28 ideas
| 14713 | Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent [Chalmers] |
| Full Idea: The epistemic 1-intension for a sentence S is True at a scenario W iff (W and not-S) is a priori incoherent. | |
| From: David J.Chalmers (Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics [2004], p.180-4), quoted by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics | |
| A reaction: See Two-Dimensional Semantics (in 'Language') and Chalmers for the background to this idea. I love the coherence view of justification, but get a bit nervous when people start defining truth in that way. |
| 10455 | Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach] |
| Full Idea: Unlike standard first-order logic, free logic can allow empty names, but still has to deny existence by either representing it as a predicate, or invoke some dubious distinction such as between existence and being. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1) |
| 10454 | In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach] |
| Full Idea: In standard logic we can't straightforwardly say that n exists. We have to resort to using a formula like '∃x(x=n)', but we can't deny n's existence by negating that formula, because standard first-order logic disallows empty names. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1) |
| 10453 | In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach] |
| Full Idea: In standard first-order logic the role of proper names is played by individual constants. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1) |
| 10452 | Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach] |
| Full Idea: Like it or not, proper names have non-referential uses, including not only attributive but even predicate uses. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1) | |
| A reaction: 'He's a right little Hitler'. 'You're doing a George Bush again'. 'Try to live up to the name of Churchill'. |
| 10456 | Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach] |
| Full Idea: The familiar problems with the Millian view of names are the problem of positive and negative existential statements, empty names, identity sentences, and propositional attitude ascription. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L1) | |
| A reaction: I take this combination of problems to make an overwhelming case against the daft idea that the semantics of a name amounts to the actual object it picks out. It is a category mistake to attempt to insert a person into a sentence. |
| 10440 | An object can be described without being referred to [Bach] |
| Full Idea: An object can be described without being referred to. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I'm not clear how this is possible for a well-known object, though it is clearly possible for a speculative object, such as a gadget I would like to buy. In the former case reference seems to occur even if the speaker is trying to avoid it. |
| 10444 | Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach] |
| Full Idea: If Russell is, as I believe, basically right, then definite descriptions are the paradigm of singular terms that can be used to refer but are not linguistically (semantically) referential. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1 s5) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure that we can decide what is 'semantically referential'. Most of the things we refer to don't have names. We don't then 'use' definite descriptions (I'm thinking) - they actually DO the job. If we use them, we can 'use' names too? |
| 14712 | A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers] |
| Full Idea: The Core Thesis for rationalist 2D semantics is that for any sentence S, S is apriori iff S has a necessary 1-intension. (That is, there is no possible way the world might be that, if it actually obtained, would make S false). | |
| From: David J.Chalmers (Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics [2004], p.165), quoted by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 2.3.2 | |
| A reaction: [The parenthesis is by Schroeter] A '1-intension' is defined by a diagonal on a 2D semantic matrix. Chalmers defends conceivability as the guide to possibility. This is a very traditional view of the a priori, expressed in modern terms. |
| 10446 | Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach] |
| Full Idea: We must distinguish 'reference' in a fiction from reference outside the fiction to fictional entities. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1) | |
| A reaction: This may be more semantically than ontologically significant. It is perhaps best explicated by Coleridge's distinction over whether or not I am 'suspending my disbelief' when I am discussing a character. |
| 10447 | We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach] |
| Full Idea: If fictional entities, such as characters in a play, are real, albeit abstract entities, then we can genuinely refer to them. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Nathan Salmon 1998] Personally I would prefer to say that abstract entities are fictions. Fictional characters have uncertain identity conditions. Do they all have a pancreas, if this is never mentioned? |
| 10443 | You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach] |
| Full Idea: If you say 'a special person is coming to visit', you are not referring to but merely 'alluding to' that individual. This does not count as referring because you are not expressing a singular proposition about it. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1 s2) | |
| A reaction: If you add 'I hope he doesn't wear his red suit, but I hope he plays his tuba', you seem to be expressing singular propositions about the person. Bach seems to want a very strict notion of reference, as really attaching listeners to individuals. |
| 10439 | What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach] |
| Full Idea: Philosophers agree that some expressions refer, but disagree over which ones. Few include indefinite descriptions, but some include definite descriptions, or only demonstrative descriptions. Some like proper names, some only indexicals and demonstratives. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], Intro) | |
| A reaction: My initial prejudice is rather Strawsonian - that people refer, not language, and it can be done in all sorts of ways. But Bach argues well that only language intrinsically does it. Even pointing fails without linguistic support. |
| 10441 | If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach] |
| Full Idea: We can refer to things which change over time, which suggests that in thinking of and in referring to an individual we are not constrained to represent it as that which has certain properties. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems a good argument against the descriptive theory of reference which is not (I think) in Kripke. Problems like vagueness and the Ship of Theseus rear their heads. |
| 10442 | We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach] |
| Full Idea: Being able to think of an individual does not require being able to identify that individual by means of a uniquely characterizing description. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1 s1) | |
| A reaction: There is a bit of an equivocation over 'recognise' here. His example is 'the first child born in the 4th century'. We can't visually recognise such people, but the description does fix them, and a records office might give us 'recognition'. |
