56 ideas
21887 | Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida] |
Full Idea: We should focus on other philosophers, and not on science. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21888 | Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is entirely linguistic, and is a display. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21896 | Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May] |
Full Idea: Derrida points out that the project of philosophy consists largely in attempting to build foundations for thought. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 1.04 | |
A reaction: You would first need to be convinced that there could be such a thing as foundations for thinking. Derrida thinks the project is hopeless. I think of it more as building an ideal framework for thought. |
21893 | Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida] |
Full Idea: All of philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and hence aesthetic. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21892 | Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Because interpretations of texts can be interpreted, they can therefore have no 'original meaning'. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
20925 | Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
Full Idea: Derrida worried that hermeneutics blunts the disruptive power of truth by forcing it conform to the interpreter's mental horizon. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction 3 'The heart' | |
A reaction: Good heavens - I agree with Derrida. Very French, though, to see the value of truth in its disruptiveness. I tend to find the truth reassuring, but then I'm English. |
20934 | Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
Full Idea: Derrida described the hermeneutic impulse to understand another as a form of violence that seeks to overcome the other's particularity and unique difference. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction App 'Derrida' | |
A reaction: I'm not sure about 'violence', but Derrida was on to somethng here. The 'hermeneutic circle' sounds like a creepy process of absorption, where the original writer disappears in a whirlpool of interpretation. |
21895 | Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21934 | The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
Full Idea: The tradition of conceiving being in terms of persisting presence, and meaning in terms of pure intelligibility or logos potentially present to the mind, finds itself dismantled by resources internal to its own construction. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 6 | |
A reaction: [compressed] Glendinning says this is the basic meaning of de-construction. My personal reading of this is that Aristotle is right, and grand talk of Being is hopeless, so we should just aim to understand objects. I also believe in propositions. |
21883 | Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Sincerity can never be verified, so fiction infuses all speech, which means that reality is also fictional. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21882 | Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Sentences are implicitly contradictory, because they can be used differently in different contexts (most obviously in 'I am ill'). | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21881 | We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida] |
Full Idea: The aim is to explore the limits of expression (which is what makes the poetry of Mallarmé so important). | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
4756 | Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel] |
Full Idea: Derrida's view is that every discourse is metaphorical, and there is no difference between truth-talk and metaphor. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Pascal Engel - Truth §2.5 | |
A reaction: Right. Note that this is a Frenchman's summary. How would one define metaphor, without mentioning that it is parasitic on truth? Certainly some language tries to be metaphor, and other language tries not to be. |
21877 | True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida] |
Full Idea: 'True' thoughts are inaccessible, buried in the subconscious, long before they get to speech or writing. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction | |
A reaction: [My reading of some Derrida produced no quotations. I've read two commentaries, which were obscure. The Derrida ideas in this db are my simplistic tertiary summaries. Experts can chuckle over my failure] |
21889 | 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida] |
Full Idea: 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21878 | Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida] |
Full Idea: We can give a subjective account of names, by considering our own name. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21879 | Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Even Kripke can't explain names, because the word is the thing, and also the thing is the word. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
2730 | Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Taking the proposition that gold is malleable to be necessary does not commit one to considering it analytic. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.116) |
2715 | Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: The four basic kinds of belief are rooted in perception, memory, introspective consciousness, and reason. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], Intr.p.7) |
2735 | Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Could one have just a single belief? | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.198) |
23888 | Knowledge is beyond question, as an unavoidable component of thinking [Weil] |
Full Idea: The speaker refuses to pose the question of knowledge, since knowledge is a given that is mixed with thought, and that no thinking being can get away from. | |
From: Simone Weil (Philosophy [1941], p.42) | |
A reaction: On the whole I favour belief-first, but I take the primary purpose of minds to be navigation, and that needs facts, not hopeful beliefs. Weil's thought pushes me a bit towards the knowledge first view. |
