Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Paradoxes: Form and Predication', 'Euthyphro' and 'The Nature of Thought'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence

2764	Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J]
	Full Idea: Blanshard says that in a fully coherent system there would not only be consistency, but every proposition would be entailed by the others, and no proposition would stand outside the system.
	From: report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], 2:265) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 8.1
	A reaction: Hm. If a proposition is entailed by the others, then it is a necessary truth (given the others) which sounds deterministic. You could predict all the truths you had never encountered. See 1578:178 for quote.

3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth

19080	Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO]
	Full Idea: Blanshard said that coherent justification leads to coherence truth. It might be said that coherence is a test for truth, but truth is correspondence. But coherence doesn't guarantee correspondence, and coherence is a test, so truth is not correspondence.
	From: report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], Ch.26) by James O. Young - The Coherence Theory of Truth §2.2
	A reaction: [compression of Young's summary] Rescher (1973) says that Blanshard's argument depends on coherence being an infallible test for truth, which it isn't.

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification

14235	Saying 'they can become a set' is a tautology, because reference to 'they' implies a collection [Cargile]
	Full Idea: If the rule is asserted 'Given any well-determined objects, they can be collected into a set by an application of the 'set of' operation', then on the usual account of 'they' this is a tautology. Collection comes automatically with this form of reference.
	From: James Cargile (Paradoxes: Form and Predication [1979], p.115), quoted by Oliver,A/Smiley,T - What are Sets and What are they For? Intro
	A reaction: Is this a problem? Given they are well-determined (presumably implying countable) there just is a set of them. That's what set theory is, I thought. Of course, the iterative view talks of 'constructing' the sets, but the construction looks unstoppable.

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique

335	Do the gods also hold different opinions about what is right and honourable? [Plato]
	Full Idea: Do the gods too hold different opinions about what is right, and similarly about what is honourable and dishonourable, good and bad?
	From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 07e)

28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question

336	Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? (the 'Euthyphro Question') [Plato]
	Full Idea: Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it?
	From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 10a)
	A reaction: The famous Euthyphro Question, the key question about the supposed religious basis of morality. The answer of Socrates is Idea 337.

337	It seems that the gods love things because they are pious, rather than making them pious by loving them [Plato]
	Full Idea: So things are loved by the gods because they are pious, and not pious because they are loved? It seems so.
	From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.398 BCE], 10e)
	A reaction: Socrates' answer to the Euthyphro Question (see Idea 336). The form of piety precedes the gods.