| 10445 | It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach] |
| Full Idea: If one is referring to whatever happens to satisfy a description, and one would be referring to something else were it to have satisfied the description instead, this is known as 'weak' reference,...but surely this is not reference at all. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.1 s7) | |
| A reaction: Bach wants a precise notion of reference, as success in getting the audience to focus on the correct object. He talks of this case as 'singling out' some unfixed thing, and he also has 'alluding to' an unstated thing. Plausible view. |
| 10457 | Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach] |
| Full Idea: An embarrassingly simple argument is that most expressions can be used literally but not referentially, no variation in meaning explains this fact, so its meaning is compatible with being non-referential, so no expression is inherently referential. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L2) | |
| A reaction: I think I have decided that no expression is 'inherently referential', and that it is all pragmatics. |
| 10463 | Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach] |
| Full Idea: Much of what speakers do that passes for referring is merely alluding or describing. ...It is one thing for a speaker to express a thought about a certain object using an expression, and quite another for the expression to stand for that object. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.3) | |
| A reaction: Bach builds up a persuasive case for this view. If the question, though, is 'what are you talking about?', then saying what is being alluded to or singled out or described seems fine. Bach is being rather stipulative. |
| 10459 | Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach] |
| Full Idea: Context does not determine or constitute reference; rather, it is something for the speaker to exploit to enable the listener to determine the intended reference. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L3) | |
| A reaction: Bach thinks linguistic reference is a matter of speaker's intentions, and I think he is right. And this idea is right too. The domain of quantification constantly shifts in a conversation, and good speakers and listeners are sensitive to this. |
| 10460 | 'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach] |
| Full Idea: If one ducks starts quacking furiously, and you say 'that duck is excited', it isn't context that makes me take it that you are referring to the quacking duck. You could be referring to a quiet duck you recognise by its distinctive colour. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L3) | |
| A reaction: A persuasive example to make his point against the significance of context in conversational reference. Speaker's intended reference must always trump any apparent reference suggested by context. |
| 10461 | What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach] |
| Full Idea: To illustrate speakers' intentions, consider the anaphoric reference using pronouns in these: "A cop arrested a robber; he was wearing a badge", and "A cop arrested a robber; he was wearing a mask". The natural supposition is not the inevitable one. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L4) | |
| A reaction: I am a convert to speakers' intentions as the source of all reference, and this example seems to illustrate it very well. 'He said..' 'Who said?' |
| 10462 | Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach] |
| Full Idea: It is a fallacy that all the information in an utterance must come from its interpretation, which ignores the essentially pragmatic fact that the speaker is making the utterance. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L4) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Barwise and Perry 1983:34] This is blatantly obvious in indexical remarks like 'I am tired', where the words don't tell you who is tired. But also 'the car has broken down, dear'. |
| 10458 | People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach] |
| Full Idea: People slide from contextual variability to context relativity to context sensitivity to context dependence to contextual determination. | |
| From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], 22.2 L3) | |
| A reaction: This is reminiscent of the epistemological slide from cultural or individual relativity of some observed things, to a huge metaphysical denial of truth. Bach's warning applies to me, as I have been drifting down his slope lately. Nice. |
| 8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The function of causal statements is 1) to explain events, 2) for predictive usefulness, 3) to help control events, 4) with agents, to attribute moral responsibility, 5) in physical theory. We should judge causal theories by how they account for these. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.207) | |
| A reaction: He suggests that Lewis's counterfactual theory won't do well on this test. I think the first one is what matters. Philosophy aims to understand, and that is achieved through explanation. Regularity and counterfactual theories explain very little. |
| 8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
| Full Idea: Kim has pointed out that there are a number of counterfactuals that have nothing to do with causation. If John marries Mary, then if John had not existed he would not have married Mary, but that is not the cause of their union. | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], 5.2) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience | |
| A reaction: One might not think that this mattered, but it leaves the problem of distinguishing between the causal counterfactuals and the rest (and you mustn't mention causation when you are doing it!). |
| 8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Counterfactuals can express 'analytical' dependency, or the fact that one event is part of another, or an action done by doing another, or (most interestingly) an event can determine another without causally determining it. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205) | |
| A reaction: [Kim gives example of each case] Counterfactuals can even express a relation that involves no dependency. Or they might just involve redescription, as in 'If Scott were still alive, then the author of "Waverley" would be too'. |
| 8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The sort of dependency expressed by counterfactual relations is considerably broader than strictly causal dependency, and causal dependency is only one among the heterogeneous group of dependency relationships counterfactuals can express. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205) | |
| A reaction: In 'If pigs could fly, one and one still wouldn't make three' there isn't even a dependency. Kim has opened up lines of criticism which make the counterfactual analysis of causation look very implausible to me. |
| 4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |
| Full Idea: Kim gives a range of examples of counterfactual dependence without causation, as: 'if yesterday wasn't Monday, today wouldn't be Tuesday', and 'if my sister had not given birth, I would not be an uncle'. | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §3.3 | |
| A reaction: This is aimed at David Lewis. The objection seems like commonsense. "If you blink, the cat gets it". Causal claims involve counterfactuals, but they are not definitive of what causation is. |