30 ideas
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
Full Idea: My knowing that I had a hidden birth-mark would not entitle me to infer with any great degree of confidence that the same was true of everybody else. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.E) | |
A reaction: This is the notorious 'induction from a single case' which was used by Mill to prove that other minds exist. It is a very nice illustration of the weakness of arguments from analogy. Probably analogy on its own is useless, but is a key part of induction. |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
Full Idea: It is currently held that we are committed to a belief in the existence of anything over which we quantify. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], IX.C) | |
A reaction: In a fairy tale we quantify over fairies, so some further criterion will obviously be needed. |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
Full Idea: We can significantly ask what properties it is necessary for something to possess in order to be a thing of such and such a kind, since that asks what properties enter into the definition of the kind. But there is no such definition of the individual. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], 9.A.5) | |
A reaction: [Quoted, not surprisingly, by Wiggins] Illuminating. If essence is just about necessary properties, I begin to see why the sortal might be favoured. I take it to concern explanatory mechanisms, and hence the individual. |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
Full Idea: The theory that other people besides oneself have mental states is one that has no serious rival. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.E) | |
A reaction: See 3463, where Searle says there is no such thing as our "theory" about other minds. In a science fiction situation (see 'Blade Runner'), this unrivalled theory could quickly unravel. It could even be a fact that you are the only humanoid with a mind. |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
Full Idea: In 1936 I combined a mentalistic analysis of the propositions in which one attributes experiences to oneself with a behaviouristic analysis of the propositions in which one attributes experiences to others. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.D) | |
A reaction: He then criticises his view for inconsistency. Ryle preferred a behaviouristic account of introspection, but Ayer calls this 'ridiculous'. Ayer hunts for a compromise, but then settles for the right answer, which makes mentalism the 'best explanation'. |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
Full Idea: The acceptance of physicalism undercuts the other minds problem by equating experiences with events in the brain, which are publicly observable. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.E) | |
A reaction: It strikes me that if we could actually observe the operations of one another's brains, a great many of the problems of philosophy would never have appeared in the first place. Imagine a transparent skull and brain, with coloured waves moving through it. |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
Full Idea: Is the character of being an item of experience one that can accrue to a quale through its relation to other qualia, or must it consist in a relation to a subject, which is conscious of these elements and distinct from them? | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.B) | |
A reaction: When nicely put like this, it is hard to see how qualia could be experiences just because they relate to one another. It begs the question of what is causing the relationship. There seems to be a Cogito-like assumption of a thinker. |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
Full Idea: The ground for thinking that qualia are only experiences because they relate to a unifying subject is that they have to be identified, by being brought under concepts, and giving rise to judgements which usually go beyond them. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.B) | |
A reaction: Thus one of Hume's greatest fans gives the clearest objection to Hume. It strikes me as a very powerful objection, better than anything Carruthers offers (1394,1395,1396). The conceptual element is very hard to disentangle from the qualia. |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
Full Idea: In general the two criteria of memory and bodily identity work together. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.B) | |
A reaction: This seems better than any simplistic one-criterion approach. In life we use different criteria for our own identity, as when dreaming, or waking with a hangover, or wondering if we are dead after an accident. |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
Full Idea: Self-consciousness is not a primitive datum, or in other words the observer's experiences are not intrinsically marked as his own. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.A) | |
A reaction: This is a very Humean, ruthlessly empiricist view of the matter. Plenty of philosophers (existentialists, or Charles Taylor) would say that our experiences have our interests or values built into them. Why are they experiences, and not just events? |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
Full Idea: If there were temporal gaps in the consciousness of disembodied spirits, the occurrences of memory-experiences would not be sufficient to bridge them. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.C) | |
A reaction: Ayer is very sympathetic to the idea that the body is a key ingredient in personal identity. Without a body, there would be no criteria at all for the continuity of a spirit which lost consciousness for a while, since consciousness is all it is. |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
