5 ideas
12583 | Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau] |
Full Idea: The truth condition of the belief is the 'normal' circumstances in which, given the learning process, it is biologically supposed to be present. | |
From: David Papineau (Reality and Representation [1987], p.67), quoted by Christopher Peacocke - A Study of Concepts 5.2 | |
A reaction: How do we account for a belief in ghosts in this story? The notion of 'normal' circumstances and what is 'biologically supposed' to happen don't seem very appropriate. This is the 'teleological' view of belief. |
8840 | There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve] |
Full Idea: Sceptics respond to the regress problem by denying knowledge; Foundationalists accept justifications without reasons; Positists say reasons terminate is mere posits; Coherentists say mutual support is justification; Infinitists accept the regress. | |
From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], I) | |
A reaction: A nice map of the territory. The doubts of Scepticism are not strong enough for anyone to embrace the view; Foundationalist destroy knowledge (?), as do Positists; Infinitism is a version of Coherentism - which is the winner. |
8841 | Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve] |
Full Idea: Contemporary foundationalists are seldom of the strong Cartesian variety: they do not insist that basic beliefs be absolutely certain. They also tend to allow that coherence can enhance justification. | |
From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], III) | |
A reaction: It strikes me that they have got onto a slippery slope. How certain are the basic beliefs? How do you evaluate their certainty? Could incoherence in their implications undermine them? Skyscrapers need perfect foundations. |
14790 | 'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The first starting of a hypothesis and the entertaining of it …is an inferential step which I propose to call 'abduction'. This will include a preference for any one hypothesis over others which would equally explain the facts. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Abduction and Induction [1901], I) | |
A reaction: I take there to be no more important function within human thought than the procedure by which we give preference to one particular explanation. It only makes sense, I think, if we take it as part of a coherence theory of justification. |
14791 | Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is of the nature of abduction to involve an original suggestion; while typical induction has no originality in it, but only tests a suggestion already made. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Abduction and Induction [1901], I) | |
A reaction: Peirce's 'abduction' is not, then, just the choice of a best explanation. He came up with the idea because he was keen to capture the creative and imaginative character of rational thought. |