2736 | We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: The possibility of making certain of what we already know suggests that knowing a proposition does not entail its being certain. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.220) |
2721 | If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: If you imagine subtracting a book's sensory properties one by one, what is left of it? | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.42) |
2722 | Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Where the sense-datum theory is an indirect realism, phenomenalism is a direct irrealism. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.43) |
2728 | The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: I may well need experience to acquire the concepts needed for knowledge of the a priori, such as the concept of a colour. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.103) |
2727 | Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: The proposition that nothing is red and green all over at once is not analytic, but it is rationally graspable, so it seems to be an a priori synthetic proposition. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.100) |
2717 | How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.20) |
2716 | To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: The propositional belief which portrays what I see in front of me AS a field requires my having a concept of one. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.17) | |
A reaction: To me this immediately invites the question of what a cow or horse experiences when they look at a familiar field. They know how to leave and enter it, and register its boundaries and qualities. Concepts? |
2719 | Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: A sense-datum theory might be called a representative realism because it conceives perception as a relation in which sense-data represent perceived external (hence real) objects to us. For Locke they were resemblances only of primary qualities. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.33) |
2720 | Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: The sense-datum theory is mainly to explain hallucinations and illusions, though there might be other theories, such as the 'adverbial' theory. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.36) |
2718 | Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Simple perceiving gives rise to objectual perceiving (attaching concepts to the object), which gives rise to propositional perceiving. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.23) |
2741 | The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: The crucial principles of justification are a priori. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], X p.311) |
2729 | Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Rationalists virtually always assert or imply that, in addition to knowledge of analytic truths, there is knowledge of synthetic a priori truths. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.105) |
2725 | To remember something is to know it [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Remembering something is so entails knowing that it is so. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], II p.68) | |
A reaction: Clearly I can say I "remember" x, but be wrong. Presumably we then say that I didn't really remember, which requires success, like "I know". It is true (as with "know") that as soon as I say that the something is false, I can't claim to remember it. |
2724 | I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: If I can neither recall nor image Jane I can still remember her, for on seeing her I might recognise her, and might remember, and even recall, our last meeting. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], II p.66) | |
A reaction: Hm. I can hardly claim to remember her if I have no concept of her, and don't recall our last meeting. If seeing her triggers recognition, I would say that I NOW remember her, but I didn't before. Memory is more conscious than Audi claims. |
2731 | Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: There are four possible kinds of epistemic chain: infinite and unanchored, circular and unanchored, anchored in a belief which is not knowledge, and anchored in a belief which is bedrock knowledge. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.183) | |
A reaction: About right, though I don't think 'chain' is the right word for what is proposed if justification is to be coherent. The justifications float like lilies in the pond of reason, and a Self (Monet?) seems needed to assess the picture |
2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Internalists about justification tend to conceive of it as a matter of having a right to believe something. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.234) | |
A reaction: I'm an internalist, but I don't understand this, unless it refers to the social aspect of justification. Can I grant myself internal rights? I can justify my belief to other people. |
2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: That 7+5=12 and that carrots are nourishing are mutually consistent, but do not exhibit coherence. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.192) | |
A reaction: This shows how difficult it would be to define 'coherent'. Is 'carrots are nourishing' coherent with 'fish are nourishing'? Is the battle of Hastings coherent with the battle of Waterloo? |
2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: It is very difficult to specify when an explanatory relation generates enough coherence to create justification. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.193) | |
A reaction: I take coherence to be the key concept in epistemology, and quite impossible to define. This is why the 'space of reasons' is a useful concept. It is a courtroom, in which each case is different. |
2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: A schizophrenic who thinks he is Napoleon, if he has a completely consistent story with enough interlocking details, may have a belief system that is superbly coherent. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.194) | |
A reaction: This is an exaggeration, but the fact is that one isolated lie is totally coherent, so coherence can only emerge when a system is large. Sense experience must be central to coherence. |
