Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causes and Counterfactuals', 'The Nature of Mathematics' and 'Intro to I: Classical Logic'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism

14782	Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce]
	Full Idea: Philosophy, although it uses no microscopes or other apparatus of special observation, is really an experimental science, resting on that experience which is common to us all.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], I)
	A reaction: The 'experimental' either implies that thought-experiments are central to the subject, or that philosophers are discussing the findings of scientists, but at a high level of theory and abstraction. Peirce probably means the latter. I can't disagree.

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction

14787	Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce]
	Full Idea: It is an anacoluthon to say that a proposition is impossible because it is self-contradictory. It rather is thought so to appear self-contradictory because the ideal induction has shown it to be impossible.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], III)

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic

9463	Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects [Jacquette]
	Full Idea: Classical logic (of Whitehead, Russell, Gödel, Church) is a two-valued system of propositional and predicate logic, in which all propositions are exclusively true or false, and quantification and predication are over existent objects only.
	From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to I: Classical Logic [2002], p.9)
	A reaction: All of these get challenged at some point, though the existence requirement is the one I find dubious.

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism

14783	Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce]
	Full Idea: Mathematics is purely hypothetical: it produces nothing but conditional propositions. Logic, on the contrary, is categorical in its assertions. True, it is a normative science, and not a mere discovery of what really is. It discovers ends from means.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], II)

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism

14788	Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce]
	Full Idea: The whole of the theory of numbers belongs to logic; or rather, it would do so, were it not, as pure mathematics, pre-logical, that is, even more abstract than logic.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], IV)
	A reaction: Peirce seems to flirt with logicism, but rejects in favour of some subtler relationship. I just don't believe that numbers are purely logical entities.

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility

14786	Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce]
	Full Idea: Many say everything is logically possible which involves no contradiction. In this sense two contradictory propositions may be severally possible. In the substantive sense, the contradictory of a possible proposition is impossible (if we were omniscient).
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], III)

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism

14789	Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce]
	Full Idea: If Mill says that experience is the only source of any kind of knowledge, I grant it at once, provided only that by experience he means personal history, life. But if he wants me to admit that inner experience is nothing, he asks what cannot be granted.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898])
	A reaction: Notice from Idea 14785 that Peirce has ideas in mind, and not just inner experiences like hunger. Empiricism certainly begins to look more plausible if we expand the notion of experience. It must include what we learned from prior experience.

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique

14785	The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce]
	Full Idea: The real world is the world of sensible experience, and it is part of the process of sensible experience to locate its facts in the world of ideas.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], III)
	A reaction: This is the neatest demolition of the sharp dividing line between empiricism and rationalism that I have ever encountered.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics

14784	Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce]
	Full Idea: Ethics is the science of aims.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Nature of Mathematics [1898], II)
	A reaction: Intriguing slogan. He is discussing the aims of logic. I think what he means is that ethics is the science of value. 'Science' may be optimistic, but I would sort of agree with his basic idea.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation

8430	Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
	Full Idea: The function of causal statements is 1) to explain events, 2) for predictive usefulness, 3) to help control events, 4) with agents, to attribute moral responsibility, 5) in physical theory. We should judge causal theories by how they account for these.
	From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.207)
	A reaction: He suggests that Lewis's counterfactual theory won't do well on this test. I think the first one is what matters. Philosophy aims to understand, and that is achieved through explanation. Regularity and counterfactual theories explain very little.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation

8396	Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
	Full Idea: Kim has pointed out that there are a number of counterfactuals that have nothing to do with causation. If John marries Mary, then if John had not existed he would not have married Mary, but that is not the cause of their union.
	From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], 5.2) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience
	A reaction: One might not think that this mattered, but it leaves the problem of distinguishing between the causal counterfactuals and the rest (and you mustn't mention causation when you are doing it!).

8429	Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
	Full Idea: Counterfactuals can express 'analytical' dependency, or the fact that one event is part of another, or an action done by doing another, or (most interestingly) an event can determine another without causally determining it.
	From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205)
	A reaction: [Kim gives example of each case] Counterfactuals can even express a relation that involves no dependency. Or they might just involve redescription, as in 'If Scott were still alive, then the author of "Waverley" would be too'.

8428	Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
	Full Idea: The sort of dependency expressed by counterfactual relations is considerably broader than strictly causal dependency, and causal dependency is only one among the heterogeneous group of dependency relationships counterfactuals can express.
	From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205)
	A reaction: In 'If pigs could fly, one and one still wouldn't make three' there isn't even a dependency. Kim has opened up lines of criticism which make the counterfactual analysis of causation look very implausible to me.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims

4781	Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]
	Full Idea: Kim gives a range of examples of counterfactual dependence without causation, as: 'if yesterday wasn't Monday, today wouldn't be Tuesday', and 'if my sister had not given birth, I would not be an uncle'.
	From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §3.3
	A reaction: This is aimed at David Lewis. The objection seems like commonsense. "If you blink, the cat gets it". Causal claims involve counterfactuals, but they are not definitive of what causation is.