6 ideas
16362 | An identity statement aims at getting the hearer to merge two mental files [Lockwood] |
Full Idea: The purpose of an identity statement is to get the hearer to merge these files or bodies of information into one. | |
From: Michael Lockwood (Identity and Reference [1971], p.209), quoted by François Recanati - Mental Files 4.1 | |
A reaction: Lockwood is a pioneer, in seeing 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' and 'Scott is the author of 'Waverley'' in terms of how the mind works. Mental files seem to me to explain a huge amount. Recanati proposes 'linking' rather than 'merging'. |
3236 | Equality of opportunity without equality of respect would create a very inhuman society [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: A highly rational, efficient and unmitigated application of the idea of equality of opportunity, while abandoning the idea of equality of respect as vague and nostalgic, would lead to a quite inhuman society. | |
From: Bernard Williams (The Idea of Equality [1962], §3) |
3233 | Equality implies that people are alike in potential as well as in needs [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Supporters of equality have asserted that people are alike in certain things they could do or achieve, as well as in the things that they need and could suffer. | |
From: Bernard Williams (The Idea of Equality [1962], §2) |
3234 | Equality seems to require that each person be acknowledged as having a significant point of view [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Equality seems to require that each person is owed an effort at identification; they should not be seen as a surface to which a label can be applied, but one should try to see the world (including the label) from their point of view. | |
From: Bernard Williams (The Idea of Equality [1962], §2) |
3235 | It is a mark of extreme exploitation that the sufferers do not realise their plight [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: It is a mark of extreme exploitation or degradation that those who suffer it do NOT see themselves differently from the way they are seen by the exploiters. | |
From: Bernard Williams (The Idea of Equality [1962], §2) |
20713 | God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B] |
Full Idea: Rachels argues 1) If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship, 2) No being could be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent, so 3) There cannot be a being who is God. | |
From: report of James Rachels (God and Human Attributes [1971], 7 p.334) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'd morality' | |
A reaction: Presumably Lionel Messi can be a fitting object of worship without being God. Since the problem is with being worshipful, rather than with being God, should I infer that Messi doesn't exist? |