Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'God and Human Attributes', 'Why Reason Can't be Naturalized' and 'The Facts of Causation'

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5 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Mellor offers a distinction between 'facts' and 'facta' (the latter being the truth-makers for facts).
     From: report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
     A reaction: The idea is that 'facta' can do the work in causation, because 'facts' are not part of the world. This seems a very helpful terminology, which should be encouraged, since 'fact' is plainly ambiguous in current usage.
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Truth is rational acceptability [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Truth, in the only sense in which we have a vital and working notion of it, is rational acceptability.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Why Reason Can't be Naturalized [1981])
     A reaction: I smell a circularity somewhere in there, probably in 'rational', though it could be in 'acceptable'. Putnams's views on truth tend to shift a lot. He denies that evolutionary survival is a criterion.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos]
     Full Idea: Mellor argues that causal statements relate facts, where facts may be seen as whatever true propositions express.
     From: report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.6
     A reaction: Choose between 'facts', 'objects', 'conserved quantities, 'events' (the usual one) or 'processes'. I rather like processes (Salmon) as they are a better prospect as the building blocks of an ontology.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley]
     Full Idea: The basic idea of probabilistic causation is that a sufficient condition of C's being a cause of E is that C and E are actual, individual events, and the objective chance of E's occurring is greater given the occurrence of C than it would be without C.
     From: report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience 5.3
     A reaction: Mellor has to include objective 'chances' in his ontology to support his theory. As it stands this looks like a weak theory, since the event might not occur despite C happening, and some less likely event might turn out to be the actual cause.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B]
     Full Idea: Rachels argues 1) If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship, 2) No being could be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent, so 3) There cannot be a being who is God.
     From: report of James Rachels (God and Human Attributes [1971], 7 p.334) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'd morality'
     A reaction: Presumably Lionel Messi can be a fitting object of worship without being God. Since the problem is with being worshipful, rather than with being God, should I infer that Messi doesn't exist?