Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causes and Counterfactuals', 'Lectures on the Philosophy of (World) History' and 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom'

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10 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason

21753	If we look at the world rationally, the world assumes a rational aspect [Hegel]
	Full Idea: Whoever looks at the world rationally will find that it in turn assumes a rational aspect; the two exist in a reciprocal relationship.
	From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of (World) History [1837], p.29), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
	A reaction: What happens when I look at irrationality rationally?

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason

21974	The world seems rational to those who look at it rationally [Hegel]
	Full Idea: To him who looks at the world rationally, the world looks rationally back; the two exist in reciprocal relationship.
	From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of (World) History [1837], Intro p.29), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.4
	A reaction: This is a nice variation on the stoic idea that nature is essentially rational. If we are capable of rationality, then nature has made us that way. Romantics seem to prefer looking at nature less rationally, so what do they see in nature?

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death

6866	It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin]
	Full Idea: For the A-theorists called 'presentists' the past is as unreal as the future, and reality leaves us behind once we die, which is disturbing; but B-theorists, who see time as unreal, say we are just as real after our deaths as we were beforehand.
	From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
	A reaction: See Idea 6865 for A and B theories. I wonder if this problem is only superficially 'disturbing'. Becoming unreal may sound more drastic than becoming dead, but they both sound pretty terminal to me.

23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism

6867	Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin]
	Full Idea: I take existentialism to be the focus on the freedom and self-making of the human being, and his or her insertion into the world.
	From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.222)
	A reaction: I take 'self-making' to be the key here. If neuroscientists somehow 'proved' that there was no free will, I don't see that making any difference to existentialism. 'Insertion' seems odd, unless it refers to growing up.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation

8430	Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
	Full Idea: The function of causal statements is 1) to explain events, 2) for predictive usefulness, 3) to help control events, 4) with agents, to attribute moral responsibility, 5) in physical theory. We should judge causal theories by how they account for these.
	From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.207)
	A reaction: He suggests that Lewis's counterfactual theory won't do well on this test. I think the first one is what matters. Philosophy aims to understand, and that is achieved through explanation. Regularity and counterfactual theories explain very little.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation

8396	Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
	Full Idea: Kim has pointed out that there are a number of counterfactuals that have nothing to do with causation. If John marries Mary, then if John had not existed he would not have married Mary, but that is not the cause of their union.
	From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], 5.2) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience
	A reaction: One might not think that this mattered, but it leaves the problem of distinguishing between the causal counterfactuals and the rest (and you mustn't mention causation when you are doing it!).

8429	Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
	Full Idea: Counterfactuals can express 'analytical' dependency, or the fact that one event is part of another, or an action done by doing another, or (most interestingly) an event can determine another without causally determining it.
	From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205)
	A reaction: [Kim gives example of each case] Counterfactuals can even express a relation that involves no dependency. Or they might just involve redescription, as in 'If Scott were still alive, then the author of "Waverley" would be too'.

8428	Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
	Full Idea: The sort of dependency expressed by counterfactual relations is considerably broader than strictly causal dependency, and causal dependency is only one among the heterogeneous group of dependency relationships counterfactuals can express.
	From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205)
	A reaction: In 'If pigs could fly, one and one still wouldn't make three' there isn't even a dependency. Kim has opened up lines of criticism which make the counterfactual analysis of causation look very implausible to me.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims

4781	Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]
	Full Idea: Kim gives a range of examples of counterfactual dependence without causation, as: 'if yesterday wasn't Monday, today wouldn't be Tuesday', and 'if my sister had not given birth, I would not be an uncle'.
	From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §3.3
	A reaction: This is aimed at David Lewis. The objection seems like commonsense. "If you blink, the cat gets it". Causal claims involve counterfactuals, but they are not definitive of what causation is.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series

6865	A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin]
	Full Idea: The A-theory regards our intuitive distinction of time into past, present and future as objective, and takes seriously the idea that time flows; the B-theory says this just reflects our perspective, like the spatial distinction between here and there.
	From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
	A reaction: The distinction comes from McTaggart. Physics seems to be built on an objective view of time, and yet Einstein makes time relative. What possible evidence could decide between the two theories?