Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Why coherence is not enough', 'De primae philosophiae emendatione' and 'Against 'Ostrich Nominalism''

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6 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers (like Devitt) think of reality as made up of things. Others, like me, think of it as made up of facts or states of affairs.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3)
     A reaction: Devitt is a follower of Quine on this. Personally I rather like 'processes'. Unanalysed things with predication (Quine) don't look promising. I currently favour things with active powers, which give rise to properties. See Shoemaker and Ellis.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: I favour the Realist view that while we can distinguish the particularity of a particular from its properties, but the two 'factors' are too intimately together to speak of a relation between them.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3)
     A reaction: Is Armstrong being a bit of an ostrich here? We could talk of part-whole relationships, or internal relations, or set membership, or coinciding objects, or bundles. We certainly ought to have a go. Armstrong approaches Quine here!
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: A philosophical account of a general sort is required of what it is for different tokens to be of the same type. To refuse to give such an account is to be a metaphysical ostrich.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §1)
     A reaction: This defines Ostrich Nominalism (a label Armstrong aims at Quine). I certainly sympathise with Armstrong. If there is no more to a class (a type) than just having members (tokens), nothing is explain. What is natural, essential, intensional etc.?
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The concept of forces or powers best reveals the true concept of substance [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The concept of forces or powers ..for whose explanation I have set up a distinct science of dynamics, brings the strongest light to bear upon our understanding of the true concept of substance.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (De primae philosophiae emendatione [1694], G IV 469), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
     A reaction: My own experience was that as soon as I encountered the notion of a 'power' in the metaphysics of science (see Molnar on this) the whole thing began to form a coherent picture. Powers rule.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve]
     Full Idea: Sceptics respond to the regress problem by denying knowledge; Foundationalists accept justifications without reasons; Positists say reasons terminate is mere posits; Coherentists say mutual support is justification; Infinitists accept the regress.
     From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], I)
     A reaction: A nice map of the territory. The doubts of Scepticism are not strong enough for anyone to embrace the view; Foundationalist destroy knowledge (?), as do Positists; Infinitism is a version of Coherentism - which is the winner.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve]
     Full Idea: Contemporary foundationalists are seldom of the strong Cartesian variety: they do not insist that basic beliefs be absolutely certain. They also tend to allow that coherence can enhance justification.
     From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], III)
     A reaction: It strikes me that they have got onto a slippery slope. How certain are the basic beliefs? How do you evaluate their certainty? Could incoherence in their implications undermine them? Skyscrapers need perfect foundations.