Full Idea: If mind and brain exactly correspond we have as good ground for saying the brain depends on the mind as the other way round; if predominance is given to the brain, the reason is that it fits into a wider explanatory system. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.D) | |
A reaction: A small but significant point. If an 'identity' theory is to be developed, then this step in the argument has to be justified. It is tempting here to move to the eliminativist view, because we no longer have to worry about a 'direction of priority'. |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
Full Idea: Our talk of propositions should not be regarded as anything more than a concise way of talking about equivalent sentences. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], IX.C) | |
A reaction: Wrong, though I can see why he says it. We struggle to express difficult propositions by offering several similar (but not equivalent) sentences. What is the criterion for deciding his 'equivalence'? |
7337 | In Mosaic legal theory, crimes are sins and sins are crimes [Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: In Mosaic legal theory, all breaches of the law offend God. All crimes are sins, just as all sins are crimes. | |
From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
A reaction: This would seem to define Josephus called a 'theocracy'. Not just rule by a priesthood, but also an attempt to make civil law coincide with the teachings of sacred texts. But doing 80 m.p.h. on a motorway at 2 a.m. hardly seems like a sin. |
7339 | Because human life is what is sacred, Mosaic law has no death penalty for property violations [Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: Where other codes provided the death penalty for offences against property, in Mosaic law no property offence is capital; human life is too sacred, where the rights of property alone are violated. | |
From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
A reaction: We still preserve this idea in our law, and also in our culture, where we are keen to insist that catastrophes like earthquakes or major fires are measured almost entirely by the loss of life, not the loss of property. I approve. |
7353 | The Pharisees undermined slavery, by giving slaves responsibility and status in law courts [Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: It is no accident that slavery among Jews disappeared with the rise of the Pharisees, as they insisted that all were equal before God in a court. Masters were no longer responsible for actions of slaves, so a slave had status, and slavery could not work. | |
From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
A reaction: As in seventeenth century England, the rise of social freedom comes from religious sources, not social sources. A slave has status in the transcendent world of souls, despite being a nobody in the physical world. |
7340 | Mosaic law was the first to embody the rule of law, and equality before the law [Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: Mosaic law meant that God ruled through his laws, and since all were equally subject to the law, the system was the first to embody the double merits of the rule of law and equality before the law. | |
From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
A reaction: If this is correct, it seems to be a hugely important step, combined with Idea 1659, that revenge should be the action of a the state, not of the individual. They are the few simple and essential keys to civilization. |
7338 | Man's life is sacred, because it is made in God's image [Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: In Mosaic theology, man is made in God's image, and so his life is not just valuable, it is sacred. | |
From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
A reaction: The obvious question is what exactly is meant by "in God's image". Physically, spiritually, intellectually, morally? I am guessing that the original idea was intellectual, because we are the only rational animal. The others seem unlikely, or arrogant. |
20713 | God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B] |
Full Idea: Rachels argues 1) If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship, 2) No being could be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent, so 3) There cannot be a being who is God. | |
From: report of James Rachels (God and Human Attributes [1971], 7 p.334) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'd morality' | |
A reaction: Presumably Lionel Messi can be a fitting object of worship without being God. Since the problem is with being worshipful, rather than with being God, should I infer that Messi doesn't exist? |
7348 | The Jews sharply distinguish human and divine, but the Greeks pull them closer together [Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: The Jews drew an absolute distinction between the human and the divine; the Greeks constantly elevated the human - they were Promethean - and lowered the divine. | |
From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
A reaction: An intriguing observation. The Greek idea runs right through European culture, surfacing (for example) in 'Faust', or 'Frankenstein', or the films of James Cameron. I'm with the Greeks; I want to see how far humanity can be elevated. |
7355 | The Torah pre-existed creation, and was its blueprint [Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: The Torah was not just a book about God. It pre-existed creation, in the same way as God did. In fact, it was the blueprint of creation. | |
From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt III) | |
