11 ideas
17596 | Coherence problems have positive and negative restraints; solutions maximise constraint satisfaction [Thagard] |
Full Idea: A coherence problem is a set of elements connected by positive and negative restraints, and a solution consists of partitioning the elements into two sets (accepted and rejected) in a way that maximises satisfaction of the constraints. | |
From: Paul Thagard (Coherence: The Price is Right [2012], p.42) | |
A reaction: I'm enthusiastic about this, as it begins to clarify the central activity of epistemology, which is the quest for best explanations. |
17597 | Coherence is explanatory, deductive, conceptual, analogical, perceptual, and deliberative [Thagard] |
Full Idea: I propose that there are six main kinds of coherence: explanatory, deductive, conceptual, analogical, perceptual, and deliberative. ...Epistemic coherence is a combination of the first five kinds, and ethics adds the sixth. | |
From: Paul Thagard (Coherence: The Price is Right [2012], p.43) | |
A reaction: Wonderful. Someone is getting to grips with the concept of coherence, instead of just whingeing about how vague it is. |
17598 | Explanatory coherence needs symmetry,explanation,analogy,data priority, contradiction,competition,acceptance [Thagard] |
Full Idea: Informally, a theory of explanatory coherence has the principles of symmetry, explanation, analogy, data priority, contradiction, competition and acceptance. | |
From: Paul Thagard (Coherence: The Price is Right [2012], p.44) | |
A reaction: [Thagard give a concise summary of his theory here] Again Thagard makes a wonderful contribution in an area where most thinkers are pessimistic about making any progress. His principles are very plausible. |
17602 | Verisimilitude comes from including more phenomena, and revealing what underlies [Thagard] |
Full Idea: A scientific theory is progressively approximating the truth if it increases its explanatory coherence by broadening to more phenomena and deepening by investigating layers of mechanisms. | |
From: Paul Thagard (Coherence: The Price is Right [2012], p.46) |
19053 | Logic would be more natural if negation only referred to predicates [Dummett] |
Full Idea: A better proposal for a formal logic closer to natural language would be one that had a negation-operator only for (simple) predicates. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Presupposition [1960], p.27) | |
A reaction: Dummett observes that classical formal logic was never intended to be close to natural language. Term logic does have that aim, but the meta-question is whether that end is desirable, and why. |
19052 | Natural language 'not' doesn't apply to sentences [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Natural language does not possess a sentential negation-operator. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Presupposition [1960], p.27) | |
A reaction: This is a criticism of Strawson, who criticises logic for not following natural language, but does it himself with negation. In the question of how language and logic connect, this idea seems important. Term Logic aims to get closer to natural language. |
8840 | There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve] |
Full Idea: Sceptics respond to the regress problem by denying knowledge; Foundationalists accept justifications without reasons; Positists say reasons terminate is mere posits; Coherentists say mutual support is justification; Infinitists accept the regress. | |
From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], I) | |
A reaction: A nice map of the territory. The doubts of Scepticism are not strong enough for anyone to embrace the view; Foundationalist destroy knowledge (?), as do Positists; Infinitism is a version of Coherentism - which is the winner. |
8841 | Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve] |
Full Idea: Contemporary foundationalists are seldom of the strong Cartesian variety: they do not insist that basic beliefs be absolutely certain. They also tend to allow that coherence can enhance justification. | |
From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], III) | |
A reaction: It strikes me that they have got onto a slippery slope. How certain are the basic beliefs? How do you evaluate their certainty? Could incoherence in their implications undermine them? Skyscrapers need perfect foundations. |
17601 | Neither a priori rationalism nor sense data empiricism account for scientific knowledge [Thagard] |
Full Idea: Both rationalists (who start with a priori truths and make deductions) and empiricists (starting with indubitable sense data and what follows) would guarantee truth, but neither even begins to account for scientific knowledge. | |
From: Paul Thagard (Coherence: The Price is Right [2012], p.46) | |
A reaction: Thagard's answer, and mine, is inference to the best explanation, but goes beyond both the a priori truths and the perceptions. |
17600 | Bayesian inference is forced to rely on approximations [Thagard] |
Full Idea: It is well known that the general problem with Bayesian inference is that it is computationally intractable, so the algorithms used for computing posterior probabilities have to be approximations. | |
From: Paul Thagard (Coherence: The Price is Right [2012], p.45) | |
A reaction: Thagard makes this sound devastating, but then concedes that all theories have to rely on approximations, so I haven't quite grasped this idea. He gives references. |
17599 | The best theory has the highest subjective (Bayesian) probability? [Thagard] |
Full Idea: On the Bayesian view, the best theory is the one with the highest subjective probability, given the evidence as calculated by Bayes's theorem. | |
From: Paul Thagard (Coherence: The Price is Right [2012], p.45) |