Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Paradoxes: Form and Predication', 'On Motion' and 'Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification

14235	Saying 'they can become a set' is a tautology, because reference to 'they' implies a collection [Cargile]
	Full Idea: If the rule is asserted 'Given any well-determined objects, they can be collected into a set by an application of the 'set of' operation', then on the usual account of 'they' this is a tautology. Collection comes automatically with this form of reference.
	From: James Cargile (Paradoxes: Form and Predication [1979], p.115), quoted by Oliver,A/Smiley,T - What are Sets and What are they For? Intro
	A reaction: Is this a problem? Given they are well-determined (presumably implying countable) there just is a set of them. That's what set theory is, I thought. Of course, the iterative view talks of 'constructing' the sets, but the construction looks unstoppable.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism

19508	Contextualism needs a semantics for knowledge sentences that are partly indexical [Schiffer,S]
	Full Idea: Contextualist semantics must capture the 'indexical' nature of knowledge claims, the fact that different utterances of a knowledge sentence with no apparent indexical terms can express different propositions.
	From: Stephen Schiffer (Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism [1996], p.325), quoted by Keith DeRose - The Case for Contextualism 1.5
	A reaction: Schiffer tries to show that this is too difficult, and DeRose defends contextualism against the charge.

19509	The indexical aspect of contextual knowledge might be hidden, or it might be in what 'know' means [Schiffer,S]
	Full Idea: One might have a 'hidden-indexical' theory of knowledge sentences: they contain constituents that are not the semantic values of any terms; ...or 'to know' itself might be indexical, as in 'I know[easy] I have hands' or 'I know[tough] I have hands'.
	From: Stephen Schiffer (Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism [1996], p.326-7), quoted by Keith DeRose - The Case for Contextualism 1.5
	A reaction: [very compressed] Given the choice, I would have thought it was in 'know', since to say 'either you know p or you don't' sounds silly to me.

27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity

12709	Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: In reality motion is not something absolute, but consists in relation.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Motion [1677], A6.4.1968), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
	A reaction: It is often thought that motion being relative was invented by Einstein, but Leibniz wholeheartedly embraced 'Galilean relativity', and refused to even consider any absolute concept of motion. Acceleration is a bit trickier than velocity.