40 ideas
| 12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: The methodology of metaphysics... is that of arguing to the simplest explanation, without regard to testability. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 1) | |
| A reaction: I love that! I'd be a bit cautious about 'simplest', since 'everything is the output of an ineffable God' is beautifully simple, and brings the whole discussion to a halt. I certainly think metaphysics goes deeper than testing. String Theory? |
| 12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: In logic, acceptability conditions can replace truth conditions, ..and the only price one has to pay for this is that one has to abandon the implausible Fregean idea that logic is the theory of truth preservation. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 1) | |
| A reaction: This has always struck me as correct, given that if you assign T and F in a semantics, they don't have to mean 'true' and 'false', and that you can do very good logic with propositions which you think are entirely false. |
| 10001 | An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: The semantic value of a determiner (an adjective) is a function from semantic values to nouns to semantic values of full noun phrases. | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §3.1) | |
| A reaction: This kind of states the obvious (assuming one has a compositional view of sentences), but his point is that you can't just eliminate adjectival uses of numbers by analysing them away, as if they didn't do anything. |
| 10007 | Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: Quantifiers have two functions in communication - to range over a domain of entities, and to have an inferential role (e.g. F(t)→'something is F'). In ordinary language these two come apart for singular terms not standing for any entities. | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §6.3) | |
| A reaction: This simple observations seems to me to be wonderfully illuminating of a whole raft of problems, the sort which logicians get steamed up about, and ordinary speakers don't. Context is the key to 90% of philosophical difficulties (?). See Idea 10008. |
| 10002 | '2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: There are two ways to read to read '2 + 2 = 4', as singular ('two and two is four'), and as plural ('two and two are four'). | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §4.1) | |
| A reaction: Hofweber doesn't notice that this phenomenon occurs elsewhere in English. 'The team is playing well', or 'the team are splitting up'; it simply depends whether you are holding the group in though as an entity, or as individuals. Important for numbers. |
| 9998 | What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols? [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: There are three different uses of the number words: the singular-term use (as in 'the number of moons of Jupiter is four'), the adjectival (or determiner) use (as in 'Jupiter has four moons'), and the symbolic use (as in '4'). How are they related? | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §1) | |
| A reaction: A classic philosophy of language approach to the problem - try to give the truth-conditions for all three types. The main problem is that the first one implies that numbers are objects, whereas the others do not. Why did Frege give priority to the first? |
| 12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: I wish to explore the idea that mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 6) | |
| A reaction: Categorical dimensions are spatiotemporal relations and other non-causal properties. Ellis defends categorical properties as an aspect of science. The obvious connection seems to be with structuralism in mathematics. Shapiro is sympathetic. |
| 10003 | Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy? [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: Why is arithmetic so hard to learn, and why does it seem so easy to us now? For example, subtracting 789 from 26,789. | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §4.2) | |
| A reaction: His answer that we find thinking about objects very easy, but as children we have to learn with difficulty the conversion of the determiner/adjectival number words, so that we come to think of them as objects. |
| 10008 | Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: I argue for an internalist conception of arithmetic. Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, not even quantified entities. Quantifiers over natural numbers occur in their inferential-role reading in which they merely generalize over the instances. | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §6.3) | |
| A reaction: Hofweber offers the hope that modern semantics can disentangle the confusions in platonist arithmetic. Very interesting. The fear is that after digging into the semantics for twenty years, you find the same old problems re-emerging at a lower level. |
| 10005 | Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: That 'two dogs are more than one' is clearly true, but its truth doesn't depend on the existence of dogs, as is seen if we consider 'two unicorns are more than one', which is true even though there are no unicorns. | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §6.2) | |
| A reaction: This is an objection to crude empirical accounts of arithmetic, but the idea would be that there is a generalisation drawn from objects (dogs will do nicely), which then apply to any entities. If unicorns are entities, it will be true of them. |
| 10000 | We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: Determiner uses of number words may disappear on analysis. This is inspired by Russell's elimination of the word 'the'. The number becomes blocks of first-order quantifiers at the level of semantic representation. | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §2) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] The proposal comes from platonists, who argue that numbers cannot be analysed away if they are objects. Hofweber says the analogy with Russell is wrong, as 'the' can't occur in different syntactic positions, the way number words can. |
| 10006 | First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: Representing arithmetic formally we do not primarily care about semantic features of number words. We are interested in capturing the inferential relations of arithmetical statements to one another, which can be done elegantly in first-order logic. | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §6.3) | |
| A reaction: This begins to pinpoint the difference between the approach of logicists like Frege, and those who are interested in the psychology of numbers, and the empirical roots of numbers in the process of counting. |
| 12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: The category of natural kinds of objects or substances should be regarded simply as a subcategory of the category of the natural kinds of processes. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
