15 ideas
19433 | The universe is infinitely varied, so the Buridan's Ass dilemma could never happen [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The Buridan's Ass case of perfect equilibrium is chimerical. ...The universe has no centre and its parts are infinitely varied; thus it will never happen that all will be perfectly equal and will strike equally from one side or the other. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Coste [1707], 1707) | |
A reaction: Can the great Leibniz have missed the point? Surely all that matters is that the ass cannot distinguish the two options - not that they actually are identical in every detail? If the ass is short-sighted, that should be easy to set up. |
10476 | The idea that groups of concepts could be 'implicitly defined' was abandoned [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Late nineteenth century mathematicians said that, although plus, minus and 0 could not be precisely defined, they could be partially 'implicitly defined' as a group. This nonsense was rejected by Frege and others, as expressed in Russell 1903. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (Model Theory [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is helpful in understanding what is going on in Frege's 'Grundlagen'. I won't challenge Hodges's claim that such definitions are nonsense, but there is a case for understanding groups of concepts together. |
10478 | Since first-order languages are complete, |= and |- have the same meaning [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: In first-order languages the completeness theorem tells us that T |= φ holds if and only if there is a proof of φ from T (T |- φ). Since the two symbols express the same relationship, theorist often just use |- (but only for first-order!). | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (Model Theory [2005], 3) | |
A reaction: [actually no spaces in the symbols] If you are going to study this kind of theory of logic, the first thing you need to do is sort out these symbols, which isn't easy! |
10477 | |= in model-theory means 'logical consequence' - it holds in all models [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: If every structure which is a model of a set of sentences T is also a model of one of its sentences φ, then this is known as the model-theoretic consequence relation, and is written T |= φ. Not to be confused with |= meaning 'satisfies'. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (Model Theory [2005], 3) | |
A reaction: See also Idea 10474, which gives the other meaning of |=, as 'satisfies'. The symbol is ALSO used in propositional logical, to mean 'tautologically implies'! Sort your act out, logicians. |
10474 | |= should be read as 'is a model for' or 'satisfies' [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: The symbol in 'I |= S' reads that if the interpretation I (about word meaning) happens to make the sentence S state something true, then I 'is a model for' S, or I 'satisfies' S. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (Model Theory [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: Unfortunately this is not the only reading of the symbol |= [no space between | and =!], so care and familiarity are needed, but this is how to read it when dealing with models. See also Idea 10477. |
10481 | Models in model theory are structures, not sets of descriptions [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: The models in model-theory are structures, but there is also a common use of 'model' to mean a formal theory which describes and explains a phenomenon, or plans to build it. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (Model Theory [2005], 5) | |
A reaction: Hodges is not at all clear here, but the idea seems to be that model-theory offers a set of objects and rules, where the common usage offers a set of descriptions. Model-theory needs homomorphisms to connect models to things, |
10473 | Model theory studies formal or natural language-interpretation using set-theory [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Model theory is the study of the interpretation of any language, formal or natural, by means of set-theoretic structures, with Tarski's truth definition as a paradigm. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (Model Theory [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: My attention is caught by the fact that natural languages are included. Might we say that science is model theory for English? That sounds like Quine's persistent message. |
10475 | A 'structure' is an interpretation specifying objects and classes of quantification [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: A 'structure' in model theory is an interpretation which explains what objects some expressions refer to, and what classes some quantifiers range over. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (Model Theory [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: He cites as examples 'first-order structures' used in mathematical model theory, and 'Kripke structures' used in model theory for modal logic. A structure is also called a 'universe'. |
10480 | First-order logic can't discriminate between one infinite cardinal and another [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: First-order logic is hopeless for discriminating between one infinite cardinal and another. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (Model Theory [2005], 4) | |
A reaction: This seems rather significant, since mathematics largely relies on first-order logic for its metatheory. Personally I'm tempted to Ockham's Razor out all these super-infinities, but mathematicians seem to make use of them. |
19434 | There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There will perhaps be a world in which dogs will have sufficiently good noses to scent their game at a thousand leagues. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Coste [1707], 1707) | |
A reaction: Wonderful. This should immediately replace Lewis's much repeated example of a world containing a talking donkey. We should always honour the first person to suggest an idea. That is one of the motivations for this collection of ideas. |
8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
Full Idea: The function of causal statements is 1) to explain events, 2) for predictive usefulness, 3) to help control events, 4) with agents, to attribute moral responsibility, 5) in physical theory. We should judge causal theories by how they account for these. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.207) | |
A reaction: He suggests that Lewis's counterfactual theory won't do well on this test. I think the first one is what matters. Philosophy aims to understand, and that is achieved through explanation. Regularity and counterfactual theories explain very little. |
8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
Full Idea: Kim has pointed out that there are a number of counterfactuals that have nothing to do with causation. If John marries Mary, then if John had not existed he would not have married Mary, but that is not the cause of their union. | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], 5.2) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience | |
A reaction: One might not think that this mattered, but it leaves the problem of distinguishing between the causal counterfactuals and the rest (and you mustn't mention causation when you are doing it!). |
8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
Full Idea: Counterfactuals can express 'analytical' dependency, or the fact that one event is part of another, or an action done by doing another, or (most interestingly) an event can determine another without causally determining it. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205) | |
A reaction: [Kim gives example of each case] Counterfactuals can even express a relation that involves no dependency. Or they might just involve redescription, as in 'If Scott were still alive, then the author of "Waverley" would be too'. |
8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
Full Idea: The sort of dependency expressed by counterfactual relations is considerably broader than strictly causal dependency, and causal dependency is only one among the heterogeneous group of dependency relationships counterfactuals can express. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205) | |
A reaction: In 'If pigs could fly, one and one still wouldn't make three' there isn't even a dependency. Kim has opened up lines of criticism which make the counterfactual analysis of causation look very implausible to me. |
4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: Kim gives a range of examples of counterfactual dependence without causation, as: 'if yesterday wasn't Monday, today wouldn't be Tuesday', and 'if my sister had not given birth, I would not be an uncle'. | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §3.3 | |
A reaction: This is aimed at David Lewis. The objection seems like commonsense. "If you blink, the cat gets it". Causal claims involve counterfactuals, but they are not definitive of what causation is. |