23326
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In the third century Stoicism died out, replaced by Platonism, with Aristotelian ethics [Frede,M]
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Full Idea:
By the second century CE Aristotelianism and Platonism had begun to eclipse Stoicism, and by the end of the third century Stoicism had no followers. All philosophers now opted for some form of Platonism, but including Aristotle's ethical principles.
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From:
Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 04)
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A reaction:
The idea that Aristotelian ethics dominated that period is new to me. Stoic influence remained strong in Augustine, and hence in Christianity.
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23336
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There is no will for Plato or Aristotle, because actions come directly from perception of what is good [Frede,M]
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Full Idea:
Plato and Aristotle do not have a notion of a will, since for them a willing, a desire of reason, is a direct result of one's cognitive state: once one sees something to be good, one will it.
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From:
Michael Frede (A Free Will [1997], 09)
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A reaction:
The point is that their decisions are 'direct', whereas the will introduces the concept of a final arbiter which weighs up the desires, reasons and drives. The historical steps were first the meta-choosing, then the will as entity, then the will as free.
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22601
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Laissez-faire individualism doesn't work, especially in troublesome times [Keynes]
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Full Idea:
It is obvious that an individualist society left to itself does not work well or even tolerably. The more troublesome the times, the worse does a laissez-faire system work.
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From:
Maynard Keynes (The General Theory of Employment [1936]), quoted by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 7
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A reaction:
I thought I was a Communitarian, but I may be a Keynesian Liberal, committed to a safety net welfare system. I haven't quite decided yet. Political philosophy is hopeless, if the ideas actually have to be implemented. What is the criterion of 'work'?
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20713
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God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B]
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Full Idea:
Rachels argues 1) If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship, 2) No being could be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent, so 3) There cannot be a being who is God.
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From:
report of James Rachels (God and Human Attributes [1971], 7 p.334) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'd morality'
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A reaction:
Presumably Lionel Messi can be a fitting object of worship without being God. Since the problem is with being worshipful, rather than with being God, should I infer that Messi doesn't exist?
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