2738 | Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: If someone consistently prophesied the winners of horse races, it appears that this man knows who will win the races, but surely he does not have justified beliefs as to who will win? | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.229) | |
A reaction: This is where internalists and externalists (notably reliabilists) sharply part company. IF a reliable clairvoyant appeared, we would eventually accept them as a knower. But they DON'T appear, because knowledge needs justification! |
2740 | A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: If one favours a reliability theory of knowledge (which is externalist) the correspondence theory of truth seems the most appropriate. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.243) | |
A reaction: Sounds right. Coherence implies some sort of internal assessment, whereas correspondence just needs to plugged into the facts. I like coherence justification and correspondence truth. |
2737 | 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Reliabilism cannot specify how reliable a process must be before it grounds knowledge, and it cannot specify what is reliable in the first place. 'Reliable' may become circular, and may mean 'justified'. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.225) | |
A reaction: The first time you ever read an instrument, or talk to a stranger, you have no indication of reliability. Circularity looks like a big problem. Knowledge must precede reliability? |
21890 | Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Heidegger showed us the importance of transient time for consciousness. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
2726 | We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: We can have false beliefs, or some degree of ignorance, about our own mental lives. For example, about our own dispositions, such as not believing that we have a certain ignoble desire. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], III p.83) | |
A reaction: This idea, that we don't know ourselves, has become a commonplace of recent philosophy, but I am unconvinced. Mostly we know only too well that we harbour a base desire, and we feel a creeping sense of shame. Total ignorance is very rare. |
21880 | 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida] |
Full Idea: All thought is controlled by tacit theory (which is why Freud is so important). | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction | |
A reaction: This idea is said to be the essential thought of Derrida's Deconstruction. The aim is liberation of thought, by identifying and bypassing these tacit metaphysical schemas. |
21886 | Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Meaning depends on 'differences' (contrasts). | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21930 | For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida] |
Full Idea: A noun [for Aristotle] is proper when it has but a single sense. Better, it is only in this case that it is properly a noun. Univocity is the essence, or better, the telos of language. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 5 | |
A reaction: [no ref given] His target seem to be Aristotelian definition, and also formal logic, which usually needs unambiguous meanings. {I'm puzzled that he thinks 'telos' is simply better than 'essence', since it is quite different]. |
21884 | Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida] |
Full Idea: The capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21935 | The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida] |
Full Idea: The sign is conceivable only on the basis of the presence that it defers, and moving toward the deferred presence that it aims to reappropriate. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 6 | |
A reaction: [Glendinning gives no source for this] I take the fundamental idea to be that meanings are dynamic, when they are traditionally understood as static (and specifiable in dictionaries). |
21933 | Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
Full Idea: Writing can and must be able to do without the presence of the sender. ...Also writing can and must he able to do without the presence of the receiver. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 6 | |
A reaction: In simple terms, one of them could die during the transmission. This is the grounds for the assertion of the primacy of writing. It opposes orthodox views which define language in terms of sender and receiver. |
21894 | Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks behind all language. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21931 | 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
Full Idea: The intention to oppose polysemia with dissemination does not aim to affirm that everything we say is ambiguous, but that polysemia is irreducible in the sense that each and every 'meaning' is itself subject to more than one understanding. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 5 | |
A reaction: The key point, I think, is that ambiguity and polysemia are not failures of language (which is the way most logicians see it), but part of the essential and irreducible nature of language. Nietzsche started this line of thought. |
21885 | Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Words only exist is 'spacings' (of time and space), so there are no synchronic meanings (except perhaps in writing). | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
23887 | Art (like philosophy) establishes a relation between world and self, and between oneself and others [Weil] |
Full Idea: Isn't true art a method for establishing a certain relation between the world and the self, and between oneself and others, and isn't that the equivalent of philosophy? | |
From: Simone Weil (Philosophy [1941], p.38) | |
A reaction: I hope the definition of 'true' art doesn't have to conform to achieving this relation. I suppose each good work of art shows you a distinctive way of relating to the world. An interesting thought (as so often with this thinker). |
21891 | The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Even the good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there can be no 'pure' good. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |