8 ideas
| 3299 | In logic identity involves reflexivity (x=x), symmetry (if x=y, then y=x) and transitivity (if x=y and y=z, then x=z) [Baillie] |
| Full Idea: In logic identity is an equivalence relation, which involves reflexivity (x=x), symmetry (if x=y, then y=x), and transitivity (if x=y and y=z, then x=z). | |
| From: James Baillie (Problems in Personal Identity [1993], Intr p.4) |
| 8840 | There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve] |
| Full Idea: Sceptics respond to the regress problem by denying knowledge; Foundationalists accept justifications without reasons; Positists say reasons terminate is mere posits; Coherentists say mutual support is justification; Infinitists accept the regress. | |
| From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], I) | |
| A reaction: A nice map of the territory. The doubts of Scepticism are not strong enough for anyone to embrace the view; Foundationalist destroy knowledge (?), as do Positists; Infinitism is a version of Coherentism - which is the winner. |
| 8851 | Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: From the point of view of the coherentist, Agrippa's Dilemma fails because it presupposes a 'linear' conception of justifying inference. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §2) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Bonjour 1985 for this view] Since a belief may have several justifications, and one belief could justify a host of others, there certainly isn't a simple line of justifications. I agree with the coherentist picture here. |
| 8841 | Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve] |
| Full Idea: Contemporary foundationalists are seldom of the strong Cartesian variety: they do not insist that basic beliefs be absolutely certain. They also tend to allow that coherence can enhance justification. | |
| From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], III) | |
| A reaction: It strikes me that they have got onto a slippery slope. How certain are the basic beliefs? How do you evaluate their certainty? Could incoherence in their implications undermine them? Skyscrapers need perfect foundations. |
| 8849 | Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist. The justification-making factors for beliefs, basic and otherwise, are all open to view, and perhaps even actual objects of awareness. I am always in a position to know that I know. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §1) | |
| A reaction: This is a helpful if one is trying to draw a map of the debate. An externalist foundationalism would have to terminate in the external fact which was the object of knowledge (via some reliable channel), but that is the truth, not the justification. |
| 8853 | Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Basic judgements threaten to buy their immunity from error at the cost of being drained of descriptive content altogether. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §4) | |
| A reaction: This is probably the key objection to foundationalism. As you import sufficient content into basic experiences to enable them to actually justify a set of beliefs, you find you have imported all sorts of comparisons and classifications as well. |
| 8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: The fact that experiential contents cannot be other than they are, as far as sensory awareness goes, does not imply that we cannot misdescribe them, as in misreporting the number of speckles on a speckled hen (Chisholm's example). | |
| From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §4) | |
| A reaction: [Chisholm 1942 is cited] Such experiences couldn't be basic beliefs if there was a conflict between their intrinsic nature and the description I used in discussing them. |
| 8852 | In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: In the peculiar context of the skeptical challenge, it is easy to persuade oneself that externalism is not an option. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §3) | |
| A reaction: This is because externalism sees justification as largely non-conscious, but when faced with scepticism, the justifications need to be spelled out, and therefore internalised. So are sceptical discussions basic, or freakish anomalies? |