Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'God and Human Attributes', 'Rationality and Virtue' and 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
21757 Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is the supreme blossom - the concept - of the entire shape of history, the consciousness and the spiritual essence of the whole situation, the spirit of the age as the spirit present and aware of itself in thought.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the History of Philosophy [1830], p.25), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
     A reaction: This sees philosophy as intrinsically historical, which is a founding idea for 'continental' philosophy. Analysis is tied to science, in which the history of the subject is seen as irrelevant to its truth. Does this mean we can't go back to Aristotle?
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
22480 Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality [Foot]
     Full Idea: If justice is a virtue it must make action good by disposing its possessor to goodness in practical rationality; the latter consisting of the right recognition of reasons, and corresponding action.
     From: Philippa Foot (Rationality and Virtue [1994], p.174)
     A reaction: This somewhat inverts Aristotle, who says the possessing of good practical reason is the key to acquiring the virtues. Foot suggests that possessing the virtue promotes the practical rationality. Someone can be sensible without being virtuous.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
22477 Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot]
     Full Idea: No one thinks that calling a knife a good knife, a farmer a good farmer, a speech a good speech, a root a good root, necessarily expresses or even involves an attitude or feeling towards it.
     From: Philippa Foot (Rationality and Virtue [1994], p.163)
     A reaction: This is the Aristotelian idea (which I favour) that good derives from function. In such a case it seems obvious that it has nothing to do with expressing emotions.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
22478 The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts [Foot]
     Full Idea: The key notion is the concept of need, …as when we say what a plant or animal of a certain species needs to have, …and what its operative features, such roots, leaves, hearts and lungs, need to do.
     From: Philippa Foot (Rationality and Virtue [1994], p.164)
     A reaction: Good. That takes it away from the idea of a function, which could be possessed by an inanimate machine (even though that still entails success and failure). Strictly, we need oxygen, but the goodness resides in the lungs.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
22479 Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees [Foot]
     Full Idea: The teaching and observing of the rules of justice is as necessary a part of the life of human beings as hunting together in packs with a leader is a necessary part of the lives of wolves, or dancing part of the life of the dancing bee.
     From: Philippa Foot (Rationality and Virtue [1994], p.168)
     A reaction: So why are some men unjust? All wolves hunt, and all appropriate bees dance. A few men even thrive on injustice.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
20713 God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B]
     Full Idea: Rachels argues 1) If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship, 2) No being could be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent, so 3) There cannot be a being who is God.
     From: report of James Rachels (God and Human Attributes [1971], 7 p.334) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'd morality'
     A reaction: Presumably Lionel Messi can be a fitting object of worship without being God. Since the problem is with being worshipful, rather than with being God, should I infer that Messi doesn't exist?