Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causes and Counterfactuals', 'Personal Identity and Memory' and 'Natural Science (lost)'

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8 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence

527	Everything exists which anyone perceives [Metrodorus of Chios]
	Full Idea: Everything exists which anyone perceives.
	From: Metrodorus (Chi) (Natural Science (lost) [c.340 BCE], B2), quoted by (who?) - where?
	A reaction: cf Berkeley and Epicurus. This misses out the problem of perceptual error, such as a square tower looking round from a distance, or one person in a group thinking they have seen something. It is still a good criterion, though!

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self

1389	If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too [Shoemaker]
	Full Idea: If memory were the sole criterion of personal identity it would have to be the sole criterion that we use in making identity statements about persons other than ourselves.
	From: Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §4)
	A reaction: From Locke's point of view, he is much less certain about the continued identity of other people, because he allows the possibility of transference of minds. Even we might reject physical identity, if a person had suffered a severe trauma.

1390	Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [Shoemaker, by PG]
	Full Idea: Bodily identity must be one of the criteria for personal identity (to establish that a rememberer was present at a past event), but memory itself must also be accepted as one of the criteria.
	From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §5) by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: This concerns the epistemology of personal identity, not the ontology. Someone with total amnesia would probably accept a driving licence as a criterion. Is personal identity a mental state, or a precondition which makes mental states possible?

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation

8430	Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
	Full Idea: The function of causal statements is 1) to explain events, 2) for predictive usefulness, 3) to help control events, 4) with agents, to attribute moral responsibility, 5) in physical theory. We should judge causal theories by how they account for these.
	From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.207)
	A reaction: He suggests that Lewis's counterfactual theory won't do well on this test. I think the first one is what matters. Philosophy aims to understand, and that is achieved through explanation. Regularity and counterfactual theories explain very little.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation

8396	Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
	Full Idea: Kim has pointed out that there are a number of counterfactuals that have nothing to do with causation. If John marries Mary, then if John had not existed he would not have married Mary, but that is not the cause of their union.
	From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], 5.2) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience
	A reaction: One might not think that this mattered, but it leaves the problem of distinguishing between the causal counterfactuals and the rest (and you mustn't mention causation when you are doing it!).

8429	Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
	Full Idea: Counterfactuals can express 'analytical' dependency, or the fact that one event is part of another, or an action done by doing another, or (most interestingly) an event can determine another without causally determining it.
	From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205)
	A reaction: [Kim gives example of each case] Counterfactuals can even express a relation that involves no dependency. Or they might just involve redescription, as in 'If Scott were still alive, then the author of "Waverley" would be too'.

8428	Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
	Full Idea: The sort of dependency expressed by counterfactual relations is considerably broader than strictly causal dependency, and causal dependency is only one among the heterogeneous group of dependency relationships counterfactuals can express.
	From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205)
	A reaction: In 'If pigs could fly, one and one still wouldn't make three' there isn't even a dependency. Kim has opened up lines of criticism which make the counterfactual analysis of causation look very implausible to me.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims

4781	Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]
	Full Idea: Kim gives a range of examples of counterfactual dependence without causation, as: 'if yesterday wasn't Monday, today wouldn't be Tuesday', and 'if my sister had not given birth, I would not be an uncle'.
	From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §3.3
	A reaction: This is aimed at David Lewis. The objection seems like commonsense. "If you blink, the cat gets it". Causal claims involve counterfactuals, but they are not definitive of what causation is.