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All the ideas for 'Causes and Counterfactuals', 'Sentences' and 'On Minerals'

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7 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic

16728	Logicians acknowledge too few things, while others acknowledge too many [Fitzralph]
	Full Idea: Those who have been well trained in logic err in recognising too few things, whereas others who are ignorant of logic ascribe to every statement a new entity, postulating more entities than God has ever established as real.
	From: Richard Fitzralph (Sentences [1328], II.1.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.3

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism

16756	Substantial forms must exist, to explain the stability of metals like silver and tin [Albertus Magnus]
	Full Idea: There is no reason why the matter in any natural thing should be stable in its nature, if it is not completed by a substantial form. But we see that silver is stable, and tin and other metals. Therefore they will seem to be perfected by substantial forms.
	From: Albertus Magnus (On Minerals [1260], III.1.7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.2
	A reaction: Illuminating. This may be the best reason for proposing substantial forms. Once materialism arrives, the so-called 'laws' of nature have to be imposed on the material to do the job - but what the hell is a law supposed to be?

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation

8430	Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
	Full Idea: The function of causal statements is 1) to explain events, 2) for predictive usefulness, 3) to help control events, 4) with agents, to attribute moral responsibility, 5) in physical theory. We should judge causal theories by how they account for these.
	From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.207)
	A reaction: He suggests that Lewis's counterfactual theory won't do well on this test. I think the first one is what matters. Philosophy aims to understand, and that is achieved through explanation. Regularity and counterfactual theories explain very little.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation

8396	Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
	Full Idea: Kim has pointed out that there are a number of counterfactuals that have nothing to do with causation. If John marries Mary, then if John had not existed he would not have married Mary, but that is not the cause of their union.
	From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], 5.2) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience
	A reaction: One might not think that this mattered, but it leaves the problem of distinguishing between the causal counterfactuals and the rest (and you mustn't mention causation when you are doing it!).

8429	Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
	Full Idea: Counterfactuals can express 'analytical' dependency, or the fact that one event is part of another, or an action done by doing another, or (most interestingly) an event can determine another without causally determining it.
	From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205)
	A reaction: [Kim gives example of each case] Counterfactuals can even express a relation that involves no dependency. Or they might just involve redescription, as in 'If Scott were still alive, then the author of "Waverley" would be too'.

8428	Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
	Full Idea: The sort of dependency expressed by counterfactual relations is considerably broader than strictly causal dependency, and causal dependency is only one among the heterogeneous group of dependency relationships counterfactuals can express.
	From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205)
	A reaction: In 'If pigs could fly, one and one still wouldn't make three' there isn't even a dependency. Kim has opened up lines of criticism which make the counterfactual analysis of causation look very implausible to me.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims

4781	Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]
	Full Idea: Kim gives a range of examples of counterfactual dependence without causation, as: 'if yesterday wasn't Monday, today wouldn't be Tuesday', and 'if my sister had not given birth, I would not be an uncle'.
	From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §3.3
	A reaction: This is aimed at David Lewis. The objection seems like commonsense. "If you blink, the cat gets it". Causal claims involve counterfactuals, but they are not definitive of what causation is.