Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'God and Human Attributes', 'Cartesian Meditations' and 'Modal Logic as Metaphysics'

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5 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads

21226	Husserl sees the ego as a monad, unifying presence, sense and intentional acts [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
	Full Idea: Husserl's notion of monad expresses a complete inegration of every intentional presence into its sense, and every sense into the intentional acts, ....and finally every intentional act is integrated into the ego.
	From: report of Edmund Husserl (Cartesian Meditations [1931]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.6.2
	A reaction: No, I don't understand that either, but it makes good sense to employ the concept of a 'monad' into the concept of the ego, if you think it embodies perfect unity. That was a main motivation for Leibniz to employ the word.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects

18925	If talking donkeys are possible, something exists which could be a talking donkey [Williamson, by Cameron]
	Full Idea: Williamson's view on modality is that everything that could exist does exist: since there could exist a talking donkey there actually exists some thing that could be a talking donkey.
	From: report of Timothy Williamson (Modal Logic as Metaphysics [2013], n20) by Ross P. Cameron - Truthmaking for Presentists n20
	A reaction: Well that thing certainly isn't me, or Tim Williamson. I'm guessing that the thing is an actual donkey, probably a rather bright one. Actually, I think this is one of those views that invites the incredulous stare. (Barcan formulae).

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds

21228	Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy. [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
	Full Idea: For Husserl monads have windows because they communicate with each other. The windows of the monads are the acts of empathy.
	From: report of Edmund Husserl (Cartesian Meditations [1931]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.7.5
	A reaction: Leibniz said his monads (which include minds) have 'no windows'. The mere existence of empathy (or mirror neurons, as we would say) is hardly sufficient to defeat solipsism.

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self

21225	The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
	Full Idea: Husserl distinguishes two sorts of egos or subjects of experience, the psychological ego and the pure ego. The psychological ego is a reality of the world, and the pure ego is a result of transcendental reduction.
	From: report of Edmund Husserl (Cartesian Meditations [1931]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.6.1
	A reaction: The sounds like embracing both the Cartesian and the Kantian egos. This is obviously the source of Sartre's interesting early book on the self. 'Transcendental reduction' is his bracketing or epoché.

28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument

20713	God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B]
	Full Idea: Rachels argues 1) If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship, 2) No being could be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent, so 3) There cannot be a being who is God.
	From: report of James Rachels (God and Human Attributes [1971], 7 p.334) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'd morality'
	A reaction: Presumably Lionel Messi can be a fitting object of worship without being God. Since the problem is with being worshipful, rather than with being God, should I infer that Messi doesn't exist?