4 ideas
| 13197 | The notion of substance is one of the keys to true philosophy [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: I consider the notion of substance to be one of the keys to the true philosophy. ....I imagine that philosophers will one day know the notion of substance a bit better than they do now. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomas Burnett [1703], 1699.01.20/30) | |
| A reaction: This is a controversial remark at this historical moment, when the apparent Aristotelian commitment to substances was becoming discredited. Personally I would eliminate substance, but not just because physicists don't refer to it. |
| 13198 | Gravity is within matter because of its structure, and it can be explained. [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: I believe that both gravity and elasticity are in matter only because of the structure of the system and can be explained mechanically or through impulsion. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Thomas Burnett [1703], 1699 draft) | |
| A reaction: The significance of this remark is that gravity is held (in full knowledge of Newton's work) to be within matter, and not imposed from the outside. I believe we now postulate a particle as part of the explanation. |
| 10246 | The limit of science is isomorphism of theories, with essences a matter of indifference [Weyl] |
| Full Idea: A science can determine its domain of investigation up to an isomorphic mapping. It remains quite indifferent as to the 'essence' of its objects. The idea of isomorphism demarcates the self-evident boundary of cognition. | |
| From: Hermann Weyl (Phil of Mathematics and Natural Science [1949], 25-7), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
| A reaction: Shapiro quotes this in support of his structuralism, but it is a striking expression of the idea that if there are such things as essences, they are beyond science. I take Weyl to be wrong. Best explanation reaches out beyond models to essences. |
| 20713 | God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B] |
| Full Idea: Rachels argues 1) If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship, 2) No being could be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent, so 3) There cannot be a being who is God. | |
| From: report of James Rachels (God and Human Attributes [1971], 7 p.334) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'd morality' | |
| A reaction: Presumably Lionel Messi can be a fitting object of worship without being God. Since the problem is with being worshipful, rather than with being God, should I infer that Messi doesn't exist? |