17 ideas
18935 | Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer] |
Full Idea: A semantic theory of names should deliver a specification of the conditions under which a name names an individual, and hence a specification of the conditions under which a name is empty. | |
From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: Naming can be private, like naming my car 'Bertrand', but never tell anyone. I like Plato's remark that names are 'tools'. Do we specify conditions for successful spanner-usage? The first step must be individuation, preparatory to naming. |
18945 | Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer] |
Full Idea: The Millian view of direct reference says that the meaning of a name is the object named. | |
From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 4) | |
A reaction: Any theory that says meaning somehow is features of the physical world strikes me as totally misguided. Napoleon is a man, so he can't be part of a sentence. He delegates that job to words (such as 'Napoleon'). |
18934 | Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer] |
Full Idea: Some empty names sentences can be understood, so appear to be meaningful ('Pegasus was sired by Poseidon'), ...some appear to be co-referential ('Santa Claus'/'Father Christmas'), and some appear to be straightforwardly true ('Pegasus doesn't exist'). | |
From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: Hang on to this, when the logicians arrive and start telling you that your talk of empty names is vacuous, because there is no object in the 'domain' to which a predicate can be attached. Meaning, reference and truth are the issues around empty names. |
18938 | Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer] |
Full Idea: In Frege's account sentences such as 'Pegasus does not exist' will be neither true nor false, since the truth-value of a sentence is its referent, and the referent of a complex expression is determined by the referent of its parts. | |
From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: We can keep the idea of 'sense', which is very useful for dealing with empty names, but tweak his account of truth-values to evade this problem. I'm thinking that meaning is compositional, but truth-value isn't. |
18947 | Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer] |
Full Idea: If it were possible for a definite description to be empty - not in the sense of there being no object that satisfies it, but of there being no set of properties it refers to - the problem of empty names would not have been solved. | |
From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 5) | |
A reaction: Swoyer is thinking of properties like 'is a unicorn', which are clearly just as vulnerable to being empty as 'the unicorn' was. It seems unlikely that 'horse', 'white' and 'horn' would be empty. |
22180 | Multiple realisability is said to make reduction impossible [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Philosophers have often invoked multiple realisability to explain why psychology cannot be reduced to physics or chemistry, but in principle the explanation works for any higher-level science. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 3) | |
A reaction: He gives the example of a 'cell' in biology, which can be implemented in all sorts of ways. Presumably that can be reduced to many sorts of physics, but not just to one sort. The high level contains patterns that vanish at the low level. |
8840 | There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve] |
Full Idea: Sceptics respond to the regress problem by denying knowledge; Foundationalists accept justifications without reasons; Positists say reasons terminate is mere posits; Coherentists say mutual support is justification; Infinitists accept the regress. | |
From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], I) | |
A reaction: A nice map of the territory. The doubts of Scepticism are not strong enough for anyone to embrace the view; Foundationalist destroy knowledge (?), as do Positists; Infinitism is a version of Coherentism - which is the winner. |
8841 | Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve] |
Full Idea: Contemporary foundationalists are seldom of the strong Cartesian variety: they do not insist that basic beliefs be absolutely certain. They also tend to allow that coherence can enhance justification. | |
From: James Van Cleve (Why coherence is not enough [2005], III) | |
A reaction: It strikes me that they have got onto a slippery slope. How certain are the basic beliefs? How do you evaluate their certainty? Could incoherence in their implications undermine them? Skyscrapers need perfect foundations. |
22172 | Not all sciences are experimental; astronomy relies on careful observation [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Not all sciences are experimental - astronomers obviously cannot do experiments on the heavens, but have to content themselves with careful observation instead. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 1) | |
A reaction: Biology too. Psychology tries hard to be experimental, but I doubt whether the main theories emerge from experiments. |
22177 | Randomised Control Trials have a treatment and a control group, chosen at random [Okasha] |
Full Idea: In the Randomised Controlled Trial for a new drug, patients are divided at random into a treatment group who receive the drug, and a control group who do not. Randomisation is important to eliminate confounding factors. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Devised in the 1930s, and a major breakthrough in methodology for that kind of trial. Psychologists use the method all the time. Some theorists say it is the only reliable method. |
22174 | The discoverers of Neptune didn't change their theory because of an anomaly [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Adams and Leverrier began with Newton's theory of gravity, which made an incorrect prediction about the orbit of Uranus. They explained away the conflicting observations by postulating a new planet, Neptune. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 1) | |
A reaction: The falsificationists can say that the anomalous observation did not falsify the theory, because they didn't know quite what they were observing. It was not in fact an anomaly for Newtonian theory at all. |
22175 | Science mostly aims at confirming theories, rather than falsifying them [Okasha] |
Full Idea: The goal of science is not solely to refute theories, but also to determine which theories are true (or probably true). When a scientist collects data …they are trying to show that their own theory is true. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: This is the aim of 'accommodation' to a wide set of data, rather than prediction or refutation. |
22182 | Theories with unobservables are underdetermined by the evidence [Okasha] |
Full Idea: According to anti-realists, scientific theories which posit unobservable entities are underdetermined by the empirical data - there will always be a number of competing theories which can account for the data equally well. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 4) | |
A reaction: The fancy version is Putnam's model theoretic argument, explored by Tim Button. The reply, apparently, is that there are other criteria for theory choice, apart from the data. And we don't have to actually observe everything in a theory. |
22185 | Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha] |
Full Idea: If two things are incommensurable they cannot be incompatible. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 5) | |
A reaction: Kuhn had claimed that two rival theories are incompatible, which forces the paradigm shift. He can't stop the slide off into total relativism. The point is there cannot be a conflict if there cannot even be a comparison. |
22176 | Induction is inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers use 'inductive' to just mean not deductive, …but we reserve it for inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: The instances must at least be comparable. Must you know the kind before you start? Surely you can examine a sequence of things, trying to decide whether or not they are of one kind? Is checking the uniformity of a kind induction? |
22178 | If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional [Okasha] |
Full Idea: If the only objective constraints concern how we should change our credences, but what our initial credences should be is entirely subjective, then individuals with very bizarre opinions about the world will count as perfectly rational. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: The important rationality has to be the assessement of a diverse batch of evidence, for which there can never be any rules or mathematics. |
22173 | Galileo refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier objects fall faster [Okasha] |
Full Idea: Galileo's most enduring contribution lay in mechanics, where he refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier bodies fall faster than lighter. | |
From: Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2) | |
A reaction: This must the first idea in the theory of mechanics, allowing mathematical treatment and accurate comparisons. |