13412
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Obtaining numbers by abstraction is impossible - there are too many; only a rule could give them, in order [Benacerraf]
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Full Idea:
Not all numbers could possibly have been learned à la Frege-Russell, because we could not have performed that many distinct acts of abstraction. Somewhere along the line a rule had to come in to enable us to obtain more numbers, in the natural order.
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From:
Paul Benacerraf (Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD) [1960], p.165)
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A reaction:
Follows on from Idea 13411. I'm not sure how Russell would deal with this, though I am sure his account cannot be swept aside this easily. Nevertheless this seems powerful and convincing, approaching the problem through the epistemology.
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13413
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We must explain how we know so many numbers, and recognise ones we haven't met before [Benacerraf]
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Full Idea:
Both ordinalists and cardinalists, to account for our number words, have to account for the fact that we know so many of them, and that we can 'recognize' numbers which we've neither seen nor heard.
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From:
Paul Benacerraf (Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD) [1960], p.166)
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A reaction:
This seems an important contraint on any attempt to explain numbers. Benacerraf is an incipient structuralist, and here presses the importance of rules in our grasp of number. Faced with 42,578,645, we perform an act of deconstruction to grasp it.
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13411
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If numbers are basically the cardinals (Frege-Russell view) you could know some numbers in isolation [Benacerraf]
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Full Idea:
If we accept the Frege-Russell analysis of number (the natural numbers are the cardinals) as basic and correct, one thing which seems to follow is that one could know, say, three, seventeen, and eight, but no other numbers.
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From:
Paul Benacerraf (Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD) [1960], p.164)
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A reaction:
It seems possible that someone might only know those numbers, as the patterns of members of three neighbouring families (the only place where they apply number). That said, this is good support for the priority of ordinals. See Idea 13412.
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8375
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'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell]
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Full Idea:
'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, meaning that it is true for all possible values of its argument or arguments. Thus 'If x is a man, x is mortal' is necessary, because it is true for any possible value of x.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.175)
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A reaction:
This is presumably the intermediate definition of necessity, prior to modern talk of possible worlds. Since it is a predicate about functions, it is presumably a metalinguistic concept, like the semantic concept of truth.
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4396
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The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell]
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Full Idea:
The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.173)
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A reaction:
A bold proposal which should be taken seriously. However, if we drop it from scientific explanation, we may well find ourselves permanently stuck with it in 'folk' explanation. What is the alternative?
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8379
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In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell]
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Full Idea:
An 'event' (in a statement of the 'law of causation') is intended to be something that is likely to recur, since otherwise the law becomes trivial. It follows that an 'event' is not some particular, but a universal of which there may be many instances.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (On the Notion of Cause [1912], p.179)
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A reaction:
I am very struck by this. It may be a key insight into understanding what a law of nature actually is. It doesn't follow that we must be realists about universals, but the process of abstraction from particulars is at the heart of generalisation.
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20713
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God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B]
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Full Idea:
Rachels argues 1) If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship, 2) No being could be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent, so 3) There cannot be a being who is God.
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From:
report of James Rachels (God and Human Attributes [1971], 7 p.334) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'd morality'
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A reaction:
Presumably Lionel Messi can be a fitting object of worship without being God. Since the problem is with being worshipful, rather than with being God, should I infer that Messi doesn't exist?
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