (see Ideas 8362 and 8363). Others go further, and say that the concept of causation arises from subjective experience of performing actions. I quite like that. |
8362 | We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv] |
Full Idea: What confers on observed regularities the character of causal or nomic connections is the possibility of subjecting cause-factors to experimental test by interfering with the 'natural' course of events. | |
From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §7) | |
A reaction: This is von Wright's distinctive proposal, making causation a feature of the culture of science, rather than of ordinary life. But see Idea 2461. Causation is becoming too epistemological for my taste. Either it is a feature of reality, or forget it. |
8360 | We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv] |
Full Idea: We may be able to analyse causation into conditionship relations between events or states of affairs, ...but conditions cannot be regarded as logical primitives, ... and must be analysed into quantifiers, or modal concepts. | |
From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §2) | |
A reaction: [very compressed] A nice illustration of the aim of analytical philosophy - to analyse the elements of reality down to logical primitives. This is the dream of Descartes and Leibniz, continued by Russell and co. Do we still have this aspiration? |
17682 | A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: A universe could hardly consist of laws and nothing else. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.4) | |
A reaction: Hm. Discuss. How does a universe come into existence, if there are no laws to guide its creation? |
17662 | Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The scientist trying to establish the geography and history of the unobserved portion of the universe must depend upon what he takes to be the laws of the universe. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.1) | |
A reaction: This does seem to be the prime reason why we wish to invoke 'laws', but we could just as well say that we have to rely on induction. Spot patterns, then expect more of the same. Spot necessities? Mathematics is very valuable here, of course. |
8365 | Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy) [Wright,GHv] |
Full Idea: Not all laws are causal 'experimentalist' laws, such as those for falling bodies, or the Gas Law, or Ohm's Law. Some are more like conceptual principles, giving a frame of reference, such as inertia, or conservation of energy, or the law of entropy. | |
From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §9) | |
A reaction: An interesting and important distinction, whenever one is exploring the links between theories of causation and of laws of nature. If one wished to attack the whole concept of 'laws of nature', this might be a good place to start. |
17690 | Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG] |
Full Idea: Three degress of law: 1) 'Oaken laws' where all Fs that aren't Hs are Gs; 2) 'Iron' laws where all Fs are Gs; and 3) 'Steel' laws where all Fs must be Gs. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 10.4) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: [My summary of Armstrong's distinction] One response is to say that all laws are actually Oaken - see Mumfor and Mumford/Lill Anjum. It's all ceteris paribus. |
17670 | Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Newton's First Law of Motion tells us what happens to a body which is not acted upon by a force. Yet it may be that the antecedent of the law is never instantiated. It may be that every body that there is, is acted upon by some force. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 02.7) |
8582 | Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
Full Idea: Armstrong's theory holds that what makes certain regularities lawful are second-order states of affairs N(F,G) in which the two ordinary first-order universals F and G are related by a certain dyadic second-order universal N. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983]) by David Lewis - New work for a theory of universals 'Laws and C' | |
A reaction: [see Lewis's footnote] I take the view (from Shoemaker and Ellis) that laws of nature are just plain regularities which arise from the hierarchy of natural kinds. We don't need a commitment to 'universals'. |
17671 | A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It is a Humean uniformity that no race of ravens is white-feathered. Hence, if the Naive Regularity analysis of law is correct, it is a law that no race of ravens is white-feathered, that is, such a race is physically impossible. A most unwelcome result. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 02.6) | |
A reaction: Chapters 2-4 of Armstrong are a storming attack on the regularity view of laws of nature, and this idea is particularly nice. Laws must refer to what could happen, not what happens to happen. |
17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: There is an utterly natural idea that the laws of nature link properties with properties. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.3) | |
A reaction: Put it this way: given that properties are expressions of invariant powers, the interaction of two properties will (ceteris paribus) be invariant, and laws are just invariances in natural behaviour. |
16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
Full Idea: My own view is simple: the laws of nature ought to be accepted as ontologically primitive. …They are preferable in point of familiarity to such necessitation relations between universals. | |
From: comment on David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983]) by Tim Maudlin - The Metaphysics within Physics 1.4 | |
A reaction: I think you make natures of things primitive, and reduce laws to regularities and universals to resemblances. Job done. Natures are even more 'familiar' as primitives than laws are. |
9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |
Full Idea: The two criticisms levelled against Armstrong are that it is unclear what his relation of contingent necessitation is, and that it is unclear how it is able to necessitate anything. | |
From: comment on David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 3.1.2 | |
A reaction: I suppose someone has to explore the middle ground between the mere contingencies of Humean regularities and the strong necessities of scientific essentialism. The area doesn't, however, look promising. |