5 ideas
| 5035 | The two basics of reasoning are contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The two first principles of reasoning are: the principle of contradiction, and the principle of the need for giving a reason. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.75) | |
| A reaction: Could animals have any reasoning ability (say, in solving a physical problem)? Leibniz's criteria both require language. Note the overlapping of the principle of sufficient reason (there IS a reason) with the contractual idea of GIVING reasons. |
| 13191 | The properties of a thing flow from its essence [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: It is the same to look for perfection in an essence and in the properties that flow from an essence. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Wolff [1715], 1715.05.18) | |
| A reaction: It is helpful to have Leibniz spelling out his commitment to the traditional view of essence, as that from which the more evident properties flow. |
| 5038 | Assume that mind and body follow their own laws, but God has harmonised them [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Why not assume that God initially created the soul and body with so much ingenuity that, whilst each follows its own laws and properties and operations, all thing agree most beautifull among themselves? This is the 'hypothesis of concomitance'. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.80) | |
| A reaction: They may be in beautifully planned harmony, but how do we know that they are in harmony? Presumably their actions must be compared, and God would even have to harmonise the comparison. Parallelism seems to imply epiphenomenalism or idealism. |
| 20713 | God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: Rachels argues 1) If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship, 2) No being could be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent, so 3) There cannot be a being who is God. | |
| From: report of James Rachels (God and Human Attributes [1971], 7 p.334) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'd morality' | |
| A reaction: Presumably Lionel Messi can be a fitting object of worship without being God. Since the problem is with being worshipful, rather than with being God, should I infer that Messi doesn't exist? |
| 5037 | God doesn't decide that Adam will sin, but that sinful Adam's existence is to be preferred [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: God does not decide whether Adam should sin, but whether that series of things in which there is an Adam whose perfect individual notion involves sin should nevertheless be preferred to others. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.78) | |
| A reaction: Compare whether the person responsible for setting a road speed limit is responsible for subsequent accidents. Leibniz's belief that the world could have been made no better than it is (by an omnipotent being) strikes me as blind faith, not an argument. |