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All the ideas for 'Why coherence is not enough', 'Philosophical Analysis' and 'A priori/A posteriori'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
13750 Analysis aims at the structure of facts, which are needed to give a rationale to analysis [Urmson, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Urmson explains the direction of analysis as 'towards a structure...more nearly similar to the structure of the fact', adding that this metaphysical picture is needed as a 'rationale of the practice of analysis'.
     From: report of J.O. Urmson (Philosophical Analysis [1956], p.24-5) by Jonathan Schaffer - On What Grounds What n30
     A reaction: In other words, only realists can be truly motivated to keep going with analysis. Merely analysing language-games is doable, but hardly exciting.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
3913 Maybe imagination is the source of a priori justification [Casullo]
     Full Idea: Some maintain that experiments in imagination are the source of a priori justification.
     From: Albert Casullo (A priori/A posteriori [1992], p.1)
     A reaction: What else could assessments of possibility and necessity be based on except imagination?
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8840 There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve]
     Full Idea: Sceptics respond to the regress problem by denying knowledge; Foundationalists accept justifications without reasons; Positists say reasons terminate is mere posits; Coherentists say mutual support is justification; Infinitists accept the regress.
     From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], I)
     A reaction: A nice map of the territory. The doubts of Scepticism are not strong enough for anyone to embrace the view; Foundationalist destroy knowledge (?), as do Positists; Infinitism is a version of Coherentism - which is the winner.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
8841 Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve]
     Full Idea: Contemporary foundationalists are seldom of the strong Cartesian variety: they do not insist that basic beliefs be absolutely certain. They also tend to allow that coherence can enhance justification.
     From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], III)
     A reaction: It strikes me that they have got onto a slippery slope. How certain are the basic beliefs? How do you evaluate their certainty? Could incoherence in their implications undermine them? Skyscrapers need perfect foundations.