A reaction: You can only become a 'people of the book' (which Moslems resented in Judaism, and then emulated) if you give this stupendously high status to your book. Hence Christian fundamentalism makes sense, with its emphasis on the divinity of the Bible. |
7336 | A key moment is the idea of a single moral God, who imposes his morality on humanity [Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: The discovery of monotheism, and not just of monotheism but of a sole, omnipotent God actuated by ethical principles and seeking methodically to impose them on human beings, is one of the greatest turning-points in history, perhaps the greatest of all. | |
From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
A reaction: 'Discovery' begs some questions, but when put like this you realise what a remarkable event it was. It is a good candidate for the most influential idea ever, even if large chunks of humanity, especially in the orient, never took to monotheism. |
7341 | Sampson illustrates the idea that religious heroes often begin as outlaws and semi-criminals [Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: Sampson is the outstanding example of the point which the Book of Judges makes again and again, that the Lord and society are often served by semi-criminal types, outlaws and misfits, who become folk-heroes and then religious heroes. | |
From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
A reaction: This illustrates nicely Nietzsche's claim, that the jews were responsible for his 'inversion of values', in which aristocratic virtues are downgraded, and the virtues of a good slave are elevated (though Sampson may not show that point so well!). |
7342 | Isaiah moved Israelite religion away from the local, onto a more universal plane [Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: The works of Isaiah (740-700 BCE) mark the point at which the Israelite religion began to spiritualize itself, to move from a specific location in space and time on to the universalist plane. | |
From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt I) | |
A reaction: This is necessary if any religion is going to make converts outside the local culture. The crucial step would be to disembody God, so that He cannot be represented by a statue. The difficulty is for him to be universal, but retain a 'chosen people'. |
7344 | Judaism involves circumcision, Sabbath, Passover, Pentecost, Tabernacles, New Year, and Atonement [Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: The practices of Judaism developed during their Exile: circumcision, the Sabbath, the Passover (founding of the nation), Pentecost (giving of the laws), the Tabernacles, the New Year, and the Day of Atonement. | |
From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
A reaction: These were the elements of ritual created to replace the existence of a physically located state. An astonishing achievement, not even remotely achieved by any other state that was driven off its lands. A culture is an idea, not a country. |
7345 | In exile the Jews became a nomocracy [Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: In exile the Jews, deprived of a state, became a nomocracy - voluntarily submitting to rule by a Law which could only be enforced by consent. Nothing like this had occurred before in history. | |
From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
A reaction: It is the most remarkable case in history of a people united and strengthened by adversity, and it became an important experiment in the building of human cultures. But what is the point of preserving a culture, with no land? Why not just integrate? |
7347 | Zoroastrians believed in one eternal beneficent being, Creator through the holy spirit [Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: Cyrus the Great was a Zoroastrian, believing in one, eternal, beneficent being, 'Creator of all things through the holy spirit'. | |
From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
A reaction: Is this the actual origin of monotheism, or did they absorb this idea from the Jews? The interesting bit is the fact that the supreme being (called Marduk) is 'beneficent', which one doesn't associate with these remote and supposed pagans. |
7349 | Immortality based on judgement of merit was developed by the Egyptians (not the Jews) [Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: The idea of judgement at death and immortality on the basis of merit were developed in Egypt before 1000 BCE. It is not Jewish because it was not in the Torah, and the Sadducees, who stuck to their texts, seemed to have denied the afterlife completely. | |
From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
A reaction: This is the idea considered crucial to religion by Immanuel Kant (Idea 1455), who should be declared an honorary Egyptian. To me the idea that only the good go to heaven sounds like sadly wishful thinking - a fictional consolation for an unhappy life. |
7354 | The main doctrine of the Pharisees was belief in resurrection and the afterlife [Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: Belief in resurrection and the afterlife was the main distinguishing mark of Pharisaism, and thus fundamental of rabbinic Judaism. | |
From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt II) | |
A reaction: Belief in an afterlife seems to go back to the Egyptians, but this development in Judaism was obviously very influential, even among early Christians, who initially seem to have only believed in resurrection of the body. |
7356 | Pious Jews saw heaven as a vast library [Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: Pious Jews saw heaven as a vast library, with the Archangel Metatron as the librarian: the books in the shelves there pressed themselves together to make room for a newcomer. | |
From: Paul Johnson (The History of the Jews [1987], Pt III) | |
A reaction: I'm tempted to convert to Judaism. |