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All the ideas for 'Why coherence is not enough', 'Sense and Sensibilia' and 'works'

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5 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness

21598	Austin revealed many meanings for 'vague': rough, ambiguous, general, incomplete... [Austin,JL, by Williamson]
	Full Idea: Austin's account brought out the variety of features covered by 'vague' in different contexts: roughness, ambiguity, imprecision, lack of detail, generality, inaccuracy, incompleteness. Even 'vague' is vague.
	From: report of J.L. Austin (Sense and Sensibilia [1962], p.125-8) by Timothy Williamson - Vagueness 3.1
	A reaction: Some of these sound the same. Maybe Austin distinguishes them.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma

8840	There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve]
	Full Idea: Sceptics respond to the regress problem by denying knowledge; Foundationalists accept justifications without reasons; Positists say reasons terminate is mere posits; Coherentists say mutual support is justification; Infinitists accept the regress.
	From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], I)
	A reaction: A nice map of the territory. The doubts of Scepticism are not strong enough for anyone to embrace the view; Foundationalist destroy knowledge (?), as do Positists; Infinitism is a version of Coherentism - which is the winner.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism

8841	Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve]
	Full Idea: Contemporary foundationalists are seldom of the strong Cartesian variety: they do not insist that basic beliefs be absolutely certain. They also tend to allow that coherence can enhance justification.
	From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], III)
	A reaction: It strikes me that they have got onto a slippery slope. How certain are the basic beliefs? How do you evaluate their certainty? Could incoherence in their implications undermine them? Skyscrapers need perfect foundations.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / d. Explaining people

7082	Nature requires causal explanations, but society requires clarification by reasons and motives [Weber, by Critchley]
	Full Idea: Weber coined the distinction between explanation and clarification, saying that natural phenomena require causal explanation, while social phenomena require clarification by giving reasons or offering possible motives for how things are.
	From: report of Max Weber (works [1905]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.7
	A reaction: This is music to the ears of property dualists and other non-reductivists, but if you go midway in the hierarchy of animals (a mouse, say) the distinction blurs. Weber probably hadn't digested Darwin, whose big impact came around 1905.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value

22155	We are disenchanted because we rely on science, which ignores values [Weber, by Boulter]
	Full Idea: Weber contends that modern western civilisation is 'disenchanted' because our society's method of arriving at beliefs about the world, that is, the sciences, is unable to address questions of value.
	From: report of Max Weber (works [1905]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 6
	A reaction: This idea, made explicit by Hume's empirical attitude to values, is obviously of major importance. For we Aristotelians values are a self-evident aspect of nature. Boulter says philosophy has added to the disenchantment. I agree.