15927
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Definition just needs negation, known variables, conjunction, disjunction, substitution and quantification [Weyl, by Lavine]
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Full Idea:
For mathematics, Weyl arrived (by 1917) at a satisfactory list of definition principles: negation, identification of variables, conjunction, disjunction, substitution of constants, and existential quantification over the domain.
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From:
report of Hermann Weyl (works [1917]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite V.3
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A reaction:
Lavine summarises this as 'first-order logic with parameters'.
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16984
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I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke]
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Full Idea:
I do not think of 'possible worlds' as providing a reductive analysis in any philosophically significant sense, that is, as uncovering the ultimate nature, from either an epistemological or a metaphysical view, of modal operators, propositions etc.
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From:
Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.19 n18)
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A reaction:
I think this remark opens the door for Kit Fine's approach, of showing what modality is by specifying its sources. Possible worlds model the behaviour of modal inferences.
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9385
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The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke]
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Full Idea:
If a speaker introduced a designator into a language by a ceremony, then in virtue of his very linguistic act, he would be in a position to say 'I know that Fa', but nevertheless 'Fa' would be a contingent truth (provided F is not an essential property).
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From:
Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.14)
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A reaction:
If someone else does the designation, I seem to have contingent knowledge that the ceremony has taken place. You needn't experience the object, but you must experience the ceremony, even if you perform it.
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16983
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Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke]
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Full Idea:
In studying probabilities with dice, we are introduced at a tender age to a set of 36 (miniature) possible worlds, if we (fictively) ignore everything except the two dice. …The possibilities are abstract states of the dice, not physical entities.
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From:
Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.16)
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A reaction:
Interesting for the introduction by the great man of the words 'fictional' and 'abstract' into the discussion. He says elsewhere that he takes worlds to be less than real, but more than mere technical devices.
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20713
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God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B]
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Full Idea:
Rachels argues 1) If any being is God, he must be a fitting object of worship, 2) No being could be a fitting object of worship, since worship requires the abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent, so 3) There cannot be a being who is God.
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From:
report of James Rachels (God and Human Attributes [1971], 7 p.334) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'd morality'
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A reaction:
Presumably Lionel Messi can be a fitting object of worship without being God. Since the problem is with being worshipful, rather than with being God, should I infer that Messi doesn't exist?
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