Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Why coherence is not enough', 'Oxford Commentary on Sentences' and 'Scientific Thought'

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8 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier

16614	Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens' [Duns Scotus]
	Full Idea: From matter and form comes one thing per se. This is not so for subject and accident. Matter and form are instrinsic causes of a composite being, but whiteness and a human being are not. Humans can exist without whiteness, so it is one thing per accidens.
	From: John Duns Scotus (Oxford Commentary on Sentences [1301], II.12.1.14), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671
	A reaction: This isn't much of a theory, but at least it is focusing on an interesting question, and the distinction between genuinely unified, and unified by chance. Compare a loving couple with siblings who hate each other.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism

14759	A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad]
	Full Idea: A thing is simply a long event, throughout the course of which there is either qualitative similarity or continuous qualitative change, together with a characteristic spatio-temporal unity.
	From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], 10 'Duration')
	A reaction: At least he is trying to give some sort of principle that links the stages of the event together.

11842	If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad]
	Full Idea: We call a lightning flash or a motor accident an event, but refuse to apply this to the cliffs of Dover. ...But quantitative differences (of time) give no good grounds for calling one bit of history an event, and refusing the name to another bit.
	From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], p.54), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 2.3 n13
	A reaction: Wiggins calls this proposal a 'terrible absurdity', but it seems to me to demand attention. There is a case to be made for a 'process' to be the fundamental category of our ontology, with stable physical objects seen in that light.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma

8840	There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve]
	Full Idea: Sceptics respond to the regress problem by denying knowledge; Foundationalists accept justifications without reasons; Positists say reasons terminate is mere posits; Coherentists say mutual support is justification; Infinitists accept the regress.
	From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], I)
	A reaction: A nice map of the territory. The doubts of Scepticism are not strong enough for anyone to embrace the view; Foundationalist destroy knowledge (?), as do Positists; Infinitism is a version of Coherentism - which is the winner.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism

8841	Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve]
	Full Idea: Contemporary foundationalists are seldom of the strong Cartesian variety: they do not insist that basic beliefs be absolutely certain. They also tend to allow that coherence can enhance justification.
	From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], III)
	A reaction: It strikes me that they have got onto a slippery slope. How certain are the basic beliefs? How do you evaluate their certainty? Could incoherence in their implications undermine them? Skyscrapers need perfect foundations.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block

8160	The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett]
	Full Idea: Not only the present but also the past exist, but the future (so long as it is the future) does not.
	From: report of C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923]) by Michael Dummett - Thought and Reality 1
	A reaction: This is quite appealing, and seems right if you believe that every truth has a truthmaker, and that there are no truths about the future. And yet the whole misery of people dying is that they cease to exist.

14609	We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad]
	Full Idea: One theory accepts the reality of the present and the past, but holds that the future is simply nothing at all. Nothing has happened to the present by becoming past except that fresh slices of existence have been added to the total history of the world.
	From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II)
	A reaction: This is now known as Broad's 'Growing Block' view of time. It is tempting to say that neither past nor future exist, but it seems undeniable that statements about the past can be wholly true, unlike those about the future.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series

22933	We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad]
	Full Idea: We imagine presentness moving, like the spot of light from a policeman's bulls eye traversing the fronts of houses in a street. What is illuminated is present, what was illuminated is past, and what is not yet illuminated is the future.
	From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II)
	A reaction: This is the 'moving spotlight' compromise theory, which retains the B-series eternal sequence of ordered events, but adds the A-series privileged present moment. Le Poidevin says Broad represents time twice over.