Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'God and Human Attributes', 'De Natura Corporis' and 'A World of Dispositions'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

6 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic

12710	As well as extension, bodies contain powers [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Over and above what can be deduced from extension, we must add and recognise in bodies certain notions or forms that are immaterial, so to speak, or independent of extension, which you can call powers [potentia], by which speed is adjusted to magnitude.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (De Natura Corporis [1678], A6.4.1980), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
	A reaction: He boldly asserts that the powers are 'immaterial', but is then forced to qualify it (as he often does) with 'so to speak'. The notion that bodies just have extension (occupy space) comes from Descartes, and is firmly opposed by Leibniz.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential

15797	All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer]
	Full Idea: I propose a dispositional ontology for the physical world, according to which a) every structural property is a dispositional one, b) a physical object is an ordered set of dispositions, and c) every event manifests a dispositional property of the world.
	From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], Intro)
	A reaction: Mumford says this is consistent with ontology as a way of describing the world, rather than being facts about the world. I like Fetzer's sketch, which sounds to have a lot in common with 'process philosophy'.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object

15800	All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer]
	Full Idea: Every atomic event in the world's history is a manifestation of some dispositional property of the world and every physical object is an instantiation of some set of dispositions; hence, every structural property is dispositional in kind.
	From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 5)
	A reaction: I quite like this drastic view, but there remains the intuition that there must always be something which has the disposition. That may be because I have not yet digested the lessons of modern physics.

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds

15798	Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer]
	Full Idea: Kinds of things are specific arrangements of dispositions.
	From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 2)
	A reaction: A 'disposition' doesn't seem quite the right word for what is basic to the physical world, though Harré and Madden make a good case for the 'fields' of physic being understood in that way. I prefer 'power', though that doesn't solve anything.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities

15799	Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer]
	Full Idea: Lawlike sentences are conceived as logically general dispositional statements attributing permanent dispositional properties to every member of a reference class. ...Their basic form is that of subjunctive generalizations.
	From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 3)
	A reaction: I much prefer talk of 'lawlike sentences' to talk of 'laws'. At least they imply that the true generalisations about nature are fairly fine-grained. Why not talk of 'generalisations' instead of 'laws'? Fetzer wants dispositions to explain everything.

28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument

20713	God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B]
	Full Idea: Rachels argues 1) If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship, 2) No being could be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent, so 3) There cannot be a being who is God.
	From: report of James Rachels (God and Human Attributes [1971], 7 p.334) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'd morality'
	A reaction: Presumably Lionel Messi can be a fitting object of worship without being God. Since the problem is with being worshipful, rather than with being God, should I infer that Messi doesn't exist?