Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'God and Human Attributes', 'Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects' and 'Introduction to 'New Pragmatists''

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5 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity

23277	Modern pragmatism sees objectivity as possible, despite its gradual evolution [Misak]
	Full Idea: One of the pillars of the new pragmatism is the thought that the standards of objectivity come into being and evolve over time, but that being historically situated in this way does not detract from their objectivity.
	From: Cheryl Misak (Introduction to 'New Pragmatists' [2007], p.2)
	A reaction: This looks to me like pragmatism finally coming to its senses. I would say that being any sort of 'social construct' (beloved of cultural relativists) in no way detracts from its capacity for objectivity and truth.

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism

9224	Proceduralism offers a version of logicism with no axioms, or objects, or ontological commitment [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: My Proceduralism offers axiom-free foundations for mathematics. Axioms give way to the stipulation of procedures. We obtain a form of logicism, but with a procedural twist, and with a logic which is ontologically neutral, and no assumption of objects.
	From: Kit Fine (Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects [2005], 1)
	A reaction: [See Ideas 9222 and 9223 for his Proceduralism] Sounds like philosophical heaven. We get to take charge of mathematics, without the embarrassment of declaring ourselves to be platonists. Someone, not me, should evaluate this.

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism

9222	The objects and truths of mathematics are imperative procedures for their construction [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: I call my new approach to mathematics 'proceduralism'. It agrees with Hilbert and Poincaré that the objects and truths are postulations, but takes them to be imperatival rather than indicative in form; not propositions, but procedures for construction.
	From: Kit Fine (Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects [2005], Intro)
	A reaction: I'm not sure how an object or a truth can be a procedure, any more than a house can be a procedure. If a procedure doesn't have a product then it is an idle way to pass the time. The view seems to be related to fictionalism.

9223	My Proceduralism has one simple rule, and four complex rules [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: My Proceduralism has one simple rule (introduce an object), and four complex rules: Composition (combining two procedures), Conditionality (if A, do B), Universality (do a procedure for every x), and Iteration (rule to keep doing B).
	From: Kit Fine (Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects [2005], 1)
	A reaction: It sounds like a highly artificial and private game which Fine has invented, but he claims that this is the sort of thing that practising mathematicians have always done.

28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument

20713	God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B]
	Full Idea: Rachels argues 1) If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship, 2) No being could be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent, so 3) There cannot be a being who is God.
	From: report of James Rachels (God and Human Attributes [1971], 7 p.334) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'd morality'
	A reaction: Presumably Lionel Messi can be a fitting object of worship without being God. Since the problem is with being worshipful, rather than with being God, should I infer that Messi doesn't exist?