3 ideas
14305 | In the truth-functional account a burnt-up match was soluble because it never entered water [Carnap] |
Full Idea: If a wooden match was completely burned up yesterday, and never placed in water at any time, is it not the case, therefore, that the match is soluble (in the truth-functional view). This follows just from the antecedent being false. | |
From: Rudolph Carnap (Testability and Meaning [1937], I.440), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions | |
A reaction: This, along with Edgington's nice example of the conditional command (Idea ) seems conclusive against the truth-functional account. The only defence possible is some sort of pragmatic account about implicature. |
8659 | The gods alone live forever with Shamash. The days of humans are numbered. [Anon (Gilg)] |
Full Idea: The gods alone are the ones who live forever with Shamash. / As for humans, their days are numbered. | |
From: Anon (Gilg) (The Epic of Gilgamesh [c.2300 BCE], 3.2.34), quoted by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.2 | |
A reaction: Friend quotes this to show the antiquity of the concept of infinity. It also, of course, shows that Sumerians at that time did not believe in human immortality. |
20713 | God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B] |
Full Idea: Rachels argues 1) If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship, 2) No being could be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent, so 3) There cannot be a being who is God. | |
From: report of James Rachels (God and Human Attributes [1971], 7 p.334) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'd morality' | |
A reaction: Presumably Lionel Messi can be a fitting object of worship without being God. Since the problem is with being worshipful, rather than with being God, should I infer that Messi doesn't exist? |