16 ideas
23548 | Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: I now believe that the existence of indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic. | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 3) | |
A reaction: I think that prior to this Fine had defended classical logic. Presumably the difficulty is over Bivalence. Nietzsche spotted this problem, despite not being a logician. Logic has to simplify the world. Hence philosophy is quite different from logic. |
23539 | Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: A precise language is often assigned a classical semantics, in which the semantic value of a name is its referent, the semantic value of a predicate is its extension (the objects of which it is true), and the value of a sentence is True or False. | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 1) | |
A reaction: Helpful to have this clear statement of how predicates are treated. This extensionalism in logic causes trouble when it creeps into philosophy, and people say that 'red' just means all the red things. No it doesn't. |
18438 | Every worldly event, without exception, is a redistribution of microphysical states [Quine] |
Full Idea: Nothing happens in the world, not the flutter of an eyelid, not the flicker of a thought, without some redistribution of microphysical states. | |
From: Willard Quine (on Goodman's 'Ways of Worldmaking' [1978], p.98) | |
A reaction: Is this causation, identity, or baffling supervenience? |
23544 | Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Vagueness concerns 'local' indeterminacy, such as whether one man in the lineup is bald, and 'global' indeterminacy, applying to a range of cases, as when it is indeterminate how 'bald' applies to the lineup. But how do these relate? | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 1) | |
A reaction: This puts the focus either on objects or on predicates which are vague. |
23540 | Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: If 'P is red' and 'P is orange' are indefinite, then 'P is red and P is orange' seems false, because red and orange are exclusive. But if two conjoined indefinite sentences are false, that makes 'P is red and P is red' false, when it should be indefinite. | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is the problem of 'penumbral connection', where two indefinite values are still logically related, by excluding one another. Presumably 'P is red and P is of indefinite shape' can be true? Doubtful about this argument. |
23546 | Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Standard notions of vagueness all accept borderline cases, and presuppose a higher standpoint from which a judgement of being borderline F, rather than simply being F or being not F, can be made. | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 3) | |
A reaction: He says that the concept of borderline cases is an impediment to understanding vagueness. Proposing a third group when you are struggling to separate two other groups doesn't seem helpful, come to think of it. Limbo cases. |
23542 | Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We can see Epistemicism [vagueness as ignorance] as a common and misguided tendency to identify a cause with its symptoms. We are unsure how to characterise vagueness, and identify it with the resulting ignorance, instead of explaining it. | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 1) | |
A reaction: Love it. This echoes my repeated plea in these reactions to stop identifying features of reality with the functions which embody them or the patterns they create. We need to explain them, and must dig deeper. |
23541 | Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Under supervaluation there should always be someone who is the last bald man in the sequence, but there is always an acceptable way to make some other man the last bald man. | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 1) | |
A reaction: Fine seems to take this as a conclusive refutation of the supervaluation approach. Fine says (p.41) that supervaluation says there is a precisification for every instance. |
23545 | We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We simply have no intelligible notion of local indeterminacy or of a borderline case. | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 2) | |
A reaction: He mentions cases which are near a borderline, and cases which are hard to decide, but denies that these are intrinsically borderline. If there are borderline cases between red and orange, what are the outer boundaries of the border? |
23547 | It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Pace Parfit and others, it boggles the mind that survival could be independent of any relation of identity between the currently existing object and the objects that subsequently exist. | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 3) | |
A reaction: Yes. If the self or mind just consists of a diachronic trail of memories such that the two ends of the trail have no connection at all, that isn't the kind of survival that any of us want. I want to live my life, not a life. |
8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
Full Idea: The function of causal statements is 1) to explain events, 2) for predictive usefulness, 3) to help control events, 4) with agents, to attribute moral responsibility, 5) in physical theory. We should judge causal theories by how they account for these. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.207) | |
A reaction: He suggests that Lewis's counterfactual theory won't do well on this test. I think the first one is what matters. Philosophy aims to understand, and that is achieved through explanation. Regularity and counterfactual theories explain very little. |
8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
Full Idea: Kim has pointed out that there are a number of counterfactuals that have nothing to do with causation. If John marries Mary, then if John had not existed he would not have married Mary, but that is not the cause of their union. | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], 5.2) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience | |
A reaction: One might not think that this mattered, but it leaves the problem of distinguishing between the causal counterfactuals and the rest (and you mustn't mention causation when you are doing it!). |
8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
Full Idea: Counterfactuals can express 'analytical' dependency, or the fact that one event is part of another, or an action done by doing another, or (most interestingly) an event can determine another without causally determining it. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205) | |
A reaction: [Kim gives example of each case] Counterfactuals can even express a relation that involves no dependency. Or they might just involve redescription, as in 'If Scott were still alive, then the author of "Waverley" would be too'. |
8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
Full Idea: The sort of dependency expressed by counterfactual relations is considerably broader than strictly causal dependency, and causal dependency is only one among the heterogeneous group of dependency relationships counterfactuals can express. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205) | |
A reaction: In 'If pigs could fly, one and one still wouldn't make three' there isn't even a dependency. Kim has opened up lines of criticism which make the counterfactual analysis of causation look very implausible to me. |
23543 | We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: There is a common tendency to identify a cause with its symptoms. Hence we are not sure how to characterise a law, and so we identify it with the regularities to which it gives rise. | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 1) | |
A reaction: A lovely clear identification of my pet hate, which is superficial accounts of things, which claim to be the last word, but actually explain nothing. |
4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: Kim gives a range of examples of counterfactual dependence without causation, as: 'if yesterday wasn't Monday, today wouldn't be Tuesday', and 'if my sister had not given birth, I would not be an uncle'. | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §3.3 | |
A reaction: This is aimed at David Lewis. The objection seems like commonsense. "If you blink, the cat gets it". Causal claims involve counterfactuals, but they are not definitive of what causation is. |