4 ideas
| 9465 | Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type [Jacquette] |
| Full Idea: The substitutional interpretation says the universal quantifier is true just in case it remains true for all substitutions of terms of the same type as that of the universally bound variable. | |
| From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to III: Quantifiers [2002], p.143) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't seem to tell us how it gets started with being true. |
| 9466 | Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects [Jacquette] |
| Full Idea: Some substitutional quantificationists in logic hope to avoid philosophical entanglements about the metaphysics of objects, ..and nominalists can find aid and comfort there. | |
| From: Dale Jacquette (Intro to III: Quantifiers [2002], p.143) | |
| A reaction: This has an appeal for me, particularly if it avoids abstract objects, but I don't see much problem with material objects, so we might as well have a view that admits those. |
| 22688 | The Aristotelian idea that choices can be perceived needs literary texts to expound it [Nussbaum] |
| Full Idea: To show forth the Aristotelian claim that 'the decision rests with perception', we need - either side by side with a philosophical outline or inside it - literary texts which display the complexity, indeterminacy, and sheer difficulty of moral choice. | |
| From: Martha Nussbaum (The Golden Bowl, and Lit as Moral Philosophy [1983], II) | |
| A reaction: Berys Gaut observes that this depends on a particularist view of moral choice (usually seen as Aristotelian), with little interest in principles. |
| 20713 | God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: Rachels argues 1) If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship, 2) No being could be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent, so 3) There cannot be a being who is God. | |
| From: report of James Rachels (God and Human Attributes [1971], 7 p.334) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'd morality' | |
| A reaction: Presumably Lionel Messi can be a fitting object of worship without being God. Since the problem is with being worshipful, rather than with being God, should I infer that Messi doesn't exist? |