| A reaction: This is a new, and interesting, proposal from Ellis (which will be ignored by the philosophical community, as all new theories coming from elderly philosophers are ignored! Cf Idea 12652). A good knowledge of physics is behind Ellis's claim. |
| 12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: We may define a physical event as any change of distribution of energy in any of its forms. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |
| A reaction: This seems to result in an awful lot of events. My own (new this morning) definition is: 'An event is a process which can be individuated in time'. Now you just have to work out what a 'process' is, but that's easier than understanding an 'event'. |
| 12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: We may define a physical property as one whose value is relevant, in some circumstances, to how a physical system is likely to act. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |
| A reaction: Fair enough, but can we use the same 'word' property when we are discussing abstractions? Does 'The Enlightenment' have properties? Do very simple things have properties? Can 'red' act, if it isn't part of any physical system? |
| 12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: I want to insist on the existence of a class of categorical properties distinct from causal powers. This is contentious, for there is a growing body of opinion that all properties are causal powers. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Alexander Bird makes a case against categorical properties. If what is meant is that 'being an electron' is the key property of an electron, then I disagree (quite strongly) with Ellis. Ellis says they are needed to explain causal powers. |
| 12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: Essentialist metaphysics seem to require that there be at least two kinds of properties in nature: dispositional properties (causal powers, capacities and propensities), and categorical ones (spatiotemporal and numerical relations). | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
| A reaction: At last someone tells us what a 'categorical' property is! Couldn't find it in Stanford! Bird and Molnar reject the categorical ones as true properties. If there are six cats, which cat has the property of being six? Which cat is 'three metres apart'? |
| 12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: Spatial, temporal and numerical relations can have various causal roles without themselves being instances of causal powers. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
| A reaction: He cites gaps, aggregates, orientations, approaching and receding, as examples of categorical properties which make a causal difference. I would have thought these could be incorporated in accounts of more basic causal powers. |
| 12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: To regard properties as sets of individuals, and relations as sets of ordered individuals, is to make a nonsense of the whole idea of discovering a new property or relationship. Sets are defined or constructed, not discovered. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |
| A reaction: This bizarre view of properties (as sets) drives me crazy, until it dawns on you that they are just using the word 'property' in a different way, probably coextensively with 'predicate', in order to make the logic work. |
| 12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: A causal power can never be dependent on anything that does not have any causal powers. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
| A reaction: Sounds right, though you worry when philosophers make such bold assertions about such extreme generalities. But see Idea 12667. This is, of course, the key argument for saying that causal powers are the bedrock of reality, and of explanation. |
| 23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
| Full Idea: Ellis allows categoricals alongside powers, …to influence the sort of manifestations produced by powers. He lists structures, arrangements, distances, orientations, and magnitudes. | |
| From: report of Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009]) by Neil E. Williams - The Powers Metaphysics 05.2 | |
| A reaction: I would have thought that all of these could be understood as manifestations of powers. The odd one out is distances, but then space and time are commonly overlooked in every attempt to produce a complete ontology. [also Molnar 2003:164]. |
| 12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: The causal powers are just a proper subset of the dispositional properties. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 5) | |
| A reaction: Sounds wrong. Causal powers have a physical reality, while a disposition sounds as if it can wholly described by a counterfactual claim. It seems better to say that things have dispositions because they have powers. |
| 12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: I would define categorical properties as those whose identities depend only on the kinds of structures they represent. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3 n8) | |
| A reaction: Aha. So categorical properties would be much more perspicaciously labelled as 'structural' properties. Why does philosophical terminology make it all more difficult than it needs to be? |
| 12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: A distinctive set of intrinsic properties for a given kind is called a 'real essence'. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
| A reaction: Note that he thinks essence is a set of properties (rather than what gives rise to the properties), and that it is kinds (and not individuals) which have real essences, and that one role of the properties is to be 'distinctive' of the kind. Cf. Oderberg. |
| 12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysical necessitation is the relation that holds between things in the world and the things they make true. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 1) | |
| A reaction: Not sure about that. It implies that it is sentences that have necessity, and he confirms it by calling it 'a semantic relation'. So there are no necessities if there are no sentences? Not the Brian Ellis we know and love. |
| 12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: A metaphysically necessary proposition is one that is true in virtue of the essential nature of things. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 6) | |
| A reaction: It take this to be what Kit Fine argues for, though it tracks back to Aristotle. I also take it to be correct, though one might ask whether there are any other metaphysical necessities, ones not depending on essences. |
| 12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: The primary aim of science is to explain what happens, not just to describe it. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |
