10 ideas
| 16669 | Everything that exists is either a being, or some mode of a being [Malebranche] |
| Full Idea: It is absolutely necessary that everything in the world be either a being or a mode [manière] of a being. | |
| From: Nicolas Malebranche (The Search After Truth [1675], III.2.8.ii), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.4 |
| 9072 | Defining concepts by abstractions will collect together far too many attributes from entities [Barnes,J] |
| Full Idea: If we create abstractions by collection of attributes common to groups of entities, we will collect far too many attributes, and wrongly put them into the definition (such as 'having hairless palms' when identifying 'men'). | |
| From: Jonathan Barnes (Commentary on 'Posterior Analytics [1993], n to 97b7) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Defining 'man' is a hugely complex business (see Idea 1763!), unlike defining 'hair' or 'red'. Some attributes will strike perceivers immediately, but absence of an attribute is not actually 'perceived' at all. |
| 9073 | Abstraction from an ambiguous concept like 'mole' will define them as the same [Barnes,J] |
| Full Idea: The procedure of abstraction will not allow us to distinguish the ambiguity between 'mole' as an animal and as an artefact. The stages of abstraction will only end up with 'physical object', and this will then count as the definition. | |
| From: Jonathan Barnes (Commentary on 'Posterior Analytics [1993], n to 97b7) | |
| A reaction: This is a problem if you adhere to a rather precise account of the steps of abstraction, with every stage explicit (and probably expressed in terms of sets), but I suspect that the real tangle of semi-conscious abstraction avoids this problem. |
| 9074 | Abstraction cannot produce the concept of a 'game', as there is no one common feature [Barnes,J] |
| Full Idea: Abstractions cannot account for those general terms whose instances do not have any set of features in common. The word 'game' is not ambiguous, but not all games have one thing in common; they are united by looser 'family resemblance'. | |
| From: Jonathan Barnes (Commentary on 'Posterior Analytics [1993], n to 97b7) | |
| A reaction: (This point comes from Wittgenstein, Idea 4141) English-speakers can't agree on borderline cases (avoiding cracks in pavements). Life is just a game. The objection would be refuted by discussion of higher-level abstractions to make connections. |
| 8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The function of causal statements is 1) to explain events, 2) for predictive usefulness, 3) to help control events, 4) with agents, to attribute moral responsibility, 5) in physical theory. We should judge causal theories by how they account for these. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.207) | |
| A reaction: He suggests that Lewis's counterfactual theory won't do well on this test. I think the first one is what matters. Philosophy aims to understand, and that is achieved through explanation. Regularity and counterfactual theories explain very little. |
| 8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
| Full Idea: Kim has pointed out that there are a number of counterfactuals that have nothing to do with causation. If John marries Mary, then if John had not existed he would not have married Mary, but that is not the cause of their union. | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], 5.2) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience | |
| A reaction: One might not think that this mattered, but it leaves the problem of distinguishing between the causal counterfactuals and the rest (and you mustn't mention causation when you are doing it!). |
| 8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Counterfactuals can express 'analytical' dependency, or the fact that one event is part of another, or an action done by doing another, or (most interestingly) an event can determine another without causally determining it. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205) | |
| A reaction: [Kim gives example of each case] Counterfactuals can even express a relation that involves no dependency. Or they might just involve redescription, as in 'If Scott were still alive, then the author of "Waverley" would be too'. |
| 8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The sort of dependency expressed by counterfactual relations is considerably broader than strictly causal dependency, and causal dependency is only one among the heterogeneous group of dependency relationships counterfactuals can express. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205) | |
| A reaction: In 'If pigs could fly, one and one still wouldn't make three' there isn't even a dependency. Kim has opened up lines of criticism which make the counterfactual analysis of causation look very implausible to me. |
| 12726 | In a true cause we see a necessary connection [Malebranche] |
| Full Idea: A true cause is one in which the mind perceives a necessary connection between the cause and its effect. | |
| From: Nicolas Malebranche (The Search After Truth [1675], 1.649 (450)), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 5 | |
| A reaction: Presumably Hume was ignorant of 'true' causes, since he says he never saw this connection. But then is the perception done by the mind, or by the senses? |
| 4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |
| Full Idea: Kim gives a range of examples of counterfactual dependence without causation, as: 'if yesterday wasn't Monday, today wouldn't be Tuesday', and 'if my sister had not given birth, I would not be an uncle'. | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §3.3 | |
| A reaction: This is aimed at David Lewis. The objection seems like commonsense. "If you blink, the cat gets it". Causal claims involve counterfactuals, but they are not definitive of what causation is. |