Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Why coherence is not enough', 'Letters to Fardella' and 'Metaphysics'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff

16771	A composite is a true unity if all of its parts fall under one essence [Scheibler]
	Full Idea: A composite entity is a unum per se if the partial entities that are in it are contained under one common essence. …In water, all those parts are contained under one essence of water.
	From: Chistoph Scheibler (Metaphysics [1650], I.4.1 n9), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671
	A reaction: Water mixed with wine is said to be an 'ens per accidens'. This is an unusual but possible view, that all the water there is is a single thing, united by its compositional essence. When we talk about 'water', we include possible water, and past water.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic

12708	The soul is not a substance but a substantial form, the first active faculty [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The soul, properly and accurately speaking, is not a substance, but a substantial form, or the primitive form existing in substances, the first act, the first active faculty.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Fardella [1690], A6.4.1670), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2
	A reaction: In all of Leibniz's many gropings towards what is at the heart of a unified object, I pounce on the phrase "the first active faculty" as the one that suits me. I take that to be a 'power'. It has two characteristics - it is active, and it is basic.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma

8840	There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve]
	Full Idea: Sceptics respond to the regress problem by denying knowledge; Foundationalists accept justifications without reasons; Positists say reasons terminate is mere posits; Coherentists say mutual support is justification; Infinitists accept the regress.
	From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], I)
	A reaction: A nice map of the territory. The doubts of Scepticism are not strong enough for anyone to embrace the view; Foundationalist destroy knowledge (?), as do Positists; Infinitism is a version of Coherentism - which is the winner.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism

8841	Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve]
	Full Idea: Contemporary foundationalists are seldom of the strong Cartesian variety: they do not insist that basic beliefs be absolutely certain. They also tend to allow that coherence can enhance justification.
	From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], III)
	A reaction: It strikes me that they have got onto a slippery slope. How certain are the basic beliefs? How do you evaluate their certainty? Could incoherence in their implications undermine them? Skyscrapers need perfect foundations.