| A reaction: This I take to be a good motto for scientific essentialism. Any scientist who is happy with anything less than explanation is a mere journeyman, a servant in the kitchens of the great house of science. |
| 10004 | Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: Our minds mainly reason about objects. Most cognitive problems we are faced with deal with particular objects, whether they are people or material things. Reasoning about them is what our minds are good at. | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic [2005], §4.3) | |
| A reaction: Hofweber is suggesting this as an explanation of why we continually reify various concepts, especially numbers. Very plausible. It works for qualities of character, and explains our tendency to talk about universals as objects ('redness'). |
| 12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: There are natural kinds of processes. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. I am tempted by the view that processes are the most basic feature of reality, since I think of the mind as a process, and quantum reality seems more like processes than like objects. |
| 12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: Natural kind structures go all the way down to the most basic levels of existence. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
| A reaction: Even the bottom level? Is there anything to explain why the bottom level is a kind, given that all the higher kinds presumably have an explanation? |
| 8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The function of causal statements is 1) to explain events, 2) for predictive usefulness, 3) to help control events, 4) with agents, to attribute moral responsibility, 5) in physical theory. We should judge causal theories by how they account for these. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.207) | |
| A reaction: He suggests that Lewis's counterfactual theory won't do well on this test. I think the first one is what matters. Philosophy aims to understand, and that is achieved through explanation. Regularity and counterfactual theories explain very little. |
| 8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
| Full Idea: Kim has pointed out that there are a number of counterfactuals that have nothing to do with causation. If John marries Mary, then if John had not existed he would not have married Mary, but that is not the cause of their union. | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], 5.2) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience | |
| A reaction: One might not think that this mattered, but it leaves the problem of distinguishing between the causal counterfactuals and the rest (and you mustn't mention causation when you are doing it!). |
| 8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
| Full Idea: Counterfactuals can express 'analytical' dependency, or the fact that one event is part of another, or an action done by doing another, or (most interestingly) an event can determine another without causally determining it. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205) | |
| A reaction: [Kim gives example of each case] Counterfactuals can even express a relation that involves no dependency. Or they might just involve redescription, as in 'If Scott were still alive, then the author of "Waverley" would be too'. |
| 8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
| Full Idea: The sort of dependency expressed by counterfactual relations is considerably broader than strictly causal dependency, and causal dependency is only one among the heterogeneous group of dependency relationships counterfactuals can express. | |
| From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205) | |
| A reaction: In 'If pigs could fly, one and one still wouldn't make three' there isn't even a dependency. Kim has opened up lines of criticism which make the counterfactual analysis of causation look very implausible to me. |
| 12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: The laws of nature must be supposed to be just descriptions of the ways in which things are intrinsically disposed to behave: of how they would behave if they existed as closed and isolated systems. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |
| A reaction: I agree with this, and therefore take 'laws of nature' to be eliminable from any plausible ontology (which just contains the things and their behaviour). Ellis tends to defend laws, when he doesn't need to. |
| 4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |
| Full Idea: Kim gives a range of examples of counterfactual dependence without causation, as: 'if yesterday wasn't Monday, today wouldn't be Tuesday', and 'if my sister had not given birth, I would not be an uncle'. | |
| From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §3.3 | |
| A reaction: This is aimed at David Lewis. The objection seems like commonsense. "If you blink, the cat gets it". Causal claims involve counterfactuals, but they are not definitive of what causation is. |
| 12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: The classical conception of force is an entity that intervenes between a physical cause and its effect, but is not itself a physical cause. I see no reason to believe in forces of this kind. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |
| A reaction: The difference of view between Leibniz and Newton is very illuminating on this one (coming this way soon!). Can you either have forces and drop causation, or have causation and drop forces? |
| 12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: Perhaps the most important of all multi-valued properties is energy itself. I think a scientific realist must believe that energy exists. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |
| A reaction: It's odd that the existence of the most basic thing in physics needs a credo from a certain sort of believer. I have been bothered by notion of 'energy' for fifty years, and am still none the wiser. I'm sure I could be scientific realist without it. |
| 12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: Cosmologists have a concept of objective simultaneity, which they take to mean something like 'temporally equidistant from the Big Bang'. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 6) | |
| A reaction: I find this very appealing, when faced with all the relativity theory that tells me there is no such thing as global simultaneity, a claim which I find deeply counterintuitive, but seems to have the science on its side. Bravo. |
| 12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
| Full Idea: The global wavefront that collapses when a light signal from the Big Bang is observed is what most plausibly defines the frontier between past and future. | |
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 6) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but it is clearly worth passing on. Of all the deep mysteries, the 'present' time may be the deepest. |