Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Why coherence is not enough', 'External and Internal Relations' and 'Confessio naturae contra atheistas'

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4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
21342 A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil]
     Full Idea: Moore characterises internal relations modally, as those essential to their relata. If a and b are related R-wise, and R is an internal relation, a and b could not fail to be so related; otherwise R is external.
     From: report of G.E. Moore (External and Internal Relations [1919]) by John Heil - Relations 'Internal'
     A reaction: I don't think of Moore as an essentialist, but this fits the essentialist picture nicely, and is probably best paraphrased in terms of powers. Integers are the standard example of internal relations.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
12693 A body is that which exists in space [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: A body is defined as that which exists in space.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Confessio naturae contra atheistas [1669], A6.1.490), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
     A reaction: A very early view. Leibniz notes that this tells you nothing about shape and motion.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8840 There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve]
     Full Idea: Sceptics respond to the regress problem by denying knowledge; Foundationalists accept justifications without reasons; Positists say reasons terminate is mere posits; Coherentists say mutual support is justification; Infinitists accept the regress.
     From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], I)
     A reaction: A nice map of the territory. The doubts of Scepticism are not strong enough for anyone to embrace the view; Foundationalist destroy knowledge (?), as do Positists; Infinitism is a version of Coherentism - which is the winner.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
8841 Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve]
     Full Idea: Contemporary foundationalists are seldom of the strong Cartesian variety: they do not insist that basic beliefs be absolutely certain. They also tend to allow that coherence can enhance justification.
     From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], III)
     A reaction: It strikes me that they have got onto a slippery slope. How certain are the basic beliefs? How do you evaluate their certainty? Could incoherence in their implications undermine them? Skyscrapers need perfect foundations.