5 ideas
21558 | 'Predicative' norms are those which define a class [Russell] |
Full Idea: Norms (containing one variable) which do not define classes I propose to call 'non-predicative'; those which do define classes I shall call 'predicative'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Difficulties of Transfinite Numbers and Types [1905], p.141) |
21559 | We need rules for deciding which norms are predicative (unless none of them are) [Russell] |
Full Idea: We need rules for deciding what norms are predicative and what are not, unless we adopt the view (which has much to recommend it) that no norms are predicative. ...[146] A predative propositional function is one which determines a class. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Difficulties of Transfinite Numbers and Types [1905], p.141) | |
A reaction: He is referring to his 'no class' theory, which he favoured at that time. |
12708 | The soul is not a substance but a substantial form, the first active faculty [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The soul, properly and accurately speaking, is not a substance, but a substantial form, or the primitive form existing in substances, the first act, the first active faculty. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Fardella [1690], A6.4.1670), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2 | |
A reaction: In all of Leibniz's many gropings towards what is at the heart of a unified object, I pounce on the phrase "the first active faculty" as the one that suits me. I take that to be a 'power'. It has two characteristics - it is active, and it is basic. |
8840 | There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve] |
Full Idea: Sceptics respond to the regress problem by denying knowledge; Foundationalists accept justifications without reasons; Positists say reasons terminate is mere posits; Coherentists say mutual support is justification; Infinitists accept the regress. | |
From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], I) | |
A reaction: A nice map of the territory. The doubts of Scepticism are not strong enough for anyone to embrace the view; Foundationalist destroy knowledge (?), as do Positists; Infinitism is a version of Coherentism - which is the winner. |
8841 | Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve] |
Full Idea: Contemporary foundationalists are seldom of the strong Cartesian variety: they do not insist that basic beliefs be absolutely certain. They also tend to allow that coherence can enhance justification. | |
From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], III) | |
A reaction: It strikes me that they have got onto a slippery slope. How certain are the basic beliefs? How do you evaluate their certainty? Could incoherence in their implications undermine them? Skyscrapers need perfect foundations. |