Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'God and Human Attributes', 'Idealism: a critical survey' and 'Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness''

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8 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism

21513	We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
	Full Idea: I think it is wrong to tie down the advocates of the coherence theory to a precise definition. ...It would be altogether unreasonable to demand that the moral ideal should be exhaustively defined, and the same may be true of the ideal of thought.
	From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.231), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 7.6
	A reaction: I strongly agree. It is not a council of despair. I think the criteria of coherence can be articulated quite well (e.g by Thagard), and the virtues of enquiry can also be quite well specified (e.g. by Zagzebski). Very dissimilar evidence must cohere.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique

21497	If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
	Full Idea: Without a detailed account, coherence is reduced to the mere muttering of the word 'coherence', which can be interpreted so as to cover all arguments, but only by making its meaning so wide as to rob it of almost all significance.
	From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.246), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 2.2
	A reaction: I'm a fan of coherence, but it is a placeholder, involving no intrinsic or detailed theory. I just think it points to the reality of how we make judgements, especially practical ones. We can categorise the inputs, and explain the required virtues.

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness

9312	Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: The two main competitors for reductive theories of consciousness are the representational theory (conscious if it represents in the right way), and higher-order monitoring (conscious if it is represented in the right way).
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], Intro)
	A reaction: Presumably there are also neuroscientists hunting for physical functions which might generate consciousness. The two mentioned here are rivals at one level of discourse. Both views may be simplistic, if complex teams of activities are involved.

9313	Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: On the assumption that any environmental feature can be represented either consciously or unconsciously, it is unclear how the mere representation of such a feature can render the representing state conscious.
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1)
	A reaction: The authors are rejecting simple representation as the key, in favour of a distinctive sort of self-representation. I'm inclined to think that consciousness results from multiple co-ordinated layers of representation etc., which has no simple account.

9315	Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: The self-representational theory of consciousness says that when one has a conscious experience as of a red tomato, one is in an internal state that represents both a red tomato and itself.
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1)
	A reaction: This seems to be avoiding the concept of 'higher-order', and yet that seems the only way to describe it - thought steps outside of itself, generating a level of meta-thought. I think that's the way to go. Philosophy is about-fifth level.

9316	How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: The difficulties with a self-representational view of consciousness are how self-representation of mental states could be possible, whether it leads to an infinite regress, and whether it can capture the actual phenomenology of experience.
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §3)
	A reaction: [compressed] All of these objections strike me as persuasive, especially the first one. I'm not sure I know what self-representation is. Mirrors externally represent, and they can't represent themselves. Two mirrors together achieve something..

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought

9314	Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]
	Full Idea: A problem for explaining consciousness by higher-order representations is that, like their first-order counterparts, they can misrepresent; there could be a subjective impression of being in a conscious state without actually being in any conscious state.
	From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1)
	A reaction: It sounds plausible that this is a logical possibility, but how do you assess whether it is an actual or natural possibility? Are we saying that higher-order representations are judgments, which could be true or false? Hm.

28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument

20713	God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B]
	Full Idea: Rachels argues 1) If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship, 2) No being could be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent, so 3) There cannot be a being who is God.
	From: report of James Rachels (God and Human Attributes [1971], 7 p.334) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'd morality'
	A reaction: Presumably Lionel Messi can be a fitting object of worship without being God. Since the problem is with being worshipful, rather than with being God, should I infer that Messi doesn't exist?