11 ideas
| 16629 | By comparing qualities and features, reason can gradually infer the nature of substance [Grosseteste] |
| Full Idea: Awakened reason distinguishes color from size and shape from body and then shape and size from the substance of body, and so by drawing distinctions and abstracting, it arrives at a grasp of the substance of body, which supports size, shape and color. | |
| From: Robert Grosseteste (Commentary on 'Posterior Analytics' [1226], I.14), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.4 | |
| A reaction: This optimistic view influenced Aquinas, and is called 'incrementalism' by Pasnau. It is the spirit of scientific essentialism, and a nice instance of inference to the best explanation (though 'substance' in itself explains virtually nothing). |
| 23857 | People in power always try to increase their power [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Every human group that exercises power does so …in such a way as to increase that power. | |
| From: Simone Weil (Prospects: Proletarian Revolution? [1933], p.15) | |
| A reaction: Not so true in smaller institutions, but at the centre of power you can control how power is distributed, so the temptation is too much. |
| 23856 | Spontaneous movements are powerless against organised repression [Weil] |
| Full Idea: A spontaneous movement is fundamentally impotent when it comes to fighting against organised forces of repression. | |
| From: Simone Weil (Prospects: Proletarian Revolution? [1933], p.2) | |
| A reaction: Her example is the Paris Commune of 1870. Hence revolution requires prior penetration of the corridors of power. Hence the phenomenon of 'entryism' of more radical people into reformist parties. |
| 23859 | True democracy is the subordination of society to the individual [Weil] |
| Full Idea: In the subordination of society to the individual lies the definition of true democracy, and that of socialism as well. | |
| From: Simone Weil (Prospects: Proletarian Revolution? [1933], p.19) | |
| A reaction: This is the simplest definition of the liberal view. The big difference is whether this subordination is the starting point of political thinking, or the end result at which it aims. |
| 23858 | War is perpetuated by its continual preparations [Weil] |
| Full Idea: War perpetuates itself under the form of preparation for war. | |
| From: Simone Weil (Prospects: Proletarian Revolution? [1933], p.16) | |
| A reaction: There are periods when military preparations are scaled down, but a reason is always found to scale them back up again. |
| 23860 | Even if a drowning man is doomed, he should keep swimming to the last [Weil] |
| Full Idea: A man who is thrown overboard in the middle of the ocean ought not to let himself drown, even though there is very litte chance of his reaching safety, but to go on swimming till exhausted. | |
| From: Simone Weil (Prospects: Proletarian Revolution? [1933], p.21) | |
| A reaction: You might survive a little longer if you don't exhaust yourself! Not clear where her authority for 'ought' comes from, but it expresses an interesting attitude. |
| 8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The function of causal statements is 1) to explain events, 2) for predictive usefulness, 3) to help control events, 4) with agents, to attribute moral responsibility, 5) in physical theory. We should judge causal theories by how they account for these. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.207) | |
| A reaction: He suggests that Lewis's counterfactual theory won't do well on this test. I think the first one is what matters. Philosophy aims to understand, and that is achieved through explanation. Regularity and counterfactual theories explain very little. |
| 8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
| Full Idea: Kim has pointed out that there are a number of counterfactuals that have nothing to do with causation. If John marries Mary, then if John had not existed he would not have married Mary, but that is not the cause of their union. | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], 5.2) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience | |
| A reaction: One might not think that this mattered, but it leaves the problem of distinguishing between the causal counterfactuals and the rest (and you mustn't mention causation when you are doing it!). |
| 8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Counterfactuals can express 'analytical' dependency, or the fact that one event is part of another, or an action done by doing another, or (most interestingly) an event can determine another without causally determining it. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205) | |
| A reaction: [Kim gives example of each case] Counterfactuals can even express a relation that involves no dependency. Or they might just involve redescription, as in 'If Scott were still alive, then the author of "Waverley" would be too'. |
| 8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The sort of dependency expressed by counterfactual relations is considerably broader than strictly causal dependency, and causal dependency is only one among the heterogeneous group of dependency relationships counterfactuals can express. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205) | |
| A reaction: In 'If pigs could fly, one and one still wouldn't make three' there isn't even a dependency. Kim has opened up lines of criticism which make the counterfactual analysis of causation look very implausible to me. |
| 4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |
| Full Idea: Kim gives a range of examples of counterfactual dependence without causation, as: 'if yesterday wasn't Monday, today wouldn't be Tuesday', and 'if my sister had not given birth, I would not be an uncle'. | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §3.3 | |
| A reaction: This is aimed at David Lewis. The objection seems like commonsense. "If you blink, the cat gets it". Causal claims involve counterfactuals, but they are not definitive of what causation is. |